# Russia Cooperation CP – BEJJ

This CP has two versions, one that functions to fiat in offense, the other to pair with NATO Bad.

The basic version argues that security cooperation is the necessary and core foundation for all NATO operations and that ending security cooperation with NATO would break the alliance (while being incompatible with the plan). The goal is to let the neg force a NATO good/bad debate against affirmatives that’ have explicitly said they solve NATO cohesion/NATO good impacts, and/or to provide uniqueness for NATO bad impact turns.

The second version includes a negotiation with Russia, including ending American security cooperation with NATO---the goal being to give the Neg a Russia Relations DA, with the CP generating Uniqueness. The security cooperation freeze helps with ‘Russia says yes’ and also answering perm do both (sends mixed signals, doesn’t appear genuine, etc.).

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# 1NC

### CP---1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should [cease/end] its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

#### Security cooperation’s the necessary foundation for alliance operations---the CP breaks the alliance.

Teichert ’22 [E. John; 3/24/22; Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs; "The Hard Power of Security Cooperation," https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-hard-power-of-security-cooperation/]

America’s strategic leaders are quick to use the phrase “allies and partners” in today’s dynamic global security environment. They describe it as a unique American advantage, the nation’s most significant strategic asset, and the core of strategic competition and integrated deterrence. Sometimes, though, it is difficult to understand how such soft-power concepts translate into actual hard-power. With all eyes today focused on the strength of European partnerships, air-force activity over NATO’s eastern flank provides a powerful example of this concept. It is the result of a firm foundation constructed through intentional long-term relationship-building and security cooperation activities.

International relationship-building among allies and partners is more than a soft-power activity. Yes, these activities build collegiality, credibility, and trust. But they also facilitate the hard power of combat effectiveness by fostering interoperability, building a portfolio of complementary weapons systems, and demonstrating success in combined operations through training and exercises. International activity that thoughtfully and intentionally develops, equips, educates, trains, exercises, and integrates forces ultimately provides the fertile ground that knits together allies and partners who are able to reliably and effectively operate together. Doing so facilitates deterrent and operational objectives. The allied air-force response to Russian aggression in Ukraine has powerfully demonstrated these important truths.

Allied Air Response to Russian Aggression

On March 10, 2022, Gen. Jeff Harrigian, commander of NATO Allied Air Command and United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, hosted the NATO Air Chiefs’ Symposium in Germany. This was not a meeting called in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead, it is a regular and established meeting held semi-annually for over 40 years that happened to fall at a particularly meaningful time for NATO and the pending rollout of two major U.S. strategy documents. The symposium brought together air chiefs or their national senior representatives from 31 countries, most of them in person. While the collegial atmosphere of friendly partnerships in the room at Ramstein Air Base was evident to all of us who were involved, the meeting was characterized by the potency of hard-power that had been fostered by those long-standing relationships. It was a meaningful manifestation of soft-power translated into combat effectiveness, cemented by a common cause, and punctuated by a poignant video teleconference with Lt. Gen. Mykola Oleschuk, the commander of the Ukrainian air force.

The rapid ability of NATO’s Allied Air Command to establish defense and deterrence as the result of the Russian aggression in Ukraine has been staggering. All along NATO’s eastern flank, advanced aircraft perform around-the-clock air policing, homeland defense, and enhanced vigilance. The air tasking order includes a slew of combat capabilities carefully woven together. For the last four weeks, these forces have collectively demonstrated stunning flexibility, integration, responsiveness, and effectiveness in ways that strategic competitors could only dream of. It has been allies and partners in action at a critical moment. None of this happened by accident, and it didn’t come out of nowhere. American senior leaders and security cooperation professionals have deliberately developed strong relationships with allies and partners over time, thereby providing a solid foundation for integrated deterrence and strategic competition. While these efforts have been largely effective, some security cooperation policies and processes continue to hinder successes.

Air and Space Interoperability

For years, senior leaders and security cooperation professionals have carefully crafted strong relationships, superb interoperability, and shared capabilities. These efforts have created a large fleet of common fighter aircraft — like F-16s, F-18s, and F-35s — that seamlessly patrol the skies over NATO allies alongside their Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, and even MiG counterparts. These fighter aircraft also fly alongside American bombers as a part of bomber task forces. MQ-9s gather imagery and data alongside NATO RQ-4s. E-3s and E-7s from multiple nations provide shared surveillance and command-and-control while C-130s, A400s, and C-17s execute airlift. KC-135 aircrew establish refueling tracks alongside their A330 partners. Nonetheless, security cooperation activities that equip ally and partner air forces are only part of this success.

Close collaboration fosters trust and understanding that is essential to enduring and effective partnerships. These air chiefs grew up together. They were educated together. They have researched, developed, tested, and evaluated capabilities together. They have created tactics together, deployed together, and fought together. They regularly engage with one another, and — recognizing the value of these interactions — insist that members of their air forces do the same through combined exercises, training, and exchanges. Furthermore, these air chiefs have created integrated command-and-control structures, interwoven networks, established common data links, operationalized a mission partner environment, and shared intelligence. Finally, they have enjoyed consistency through the long-term benefits of the State Partnership Program, and have employed a wide range of security cooperation tools to meet their common objectives. Today, their bonds of trust are fortified by a shared threat and their unified response to it.

This manifestation of hard-power is not only related to the skies. Many of these air chiefs control large portions of their national space capabilities while some are dual-hatted as space chiefs. Collectively, they enjoy shared space situational awareness and other space-based data agreements; collaborative launch and payloads; and complementary satellite communication, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Recognizing the challenges of a contested space environment that is a warfighting domain, they understand the urgency of space control. They also realize they are interwoven into joint forces that span all domains and are part of whole-of-government strategies. It is hard-power on display.

Soft Power Translated to Combat Effectiveness

While the hard-power example of allied air and space force activity on NATO’s eastern flank during the last month has been striking, the principles are generalizable and translatable to other theaters and other situations. For decades, American senior leaders and security cooperation professionals have carefully crafted strong relationships among allies and partners around the world that provide the necessary foundation for a strategy of integrated deterrence in an environment of strategic competition. They have created common or interoperable fleets of aircraft that can fly together and fight together. These weapons systems are operated through integrated command-and-control systems and with shared data-link architectures. Their effectiveness has been shaped through common education, refined through combined training, and proven through robust exercises. Ally and partner relationships are not simply a flaccid display of soft power, nor are they a federalized force that operates separately in the same general areas of responsibility. They are actually an operationally effective, integrated force. Yet, some security cooperation processes continue to hinder progress and harm effectiveness.

Barriers to Further Progress

There is still much work to be done to overcome security cooperation obstacles and properly create a force that is fully ready for strategic competition and ideally postured for integrated deterrence. First, onerous security barriers hinder progress in interoperability and integration, creating operational risk to avoid minor technical risk. When making exportability rulings, decision-makers too heavily and strictly consider security risk or concerns about technological exploitation, preventing the export of U.S. weapons systems without a proper consideration for the operational necessity of offering that capability to allies and partners in order to share burdens and develop interoperability. As a result, in the name of maintaining a unilateral technological advantage, bureaucrats pass on operational risk to combatant commanders and warfighters who expect to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with fully-capable allies and partners. Second, exportability of combat-relevant systems remains an afterthought of the acquisition process. Though American policy directs that new systems be designed for exportability, waivers to this policy are liberally applied and commonplace. Finally, slow security cooperation processes often deliver certain systems late-to-need, in part because of plodding security-focused decision-making mechanisms that are a part of exportability rulings. Delayed delivery schedules create a competitive disadvantage as compared to strategic rivals while frustrating the allies and partners that the United States will rely upon in the next conflict. In the end, some Defense Department and interagency policies and processes continue to zealously guard capabilities while hindering interoperability and harming operational effectiveness. American leaders and security cooperation professionals need to systematically eliminate these remaining obstacles to properly meet integrated deterrence objectives.

### CP---Russia---1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the Russian Federation, including committing to cease U.S. participation in NATO initiatives.

#### Negotiating a grand bargain is the only path to a sustainable European security theater---it spills over to concessions on arms control, Ukraine, AND Russian withdrawal from breakaway regions.

McFaul ’22 [Michael; February 11; Professor of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University; Foreign Affairs, “How to Make a Deal with Putin,” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-02-11/how-make-deal-putin>]

If Putin does agree to negotiate, then Biden and his team should not just offer defensively minimal concessions to freeze the crisis. Instead, in concert with allies and partners, Biden should seize the diplomatic offensive and counter with a comprehensive, grand bargain for enhancing European security. Call it “Helsinki 2.0.” This agreement could refresh and modernize the Helsinki Accords signed during the Cold War, which stabilized the continent even as U.S.-Soviet competition grew in other parts of the world. It could resuscitate and amend defunct arms control agreements and provide a bigger framework for European security, and in the process help solve the issues surrounding Ukraine.

Convening a major summit to renegotiate European security will give Russia an international platform that Putin does not deserve. But that symbolism shouldn’t stop Biden, NATO leaders, and other European democracies. The Helsinki Accords recognized the Soviet Union as a superpower, and that affirmation helped persuade Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to make concessions. Putin also likes attention, and the West should be prepared to offer cheap pageantry not only to prevent a new Russian invasion into Ukraine but also to repair Europe’s broken security architecture. The United States and Europe must have the courage to move beyond defensive patchwork fixes and instead pivot to bold, aggressive initiatives to make the continent safer.

Bit by Bit

On the surface, the 1970s were not an auspicious time for Soviet-U.S. compromise. Many observers believed the Kremlin’s power was rising and Washington’s was falling. Communists were taking power in parts of southeast Asia and southern Africa. Tension between the world’s main blocs was running high.

But in the middle of the decade, Canadian, Soviet, U.S., and European diplomats set aside their broad and fundamental disagreements to discuss an issue of shared concern: European security. After several years of negotiations, they produced and signed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which codified ambiguous issues left over from World War II. At the heart of the accords was a central compromise: Western states de facto recognized the borders that resulted from Soviet conquests after World War II, and in return, the Soviet Union agreed to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or beliefs, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) tasked with implementing these obligations. The Soviet Union and the West also tacitly agreed to disagree on the precise definitions of government accountability, human rights, economic rights, and non-intervention in internal affairs. Ambiguity, they showed, is sometimes necessary for effective diplomacy.

In the first two decades after the accords were signed, Europe saw an explosion of new security agreements and treaties, particularly after Soviet reformer Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. In 1987, he joined U.S. President Ronald Reagan to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating a whole class of highly destabilizing weapons. In 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty came online, substantially reducing the size of conventional forces deployed on the continent. The 1990 Vienna Document, signed by Canada, the Soviet Union, the United States, and most of Europe and Central Asia, expanded transparency about weapons and military training exercises.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia and the West continued to make deals that helped keep Europe secure. The 1992 Open Skies Treaty, which followed the Vienna Document, allowed signatories to fly reconnaissance missions through one another’s territories to collect information on military activities. The ambitious 1990 Charter of Paris trumpeted that all European signatories would “build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.” It declared prematurely that “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.” The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine sent Kyiv’s nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for promises that Moscow, the United Kingdom, and the United States would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act established mechanisms for the two parties to collaborate, marking a high point in cooperation.

But during the following decade, ties between the two sides deteriorated. [Putin](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2020-06-09/pinning-down-putin#author-info) came to power in 2000, and he grew progressively more disappointed with the West as NATO further expanded in 2004; as Washington started a war in Iraq; and after the so-called color revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. The West, meanwhile, grew disenchanted with Moscow after Russia launched the second [Chechen](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2000-03-01/russias-ruinous-chechen-war) war; grew more autocratic; invaded Georgia and recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries in 2008; annexed Crimea in 2014; and then supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, leading to ongoing war and thousands of deaths.

European security agreements from the previous two decades began to break down. Russia stopped implementing the CFE Treaty in 2007. Putin then violated virtually every European and international security agreement his Kremlin predecessors signed. The United States stopped meeting its CFE obligations in 2011, and under former President Donald Trump, pulled out of the INF and Open Skies treaties, as well. The Vienna Documents today do little to enhance transparency, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—the successor to the CSCE—has become feckless in large measure because Moscow objects to its efforts to monitor [elections](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-03-16/putins-past-explains-russias-future) and protect human rights.

Getting to Yes

After decades of division, it will be difficult—and maybe impossible—for Russia and the West to strike any security deals on Europe. They have little faith in each other and plenty of reasons for suspicion. But given the stakes, the world must [try](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-06-14/how-biden-should-deal-putin). If Putin signals a commitment to negotiate, Biden and his European partners should go big. After all, Europe’s security architecture needs genuine repair and creative renewal.

They should start with steps toward revamping transparency, which will allow each country to keep tabs on the other’s activities and better predict each other’s actions. Right now, Russia, the United States, and Europe have less information about the deployment of rival soldiers and weapons than at any time since the end of the Cold War. A new grand bargain on European security could commit all signatories to more frequent monitoring of troop deployments, weapons deployments, and military exercises. The United States and Russia have learned how to successfully implement an obtrusive inspections regime from the New START Treaty, which limits the number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles each country can deploy. New START is one of the few U.S.-Russian deals that still operates, and a broader agreement could share the treaty’s obligations to short-notice inspections and close probing of weapon systems. Helsinki 2.0 could allow Russian inspectors to visit the sites of U.S. missile defenses in Poland and Romania, and NATO monitors could have similar access to Russia’s Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.

Moscow and Washington could further bolster transparency by rejoining, amending, and modernizing previously effective agreements, such as the Open Skies Treaty and CFE. To avoid dangerous miscalculations, both states must also work to revive the Vienna Documents. That means Russia and every NATO country should offer specified notifications about training and impose new limits on the scale and locations of exercises, especially because exercise preparations can appear very similar to planning for an actual attack.

Diplomats should also dust off, modernize, and implement old ideas that never came to fruition. Russia and the United States failed to implement a 2000 memorandum of agreement on sharing data about missile launches, known as the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), because of technicalities and mounting hostilities in U.S.-Russian relations. But an initiative of its kind between Moscow and NATO or among all OSCE members would enhance all of Europe’s security (including Russia’s) and could have better odds of succeeding.

Transparency, of course, is just one aspect of arms control. After Russia and the West agree to open their systems for inspections, diplomats will need to turn to the issue of control itself. They should begin by addressing the most destabilizing forces: the troops and weapons stationed on or near the Russian border. On a reciprocal and verifiable basis, all sides should pull these back, beginning with the massive Russian army mobilized around Ukraine today. They should also pull back their rockets. This may seem like a hard ask of Moscow, but Putin has already proposed that signatories not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas where they can reach other signatories. Russian commentary has emphasized keeping all such weapons out of Ukraine. Their demand is reasonable as long as Moscow places similar restraints on short-range rockets that can hit Kyiv, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius, or Warsaw.

The Biden Administration could also propose some limits on missile defenses in Europe. Washington could agree to refrain from deploying defense systems on the continent with capabilities against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles in return for limits on Russian missile defenses in the European theater. This may sound like a big U.S. concession, but it’s not. The U.S. interceptors that are currently deployed (SM3s) have no capability against Russian strategic weapons. The smartest place for interceptors that can defend the U.S. homeland against Russian or North Korean weapons (the Ground-Based Interceptor, or GBI) is Alaska, which is where they are mostly already located.

To better safeguard the United States and Europe from quick, devastating attacks, negotiators also must try to reduce the overall number of missiles—especially nuclear missiles. Ideally, both Russia and the United States would rejoin and credibly implement the INF treaty. To do so, Russia would have to agree to include its 9M729 missile in the agreement. If a complete ban on intermediate-range ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe proves impossible, negotiators could at least prohibit these kinds of rockets from being armed with nuclear warheads. Although this would be difficult to verify, negotiators should also try to restrict or ban the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (including Russian territory west of the Ural Mountains).

Diplomats also must attempt to reduce the amount of conventional weaponry on the continent, going beyond either the original or adapted CFE treaties. If new limits on conventional weapons prove impossible, negotiators could consider more modest regional limits, such as in the Baltic or Black Sea regions. They should try to place limits in Europe on cluster bombs and cyberweapons, which can target civilians and critical infrastructure.

Finally, Western diplomats must insist again that Putin obtain permission before placing troops in other countries, which would keep Russia in line with agreements signed by its previous leaders. Putin will dispute who the legitimate host nation is in Crimea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. But he might be persuaded to relinquish Russian claims of consent in certain breakaway regions, such as Transnistria in Moldova and Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, if in return, NATO allies could drop a demand from the CFE treaty that placed constraints on Russian troop movements between different regions—or “flanks”—of Russia. (Of course, this new provision would not mean greenlighting buildups on the borders of other countries.) Such a deal is unlikely, but Western diplomats must affirm the principle of host nation consent.

#### US-Russian cooperation solves extinction.

Dobczansky ’22 [Markian; 04/05/22; Ph.D in Russian/Soviet history from Stanford University, held fellowships at the University of Toronto and Columbia University; "Why Russia and America Need Each Other," Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-russia-and-america-need-each-other> //smarx, AZG]

"The main message I have today is that we need to awaken to the importance of the relationship between Russia and the United States; we should not leave it on auto-pilot indefinitely," said Dmitri Trenin, senior associate and deputy director, Carnegie Moscow Center, at a 2 February 2007 seminar at the Kennan Institute. Trenin recounted the current problems in the relationship, arguing that both sides have unrealistic expectations of one another. In his view, the U.S.-Russian relationship is of crucial importance, and he described ways in which relations could be improved.

"At the beginning of this year, the talk in both capitals is rather downbeat," Trenin said, adding, "I think people agree more or less that we have never had a relationship that was at such a low level as today since 1991." Trenin said that this is true in spite of what he sees as a great deal of shared interests between the two countries.

According to Trenin, the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations is viewed in starkly different terms in Washington and in Moscow. "If you put your ear to the ground in Washington, it's all because of Putin's authoritarianism at home, and increasing assertiveness abroad," Trenin said. He added that Washington views Russia's increased strength as a direct result of its large exports of oil and natural gas, and for this reason Russia's resurgence is seen as both undeserved and fragile.

"If you listen in Moscow, you get a very different story," Trenin observed. Prevailing opinion in Moscow regards the heightened tension between the United States and Russia as a natural consequence of Russia's increased strength. Russia's leadership believes that tensions inevitably arise when one power gains strength rapidly while another country's power diminishes, Trenin stated.

Both of these views are wrong, Trenin believes. "Despite what some people in Russia hope, the United States is not a declining power, Iraq notwithstanding," he stated. "As the world's most important nation, it will be around for a long time." On the other hand, he continued, Russia is more important than most Americans realize. "Despite what a number of people in the U.S. have concluded, Russia is not so much in decline; it is rather in the process of reformatting itself, emerging as a totally different economy and a totally different society than the Soviet one," Trenin said.

The steady deterioration of relations is threatening to jeopardize future Russian-American partnership and cooperation, Trenin warned: "The U.S. and Russia may be straying into the territory of direct material damage to their existing interests." He noted that this situation is not likely to change until the respective American and Russian presidential elections in 2008. Both of the new presidents will probably be untested statesmen, and thus an opportunity for reinventing the relationship will arise.

In spite of these disagreements, Trenin emphasized that Russia and the United States need one another and that cooperation between the two countries is essential. On a wide range of issues, U.S. and Russian interests coincide, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, managing the rise of China, dealing with the difficult situation in the Middle East, and resolving "frozen conflicts." In addition, Russia needs American assistance to modernize and integrate its economy into the global market, and to gain access to American markets, he said. The United States needs Russia's cooperation in the fight against terrorism, he said. Positive relations between the two countries would lead to a more stable world, and would enhance both countries' security.

In connection with this, Trenin believes that a new global institution needs to be formed to maintain stability and security. This organization would be similar to the G-8, in that it would provide a forum for the discussion of major problems confronting the world, he said, but would be more inclusive than the G-8, because it would not require a country to be "democratic." The group could include all the G-8 members, as well as China, India, and Brazil. Russia wants to be given a seat at the table where decisions are made, Trenin stressed, and such an organization could be one way to accomplish this goal.

# Collapse

## Solvency

### Solvency---2NC

#### The CP pushes NATO past the brink---allies are reassessing our commitment now and expecting increased security cooperation.

Cooper ’21 [Ryan; 9/3/21; nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, senior director of Guard Hill House; "American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/american-security-cooperation-needs-an-integrity-check/]

Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the US military, the term “integrity check” refers to a concern about an individual’s or unit’s capability or trustworthiness. Following the debacle in Kabul, the United States and its global security cooperation posture is in dire need of one.

Just look at the anger expressed by stalwart NATO allies such as the United Kingdom, which in the aftermath of 9/11 unquestionably joined in to invoke the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for collective self-defense (the first time the Alliance ever did so). That NATO launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and began a far-reaching transformation of capabilities signaled its trust in the United States’ reliability when it came to security cooperation.

Now, treaty allies and partner nations are reassessing their bilateral security relationships with the United States. It’s not just the NATO states caught off-guard by the haphazard departure from Afghanistan that will think twice before embarking upon future military campaigns with the United States. Resolute defense partners in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—likely also need overt reassurance, such as a clear national-security strategy and declared recommitments.

Additionally, these partners are increasingly feeling the need to proactively raise their own defense capabilities by boosting their budgets or coordinating with allies to ensure regional security along with the United States.

Besides stress-testing the integrity of American security cooperation, the Afghanistan withdrawal also highlights the necessity of staying the course on long-term investment in mutually beneficial security partnerships with countries with which the United States has shared interests—or shared threats. Well before the fall of Afghanistan, foreign partners were already questioning the reliability of the United States at a time when the debate in Washington about our global posture was becoming increasingly politicized.

The case for partnering with the United States needs to be clearly articulated through the presence, performance, and processes of American security cooperation. The quality of US aerospace and defense equipment, the commitment to build capabilities, and the reassurance that comes from partnering with the US military must include further transparency, accountability, and predictability of policies.

If not, American allies and partners will be hesitant to collaborate with us on future shared security requirements—or simply seek cooperation elsewhere.

#### Lack of US investment crushes NATO – exposes deficiencies and drastically weakens NATO

Bergmann & Cicarelli ’21 [Max, Siena; 1-13-2021; "NATO’s Financing Gap," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/natos-financing-gap/>, smarx, AZM]

The United States as NATO’s financial backbone

NATO has operated on the assumption that its most powerful member, the United States, would play the same role it had during the first two world wars.

In the years after WWII, the United States pushed to rebuild Europe, both economically and militarily. While the Marshall Plan provided critical economic assistance, the United States also effectively financed the military reconstruction of Western Europe. Through the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the 1951 Mutual Security Act, the United States provided more than $50 billion in today’s dollars in military aid to the newly formed NATO.13

When NATO was formed, it was seen as a way of keeping Americans engaged in Europe and preventing the United States from reverting to a post-WWI isolationism. But the United States was also focused on encouraging European rearmament and reducing reliance on the United States, which led to strong early U.S. support for European defense restructuring and integration. U.S. efforts to spur rearmament, particularly in West Germany, were a crucial motivating factor for France to push for European integration through the merging of the coal and steel industries into the European Coal and Steel Community.14 The United States also strongly backed a French proposal to create a European Defense Community (EDC), which would have formed a pan-European army.15 In the aftermath of WWII, the United States therefore sought and encouraged ways to spur European defense reforms in an effort to strengthen the European pillar of the newly formed alliance, which would have reduced Western Europe’s military and economic reliance on the United States. Ultimately, however, the EDC never took hold and a European Army was never formed. Europe integrated economically, but not militarily.

Defense was left to nation-states, coordinated through NATO, leaving the United States not only as the lead military guarantor of European defense but also as its de facto financial backbone. As Western Europe recovered economically, individual NATO members took on responsibility for financing and sustaining investments in their military capabilities, which led to U.S. concerns during the Cold War about European underinvestment in defense.16 However, the United States’ military presence in Europe and focus on the Soviet Union meant that it made up for whatever European military deficiencies may have existed.

After the Cold War, unlike after WWII, the United States and many NATO members cut defense spending, taking the so-called peace dividend. However, NATO simultaneously expanded eastward, incorporating numerous Warsaw Pact countries. These former Warsaw Pact members had militaries that had been designed and built with the purpose of operating with the Soviet Union against the alliance. Additionally, and similar to NATO’s founding members after WWII, these nations lacked the financial wherewithal to rebuild their militaries. Yet unlike after WWII, the United States made no significant investment to rebuild and transform the militaries of these new members states.

When NATO was called on in Afghanistan after 9/11, it was the United States that, through coalition support funds, provided funding and assistance to encourage, support, and sustain member state operations in Afghanistan.17 Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the alliance recognized the need for urgent investment to deter Russia. Members pledged to spend more, and the United States established the European Reassurance Initiative, now called the European Deterrence Initiative.18

The European Deterrence Initiative provided tens of billions of dollars to bolster NATO’s capacity to deter Russia. It invested in modernizing and expanding military facilities, provided training assistance to forces, and funded the development of military capabilities.19 This American effort has been significant in bolstering NATO’s overall strength. Once again, it was an example of the United States stepping in financially to fill a gap in the alliance.

#### The CP causes a NATO collapse – US manpower is key and there’s no replacement for leadership

Savage ‘17 [Patrick; 3-14-2017; "NATO Without America: A Grim Prognosis," Georgetown Security Studies Review, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/03/14/nato-without-america-a-grim-prognosis/>, smarx, AZM]

On paper, NATO has the potential to be viable as a collective security organization without the United States. Remove the United States from the equation and NATO retains 27 member states with nearly 600 million people[iii] and a combined nominal GDP of almost $20 trillion.[iv] This should be more than adequate to build a self-sufficient military infrastructure. A majority of NATO’s members are also deeply connected both politically and economically through the European Union.[v] In the long term, a NATO without the United States may not only be feasible, but desirable. However, these rosy structural facts belie a more troublingly reality in NATO’s immediate future.

When looking at NATO’s short-term viability, the picture is far less positive without the substantial commitment of the United States. The most obvious item of concern if the US were to leave or moderate its commitment to NATO in the short term would be sheer manpower. In 2016, the alliance had a combined troop strength of around 3.1 million active duty personnel. Without the United States, that immediately drops by nearly half to somewhere below 1.9 million personnel.[vi] This ignores thousands of pieces of military equipment that would no longer support NATO, including armored vehicles, aircraft, and ships. Granted, Russia—the most prominent threat to NATO—has significantly cut down its active duty forces in recent years, estimated at just over 900,000 active duty personnel in 2016.[vii] However, the exact number of reservists Russia has at its disposal is unknown, and could be anywhere from 2 to 20 million personnel depending on the scale of a call up.[viii] While NATO forces may have an advantage in training, equipment, and organization, past a certain point quantity surpasses quality. Russia has also been increasing efforts to update its military arsenal, purchasing new weapons and equipment to close that gap as well.[ix]

The more important question, however, may be who would assume the burden of leadership for the alliance in the absence of the United States. Among the most influential of NATO’s members, there is no obvious candidate to take the lead if the United States were to step aside, and all the obvious candidates face their own significant political issues at home and abroad. The United Kingdom’s relationship with continental Europe has been strained in the aftermath of its vote to leave the EU. Its relationship will be further tested in the months and years to come as that process plays out.[x] Germany’s President-elect, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has broken with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing coalition with a more conciliatory tone towards Russia. He has criticized NATO policies on sanctions and military exercises.[xi] Meanwhile, France remains in a constant state of high alert following a string of terrorist attacks over the past several years—a threat it is not alone in facing—with new plots being uncovered and thwarted in February and troops remaining deployed on the streets.[xii]

These existing political issues are aggravated by the fact that the UK, Germany, and France all face populist or nationalist surges in their domestic politics, a trend seen across Europe. The UK Independence Party played an instrumental role in Britain’s decision to leave the EU. National Front candidate Marine Le Pen is highly likely to make it to the second round of the French presidential election this year. The Alternative for Germany party of Frauke Petry and Jorg Meuthen seems poised to gain its first seats in the Bundestag following elections this fall. Among a laundry list of controversial policy positions, these parties have tended to either have highly critical views of NATO, close ties to Russia, or both.[xiii] While the United States is obviously not without its own domestic political issues, the relative size, power, and strength of its institutions all put it in a better position to simultaneously deal with such issues and wrangle NATO at the same time. It is questionable if Britain, France, or Germany would be able to do the same if the mantle of leadership fell upon them.

If the United States were to leave NATO in the next four years, even if the alliance were not to collapse immediately, the ensuring vacuum would call into question its short-term survivability. But even if President Trump does not truly plan to leave NATO, the longer the doubt over continued US participation, the greater damage this uncertainty creates. It encourages political forces within member states not consistent with NATO’s values and it may encourage potential adversaries to undertake provocative and aggressive actions. It is critical that President Trump be more consistent and clear in voicing his desire to remain in the alliance, and frame whatever criticisms he has of NATO—which are not baseless—in the context of improving the alliance. It is also critically important that the President strive to set a better domestic political example for NATO allies as they face increasing levels of political instability and uncertainty of their own. More than his own approval ratings may be riding on his ability to be a unifying political figure.

### Solvency---Ext

#### Security Initiatives are essential to NATO’s operations

DoS, 21 (United States Department of State, 6-14-2021, Office of the Spokesperson, "The Ironclad U.S. Commitment to NATO," <https://www.state.gov/the-ironclad-u-s-commitment-to-nato/> /alundy)

Building off President Biden’s participation in the 2021 Brussels Summit, the United States is joining with our Allies to ensure NATO is fit for purpose in an era of increased strategic competition. In Riga, Foreign Ministers will discuss the development of NATO’s next Strategic Concept, which will guide the Alliance as it addresses current and emerging challenges. The new Strategic Concept will be prepared for adoption at the NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain, June 29-30, 2022. At the Brussels Summit, NATO leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy to support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defense posture. Putting that policy into practice, Allies are developing a Cyber Action Plan to ensure NATO’s resilience against increasingly frequent and complex malicious cyber activity perpetrated by state and non-state actors, including disruptive ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure.

Recognizing the increasingly complex threats to our security, Allied leaders affirmed in December 2019 and in June 2021 that national and collective resilience are essential for credible deterrence and defense, and vital to safeguard our societies, citizens, and shared values. Allied leaders issued a Strengthened Resilience Commitment that outlined future priorities, including on the security of supply chains, critical infrastructure, and energy networks, as well as preparedness for pandemics and natural disasters. Allies have subsequently updated NATO’s seven baseline requirements to support the effective enablement of armed forces and the Alliance’s three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

At the Brussels Summit, Allies endorsed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan positioning NATO as a leading international organization for understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. NATO recognizes climate change as a defining challenge of our times and a threat multiplier impacting Allied security. NATO is incorporating climate change considerations into its full spectrum of work, ranging from defense planning and capability development to civil preparedness and exercises.

To maintain the Alliance’s technological edge, Allies are negotiating the provisional Charter of the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, an initiative that will facilitate technological cooperation and speed the adoption of technological solutions to enhance the Alliance’s defense and security.

In the 2019 Leaders’ Statement and the 2021 Brussels Communique, NATO Allies recognized the PRC’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges we need to address together as an Alliance. Beijing is building up its military and expanding its footprint in cyberspace, the Arctic, and in areas that directly affect Transatlantic security, including the Middle East and Africa.

The progress Allies have made on defense spending helps ensure NATO is ready and has the capabilities required to meet any challenge. European Allies and Canada have increased their defense spending by more than $260 billion since 2014. These increases are significant, but Allies must also continue to make investments to meet their NATO Capability Targets, to increase the readiness of their armed forces, especially the NATO Readiness Initiative, and to meet force generation commitments for NATO missions and operations.

### Solvency---Cohesion---2NC

#### NATO cohesion depends on US leadership in security

Dassù, 21 (Marta Dassù, Senior advisor Europe, the Aspen, served as Italy’s deputy minister of foreign affairs,  appointed as a member of the group of experts to support the NATO 2030 initiative and provide advice on how to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension, 7-6-2021, "Four ways Europeans can help refocus NATO," ECFR, <https://ecfr.eu/article/four-ways-europeans-can-help-refocus-nato/> /alundy)

As the nature of global security shifts; as China rises; and with Joe Biden in the White House, it is time for Europeans to consider how they can best play their part in modernising NATO.

The first thing Europeans can do is to seek to retain American support for the alliance by making clear they recognise, and will respond to, today’s shifting strategic priorities. We are now back to a situation in which, from the United States’ standpoint, its alliance with Europe gives it a comparative advantage in global power competition. But even the most Atlanticist US president will ask Europe to sustain its part of a transatlantic bargain fit for the present, not for the past. Since America’s priorities are domestic renewal and competition with China, such a bargain has the following contours: NATO, with American support, will focus mainly on Europe and collective defence; at the same time, Europeans will support Washington in containing China, in diplomatic and economic terms. Therefore, when faced with US-China “extreme competition”, to use Biden’s formulation, Europe will not be able to remain neutral without paying a high price on the transatlantic front.

To make this bargain functional, a more political NATO, and a more globally wise NATO, must emerge – and both dimensions require a stronger NATO-EU link. This is because some of the solutions to shared security challenges – especially as far as hybrid threats are concerned – will come from EU member state decisions coordinated at the EU level.

Therefore, how to deal with China is becoming a key variable in transatlantic relations. However, while this is extremely important in strategic terms, it is less so in purely military terms: Washington is not asking Europeans to support it militarily in Asia. Some individual European allies are offering their (limited) help, but NATO as a whole is bound to remain a regional defence alliance. As a consequence – and this is the second priority – the challenge for NATO is how to adopt a globally wise perspective while preserving its core mission. If it does not adopt such a global perspective, NATO could be side-lined, with a growing gap between European and US security perceptions.

A more global NATO, while not engaging militarily in the Asia-Pacific region, will have to confront the implications of China’s rise for Euro-Atlantic security. That means, for instance, reducing European vulnerabilities in value chains in strategic sectors, monitoring strategic foreign investments, preserving technology edge, countering cyber attacks, and building up the resilience of democratic societies. This widening of the very concept of security necessarily involves the EU, with its economic leverage, more than it ever did in the past. Thus, by definition, improving the coherence between NATO and the EU is becoming a key factor for transatlantic security.

### Solvency---Emerging Tech---2NC

#### Emerging technology cooperation is key to NATO cohesion.

Bazin ’17 [Aaron; 9-27-2017; VetCoin Foundation 501(c)(3), Co-Founder and President, U.S. Special Operations Command, Strategist, University of Oxford, Graduate Certificate in Blockchain Strategy, University of the Rockies, Doctor of Psychology Mediation and Conflict Resolution; Dominika Kunertova; PhD in Political Science from Université de Montréal, specialization in Security Studies and Canadian Politics, Senior Researcher at Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich; “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO” https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/] Accessed – 6/22/2022, WWIS

For almost seventy years, NATO has positively influenced the world. The Alliance’s many credits include acting as a major factor in deterrence of nuclear war, contributing to the erosion of the communist ideology of the Soviet Union, and projecting stability in difficult places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Although these measures of past performance indicate that NATO could continue to succeed in the future, there are no guarantees. In fact, if the complex and adaptive security environment continues to evolve on its present course, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain cohesion of the Alliance. Arguably, it is one of the most successful alliances in human history, but without cohesion, NATO can and will fail.

Whether one agrees with Carl von Clausewitz’s supposition that the center of gravity of any alliance is “unity formed by common interests” or not, no one can deny that if the members are of one mind, an alliance exists.1 Conversely, if the members do not have a common understanding, an alliance does not exist. Between these two extremes lie varying degrees of cohesion, and, as such, directly proportional degrees of effectiveness, efficiency, and synergy. If one makes the assertion that cohesion is a center of gravity of NATO, then it becomes essential to identify the types of variables that affect the strength of this center of gravity.

In the spring through the summer of 2017, the authors of this article conducted in-depth research into the factors that contribute to or detract from Alliance cohesion pursuant to the development of the document The Framework for Future Alliance Operations.2 This article summarizes the project’s analysis of factors that could affect Alliance cohesion in the future. It provides a model grounded in data to help readers understand and visualize the aspects of cohesion. It is an exploration of the realm of the possible and acts as a solemn warning to leaders of the many possible ways the Atlantic alliance could fracture in the future.

Underlying Conceptual Definitions

As with many research projects, this study began with an exploration of conceptual definitions. The NATO Glossary defines a center of gravity as the “characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force, or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.”3 This Clausewitzian metaphor refers to a “focal point” as “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” for the group.4 Rather than “characteristics, capabilities, or locations,” centers of gravity can be “dynamic and powerful physical and moral agents of action or influence.”5 Even though some question the idea of a center of gravity, the concept retains its relevance for many contemporary planners as it helps them understand the complexities of the security environment and the relationships between systems, as well as prioritize efforts.6

The next key term, alliance cohesion, reflects the degree to which the members are able to agree on goals, strategies, and tactics, and coordinate activity for attaining those goals.7 In addition to this behavioral component, cohesion represents the particular quality that makes its members operate as a whole during times of crisis. Literature from the psychology field defines cohesion as “bonds, either social or task based, that contribute to the synergistic functioning as a whole.”8 Other accounts claim “alliance cohesion is based upon the distance between individual member interests and the collective alliance interest.”9 In defining this term, it is key to note that cohesion is a very fluid idea, contextually based and highly subjective. Therefore, this research proceeded under the assumption that cohesion is largely qualitative in nature.

Some assert that the best moment to understand cohesion is in time of crisis, such as when the Alliance faces a significant conflict. In case of wartime alliances, cohesion refers to the states’ ability to coordinate military strategy, agree on war aims, and avoid making a separate peace, together with “the degree of convergence among member states’ commitments to the alliance.”10 This is important, since conventional wisdom asserts the source of cohesion is usually the element (be it political, economic, military, or nonmaterial) that is targeted by adversary activities and likely results in the defeat of the attacked party. It then follows that by adhering to these definitions, one could consider Alliance cohesion to be at the level of a center of gravity, since it “exerts a certain centripetal force that tends to hold an entire … structure together.”11

Literature Review

Many scholars in the fields of political science and international relations have conducted research into the topic of cohesion. Especially, the post-Cold War period led some to assert that cohesion between North America and Europe is “no longer guaranteed by a commonly acknowledged existential threat.”12 With their national interests “less predetermined by a priori ideological considerations,” the “situational nature of threats and challenges, capabilities, and commitments, and interests and alignments” has directly affected Alliance cohesion.13 One can therefore assume that if a direct existential threat exists, the bond is stronger than when it does not.

Therefore, the first and the most parsimonious factor that emerges is threat—a cognitive, or perceptual, concept, whose degree is mostly a function of capabilities.14 Particularly, the level and source of threat tell about the raison d’être of alliances and inform us about their internal dynamics and durability.15 The alliance cohesion theory’s dominant explanation concerns the external threat to alliance. Especially, the realist school of thought writes, “Alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response,” while being “maintained by stronger states to serve their interests.”16

The next key observation is that the evolving security context and disappearance of traditional alliance politics have led to the default mode of uses of “coalitions of the willing” and “alignments of convenience.”17 Especially in terms of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, cohesion has become “challenged politically as well as militarily.”18 Moreover, threat assessment differentials in terms of dissimilar prioritization based on the perceived level of threat negatively affect alliance cohesion to a significant extent. In the past few years, cohesion waned as the multiplication of crises—including international terrorism, mass migration, and Russian foreign policy—deepened strategically the east-south division among NATO allies, and as the Alliance’s internal disputes intensified due to rising populism and Euroscepticism.19 While these various “domestic pressures and diverging threat perceptions are threatening to pull Allies apart,” cohesion “remains critically dependent on its collective defense commitment.”20

In outlining realist, economic, institutionalist, and social-constructivist theoretical perspectives, other categories of variables emerged: internal dimension of threats, bureaucracy and alliance institutionalization, and shared values and identity. What happens inside the Alliance could matter as much as what happens outside the Alliance.

Given that NATO’s endurance had not conformed to the predictions of traditional alliance theory, Ohio University professor Patricia Weitsman suggested examining internal and external threat dyads in order to understand alliance cohesion.21 She found that NATO survived the end of the Cold War due to low internal threat, which concerns the politics of alliances. Consequently, this alliance cohesion theory says the lower the internal threat, the more cohesive the alliance; and the greater the external threat, the higher level of alliance cohesion.22

Another important factor in alliance cohesion is the way in which intra-alliance cooperation institutionalizes bureaucratic structures.23 For instance, some assert that consultative norms and structures can mitigate internal threats to cohesion.24 Furthermore, the Alliance’s institutional structures allow for information exchange among allies that can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors.25 Additionally, the transatlantic bond has depended on credible signaling (i.e., an ally’s trust in another’s assurances). Especially in the context of nuclear sharing, “weak signals” of U.S. commitment to Europe could damage NATO’s cohesion.26

The next factor that emerges is that technology and its rapid development remains omnipresent, affecting both the relative operational effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance.27 Lastly, some assert that Alliance cohesion flows from the degree of security community formation and the socialization of political and military elites within and among democratic allies that possess a shared set of values and collective identities.28

Having laid the conceptual foundation inspired by the existing scholarly literature, this study explored, examined, and refined these ideas in an attempt to ascertain the factors that affect the cohesion of NATO in a practical sense.

Methodology

The primary research objective of this study was to identify and explore which factors were likely to affect NATO’s cohesion through 2035 and beyond in terms of both risks and opportunities. This project targeted students and professionals as the next generation of leaders from different backgrounds (e.g., academia, military, industry, etc.) to understand their perspectives on NATO’s cohesion. The primary question that guided this research was, “Which factors are likely to affect NATO’s cohesion through 2035 and beyond?”

The study followed a grounded theory methodology and employed both quantitative and qualitative methods, triangulated with the scholarly literature on alliance cohesion theory. Between March and June 2017, researchers gathered data through a series of focus groups, an online survey, and a workshop prepared in cooperation with the Innovation Hub sponsored by NATO Allied Command Transformation. In total, almost one hundred persons participated from across NATO and Partnership for Peace nations.29 The researchers then analyzed the data with the objective of identifying the thematic categories of variables and the organization of these themes into a theoretical model grounded in the data.30

Findings: Five Cohesion Factors

In making sense of Alliance cohesion in the future, this study first refined the understanding of cohesion itself. The findings indicate that NATO’s cohesion means synergy and the ability of NATO nations to think and act together. That is, to develop shared interests, values, and common standards and rules, and to respond to problems as a united group. Relying on mutual trust, cohesion is “doing what is best for the community” and looking beyond self-interests. Building on the analogy of ties between family members, the participants stated that cohesion is an expression of staying together despite differences, of “something bigger than ourselves.” One participant believed that “without cohesion, the Alliance would implode.”

Consequently, based on the scholarly literature and corroborated through the focus groups, this study established that alliance cohesion fluctuates in accordance with a variety of factors. The data collected in this study indicated that variables that affect alliance cohesion fell into five thematic areas: (1) external risks, (2) political and economic factors, (3) organizational structures and processes, (4) technology advances, and (5) core values (see figure 1).

External risks. The participants found it questionable whether allies will be able to find a common conventional threat that would be perceived as strong enough to “transcend the domestic pressures and the concept of sovereignty.” Although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie in multiplication of external threats and a lack of common perception of those threats.

This underdeveloped common understanding of external threats, accompanied by differential threat assessments, could weaken NATO’s cohesion. To illustrate this point, although the survey participants listed the failure to activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, further discussions showed that non-Article 5 missions could constitute the real test for NATO’s cohesion. In words of the one of participants, “if there is an operation and only two nations show up, this is not cohesion.”

For some nations, this threat multiplication and dissimilar threat perceptions can lead to an operational overstretch or to an eventual “mission creep.” In contrast, other nations might develop an excessive sense of security that would lead them to reduce their attention and willingness to participate in NATO activities. For this reason, terrorism, for instance, cannot constitute NATO’s defining threat. Additionally, the changing nature of threats to allies’ security will require domestic, nonmilitary means to address them, rather than alliance-wide military measures. In other words, “nations will be looking inside to maintain order.”

Political and economic factors. The group of political and economic factors points to the risks of severe disagreements among the allies, which could lead to the weakening of the transatlantic bond, disintegration tendencies within the European Union, or even withdrawal of a NATO nation from the Alliance.

At the level of political elites, the participants identified the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations among the most probable causes of weakening alliance cohesion in the future. Particularly, populist leaders who prefer narrow, short-term political gains at home and who are prepared to “undermine an international institution to gain consensus internally” represent a serious threat to multilateralism, on which the Alliance has depended. Oftentimes, national leaders “use NATO as a scapegoat for their domestic political games,” while “NATO does not [and cannot] fight its own nations.”

At the level of domestic population, the support for the Alliance in member states can decline due to NATO’s unclear purpose. This could become an acute problem, especially if national leaders continue to frame security problems exclusively in domestic terms instead of treating them as NATO-wide. Particularly, concerns over sovereignty could override the relative value of the Alliance’s collective good and make governments pull limited funds away from NATO.

In a similar vein, demographic shifts changing the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of nations, such as an aging population and migration, will drive differences in fiscal priorities, which could result in decreasing national defense spending. Furthermore, if the free-riding behavior reaches critical proportions within NATO burden sharing, it can create, out of those who bear their fair share, a group of allies disinterested in defending free-riding nations, as they could cease to see “return on their investment.”

Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align.

Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up.

Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand.

Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations.

Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31

Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

### Solvency---Interoperability---2NC

#### US presence and influence in cooperative security is essential to NATO’s operations

Carafano, 20 (James Carafano, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, 10-14-2020, "A Golden Opportunity for the U.S. to Lead NATO Into the Future," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/golden-opportunity-the-us-lead-nato-the-future)

as NATO’s leader, the United States must ensure that the reflection outcome firmly moors a future alliance to both sides of the Atlantic, refocuses the allies on the raison d’être of collective defense, and ensures NATO’s readiness to address a range of growing challenges. The latter, of course, requires robust defense spending and vigorous capabilities in increasingly active arenas such as cyber- and information warfare.

The last time the alliance conducted a comprehensive review was in 2010, with NATO’s Strategic Concept. A decade later, the world looks drastically different. Russia’s malign behavior has metastasized, from its invasion of Ukraine to its illegal annexation of Crimea, and from its attacks on Western democratic institutions to its brazen political assassinations on European soil. At the same time, the alliance faces emerging challenges including the rise of China, disinformation attacks, global pandemics, and threats from terrorism.

The reflection process should start with the bedrock principle that transatlantic security (which encompasses American security) is rooted in a strong NATO, with robust U.S. participation and continued leadership. A strong NATO requires defense investment, openness to future alliance enlargement, and political willingness to commit to collective defense.

Those taking part in the reflection should be guided by 10 principles, the most important of which is that NATO’s number one mission is collective defense. Everything else the alliance does is secondary to that mission.

In the 21st century, NATO needs to return to basics, with territorial defense as its primary goal. NATO cannot try to be everywhere in the world doing everything all the time. It should think long and hard before leading and conducting additional out-of-area military interventions. If the member states believe that an out-of-area military operation is needed, it should probably be led by a coalition of the willing outside the formal NATO command structure.

The alliance should not seek out problems elsewhere in the world when there is so much for NATO to do in its area of responsibility: “the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

For instance, four regions in the Euro-Atlantic region need constant NATO attention to deter Russian aggression: the Arctic, the Balkans, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. A fifth, the Middle East-North Africa region, requires NATO’s focus and attention to increase local capacity building, improve interoperability, and strengthen relations. There are a host of ways in which NATO can bolster collective defense in these regions. The strategic review should give full consideration to each and every one of them.

Finally, while collective defense must remain NATO’s core focus, the alliance does have a role to play in meeting other growing challenges. Ensuring NATO’s readiness to address these challenges requires an understanding of where the alliance has been, where it is now, and where it is headed.

For 70 years, NATO has underpinned European and North American security and economic prosperity. While Macron’s comments may have been ill-advised and out of touch, they have ignited a vital process by which the alliance can recommit itself to its most important task: territorial defense of the member states; enabling collective defense; and understanding NATO’s proper role in responding to growing challenges, as well as the tools it has to address them.

U.S. leadership has the opportunity and responsibility to ensure that the strategic reflection process guarantees this vital alliance remains vibrant and able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Forget about the nightmare of a zombie alliance. The ongoing period of reflection gives NATO the chance to reaffirm, “It’s alive. It’s alive!”

### Solvency---AT: Autonomy---2NC

#### NATO without US support fails – lack of leadership and limited investment ensures the Pact collapses

Lukasik ’21 [Przemyslawl; 2021; "NATO Without the USA: How Long Will the Alliance Survive Without American Leadership?," NATO and the Future of European and Asian Security, <https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/nato-without-the-usa/286732>, smarx, AZM]

European defense sovereignty without the US therefore appears to be, as has been said before, a rhetorical figure. This is due to possible costs of such a process: economic and social, political and strategic. Europe, like the rest of the world, will have to bear the economic and social costs of the Covid-19 pandemic, the migration crisis and, above all, the demographic costs of an aging population. Rising costs of social benefits will limit investment possibilities in the field of state security. Some of the EU member states will probably be reluctant to bear the cost of collective defense, which the Alliance is pursuing anyway. The absence of a universally accepted leader to replace the US in EU defense integration is a serious challenge to the idea of, European defense sovereignty. The political cost here may be the division of Europe and the return to particular defense alliances. At the moment, the scenario of voluntary closer defense integration between selected member states seems to be the most certain. Strategically significant costs would be US abandonment, the collapse of the entire Pact, US isolationism and the breakup of the transatlantic community. Despite the uncertainty and unpredictability, the USA is still Europe’s closest partner (Lippert, Ondarza, Perthes, 2019).

## Competition

### Perm---AT: Do Both---Cease---2NC

#### To cease means to recall – here’s comparative evidence

Schweizer ’17 [Mark; 01/17/17; Schweizer, President of the Federal Patent Court in St. Gallen, former lawyer, former delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross; "BGH: to cease means to recall," IPKat, <https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/01/bgh-to-cease-means-to-recall.html> //smarx, AZG]

We would like to bring the attention of our German Readers a recent decision (published 13 January 2017) of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) with far-reaching implications for practitioners. In essence, the BGH held that any prohibition to distribute a product entails an obligation to actively recall any products already on the shelves, endorsing the view expressed by the Oberlandesgericht Munich in 2013. The same dispute has already led to a judgment of the ECJ on 23 November 2016 (not related to the enforcement of the order).

Plaintiff had obtained an injunction based on unfair competition law (UWG) against the mareting and distribution of alcoholic beverages under the signs "RESCUE DROPS" and "RESCUE NIGHT SPRAY" ("es zu unterlassen, im geschäftlichen Verkehr als Spirituosen gekennzeichnete Produkte unter der Bezeichnung „RESCUE TROPFEN“ und/oder „RESCUE NIGHT SPRAY“ zu bewerben und/oder zu vertreiben"). By its wording, the order only entails an obligation to cease and desist, and not any obligation to actively recall any products. The order became provisionally enforceable.

Defendant failed to recall any products already sold to retailers (primarily pharmacies). Plaintiff argued that this violated the order - and prevailed. The BGH held that in a case where the continued presence of the products on the shelves of retailers creates a continued disturbance ("fortdauernder Störungszustand"), the obligation to cease and desist includes the obligation to remove the continued disturbance, although generally, an obligation to cease (Unterlassungspflicht) must be distinguished from an obligation to remove (Beseitigungspflicht). It was further irrelevant that the buyers of the products were not obliged to comply with any request for a recall of the products (since they have become the legal owners of the products). The key reasoning is in paras. 24-27 of the decision for those who read German.

While the injunction in this case was based on unfair competition law, it is hard to see that the outcome would have been any different for a prohibition based on trade mark, copyright or patent law. In essence, any obligation to cease distribution of a product in Germany in the future also entails the obligation to recall products already distributed (and not yet used up). Failure to do so makes the Defendant liable to pay the administrative fine imposed by the order in case of non-compliance - in the case at hand, EUR 15,000 for the omission of recalling the products.

### Perm---AT: Do Both---Cease---Ext

#### Cease means to end an activity

Liller v. Logsdon ’71 [Liller v. Logsdon, 261 Md. 367, 275 A.2d 469, 1971 Md. LEXIS 1091, Court of Appeals of Maryland April 6, 1971, Decided, smarx, AZM]

In construing contracts, words are to be given their ordinary meaning. Mascaro v. Snelling and Snelling, 250 Md. 215, 229, 243 A. 2d 1 (1968). "Cease" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961):

"to leave off: [\*\*\*6] bring to an end \* \* \* to come to an end: break off or taper [\*\*471] off to a stop \* \* \* to give over or bring to an end an activity or action".

#### Cease means to no longer continue

Marriam ‘9 [Marriam Webster, carbon dated 2009, "Cease," Marriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cease>, smarx, AZM]

: to cause to come to an end especially gradually: no longer continue

#### Cease means to stop

Cambridge ’15 [Cambridge Dictionary, carbon dated 2015, "cease," Cambridge Dictionary, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/cease>, smarx, AZM]

to stop something

#### Cease means to discontinue

Collins ’18 [Collins Dictionary; carbon dated 2018; "Cease," Collins Dictionary, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/cease>, smarx, AZM]

To put a stop or end to; discontinue

#### Cease means to stop

Britannica ’22 [Britannica Dictionary; carbon dated 2022; "Cease," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/cease>, smarx, AZM]

: to stop doing (something)

### Perm---AT: Do Both---End---2NC

#### **“End” means stopping or finishing – that’s the opposite of “increase”**

Webster ’No Date [Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary; “Definition of END,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/end> //smarx, AZG]

: to bring or come to an end : STOP, FINISH I wish vacation would never end. He ended the discussion.

#### “End” means going no further

Learner’s Dictionaries ’No Date [Oxford; "end\_2 verb,", <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/end_2> //smarx, AZG]

to finish; to reach a point and go no further; to make something finish At last the war ended. The road ends here. How does the story end? The problems did not end there. end with something Her note ended with the words: ‘See you soon.’ end by doing something The speaker ended by suggesting some topics for discussion. end something They decided to end their relationship. to end the occupation/conflict/violence A back injury effectively ended her career. end something with something The team ended the season with a 4–0 win. + speech ‘And that was that,’ she ended.

#### To “end” is when something reaches its final point

Collins Dictionary ’No Date ["End definition and meaning,", <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/end> //smarx, AZG]

When a situation, process, or activity ends, or when something or someone ends it, it reaches its final point and stops. The meeting quickly ended and Steve and I left the room.

# Russia Relations

## Solvency---Negotiations

### Solvency---2NC

#### Grand bargain is possible and desirable.

Bandow, 21 (Doug Bandow, 6-8-21, assistant to President Ronald Reagan and fellow specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Time to Make a Deal with Vladimir Putin,” <https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-make-deal-vladimir-putin>)/MS

More likely, however, the future is uncertain and will be influenced by U.S. behavior. There is much mischief that the two could do together against the United States. The worse America’s relationship with Moscow, the greater Russia’s inclination to obstruct Washington as a matter of course. At the margin, a Beijing–Moscow axis could play a greater (and malign) role in Burma, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Central Asia, the Balkans, and elsewhere.

Fourth, the U.S. can’t afford any grand new international crusades. Washington squandered trillions of dollars — and thousands of lives — in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, the U.S. is effectively bankrupt. President Donald Trump and the Republican Congress went wild, simultaneously hiking outlays and cutting revenues. The COVID-19 pandemic, by increasing social expenditures and depressing taxes, will end up adding as much as $16 trillion to the national debt. The Biden administration is pushing a tsunami of spending unconnected to personal and national need. As a result, America will soon break its previous record of debt at 107 percent of GDP, set in the aftermath of World War II. Alas, the impact of an aging population will only intensify. By 2050 the Congressional Budget Office figures that number [will be an astounding 200 percent](https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-03/56977-LTBO-2021.pdf).

It’s time for America to make a deal. President Donald Trump had an opportunity to do so, but he didn’t. But his room to maneuver was constrained by false claims of election collusion in 2016, supplemented by a bipartisan smear campaign. Republicans didn’t want to give up their traditional Cold War enemy, Moscow, which Democrats suddenly found politically convenient to denounce. The president’s appointees joined the permanent bureaucracy to consistently undercut his approach, continuing Washington’s previous anti‐​Russia policy, increasing sanctions and further alienating relations.

In contrast, Biden has been denouncing Russia for years. Indeed, he called Moscow a threat while describing China as a “competitor.” But that gives him an opportunity to play a modern Richard Nixon. Biden can “go to Russia” metaphorically — the summit is being held in Switzerland — and stabilize a relationship that is too important to lose.

The outlines of an offer aren’t hard to draw. Election interference should be verboten by both sides — the U.S. actually is [far more guilty of such meddling](https://www.npr.org/2016/12/22/506625913/database-tracks-history-of-u-s-meddling-in-foreign-elections) than is Russia. So should be cyber‐​expeditions, other than intelligence‐​gathering, which is an inherent part of international relations. Washington should be prepared to retaliate, but cutting diplomatic staff in response is perverse and counterproductive.

European governments should take a similar approach. For instance, they could offer to drop repeated complaints that Russia is not a democracy — were they really shocked to discover this fact? — in return, say, for Moscow halting assassinations on European soil. After all, the Europeans’ humanitarian sensitivities instantly disappear when it comes to accepting Saudi money for weapons used to kill Yemeni civilians. Brussels has similarly accommodated Turkey, which has kidnapped perceived enemies, meaning most anyone who criticizes [President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan](https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/instead-of-warmongering-trump-should-throw-turkey-out-of-nato/), from Europe.

Even more important, the U.S. and its NATO allies should offer to end NATO expansion. Inclusion of [North Macedonia](https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/america-doesnt-need-another-weakling-nato-ally/) and [Montenegro](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/07/montenegro-awaits-senate-verdict-president-donald-trump-should-end-nato-expansion-charade/?sh=30d4012c5261) (at least the latter is a great movie set!) demonstrate that the process has outrun any potential usefulness. What’s next? Bringing in the [Duchy of Grand Fenwick](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0053084/)? Most important, the U.S. should pledge that neither Georgia nor Ukraine will be added. Indeed, this decision should have been reached long ago. Including them is not in America’s interest — they would bring conflict and controversy into the alliance — and could trigger escalation by Russia.

In return, Moscow should end its support for Ukrainian separatists, while Kyiv should follow its promise and grant greater autonomy to the Donbass region. Ukraine would be politically and militarily neutral but left to decide its own economic destiny. Such a compromise might displease Ukrainians, who of course would remain free to set their own course. But they have no right to NATO membership and defense by America. The U.S. should simply make clear the Americans won’t be coming — whether it is military aid today or soldiers (and possibly nukes) tomorrow.

#### Bilateral negotiations solve---both Biden and Putin want to limit the risk of escalation.

Amy F. Woolf 22, specialist in nuclear weapons policy, 2/28/2022, “Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin Summit,” <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11694>, RH

Presidents Biden and Putin reaffirmed “the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had issued this statement in 1985, when they indicated that they were “conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace.” By issuing this statement, Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the need to ease tensions that might lead to a conflict that could escalate to nuclear war. Some experts have suggested that a U.S.-Russian reaffirmation of this statement might help bolster international nonproliferation efforts by reducing the perceived value of nuclear weapons. On January 3, 2022, the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as the P5) also affirmed this statement. Some have suggested that both the U.S.-Russian reaffirmation and the P5 confirmation might offset the impression that nuclear weapons states seem to view these weapons as a viable tool to address regional security challenges. The statement might also signal that the nuclear weapons states recognize the growing risks of nuclear escalation during crises. Others, however, have questioned the value of the statement in the current security environment, noting that, in 1985, it was a reflection on the risk of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union. Moreover, some argue that a statement excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict could undermine efforts to deter large-scale conventional attacks or even cyberattacks. Some have also questioned whether the United States might have to alter its employment policy or force posture if it acceded to a statement forswearing the value of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. The Biden Administration has not addressed questions about its rationale for reaffirming the statement. When it issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021, it noted that the United States would “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” Reissuing this statement on nuclear war may contribute to that goal without foreshadowing any changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.

Presidents Biden and Putin agreed that the United States and Russia would engage in “an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” The United States and Russia had engaged in similar talks in the past, and both Presidents supported their resumption prior to the summit. In his press briefing following the summit, President Biden noted that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”

The U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks will likely not include other nations with nuclear weapons— such as China, France, and the United Kingdom—but could include discussions about other types of weapons beyond the long-range strategic weapons limited in New START. However, the two nations may hold different views on which topics they should discuss and different understandings of what constitutes strategic stability. In early September 2021, Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, noted that the United States would seek to capture new kinds of intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the upcoming talks. Russia appears to favor a broader agenda; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has noted that the discussions should include everything that “influences strategic stability,” including “nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive weapons.” For Russia, this list includes ballistic missile defense, longrange strategic conventional arms, and weapons in space. At the same time, with its mention of “arms control and risk reduction measures,” the joint statement also seems to indicate that the talks will not focus exclusively on negotiating a new treaty limiting nuclear weapons. They might also address transparency and risk reduction measures that could reduce the risk of inadvertent or intentional escalation to nuclear use during a crisis or conflict. The agenda could also include emerging technologies, operational practices, or doctrinal statements that might exacerbate tensions or complicate crisis management.

#### Empirics prove---US-Russia relations have resolved crisis through diplomacy.

Kaplan, 2-13 (Fred Kaplan, 2-13-22, Columnist for international relations and U.S. foreign policy, “A secret Deal With Putin Might Be the Only Way Biden Can End the Ukraine Crisis,” <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/02/biden-putin-ukraine-cuban-missile-solution.html>)/MS

With [Russian troops moving closer to the Ukrainian border from multiple angles](https://www.economist.com/interactive/2022/02/11/russias-military-build-up-enters-a-more-dangerous-phase), the chance of war creeps higher by the day. Yet Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin are still hinting at the possibility of a diplomatic solution, which would offer Putin a face-saving way out of the crisis he created.

The question is whether they can—and are willing to—devise a mutually palatable deal, given the dense tangle of conflicting interests driving this conflict. There is a way to cut the knot: Biden could borrow a move from John F. Kennedy’s playbook and offer Putin a secret deal. Here is the current state of affairs. After Putin and Biden’s hour-long phone conversation on Saturday, [the White House read-out](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/12/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia/) made it seem nothing had changed; Biden, it said, warned once again of “swift and severe costs” if Russia invaded Ukraine. Period.

However, at a press conference in Moscow later in the day, Putin aide Yuri Ushakov revealed that much more was discussed. Biden, he said, recalled the long record of cooperation between the two countries, noted the many issues on which they still needed to cooperate, and offered several diplomatic compromises to the crisis (Ushakov did not detail what they were). Putin said he would think them over, but complained that the West was ignoring his fundamental demand—that Ukraine never join NATO. (A still-later background press briefing by a “senior administration official” confirmed Ushakov’s account.)

Biden, Putin, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have all taken maximalist positions on this issue: Biden says NATO’s open-door policy can’t be shut permanently on Ukraine; Putin says it must be; Zelensky keeps asking to join the U.S.-led military alliance. Any backing away from these positions would be seen as an act of weakness: U.S. credibility would be shot; Putin would lose what he sees as his last chance to restore Russia’s sphere of influence on its western border; Zelensky would be hounded by anti-Russia nationalists who view any compromise as treason.

The question is whether they can—and are willing to—devise a mutually palatable deal, given the dense tangle of conflicting interests driving this conflict. There is a way to cut the knot: Biden could borrow a move from John F. Kennedy’s playbook and offer Putin a secret deal.

In the end, Kennedy instructed his brother, Robert Kennedy, the attorney general (who also opposed the missile trade), to go see Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and say we would take the trade—but only if it was kept secret. If the Soviets revealed he accepted the deal, it would be called off. Kennedy told just six of his advisers about his agreement. (He deeply feared the political consequences of compromising with the Kremlin.) To everyone else, and the rest of the world, he put out a cover story, claiming he’d rejected the missile trade but instead accepted a proposal that Khrushchev had put forth the night before: that he would remove his missiles if Kennedy promised never to invade the Communist island of Cuba.

The next day, Sunday, Oct. 29, Khrushchev announced he would remove the missiles, reciting the fictional cover story.

Remarkably, this deal was kept secret for a long time. Only in 1982, on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, when the existence of the tapes was about to be revealed, did McNamara, Bundy, and other advisers reveal the true story—or at least part of it. (They did not confess that they had all opposed the secret deal.)

If the deal had not been struck, U.S. air strikes were scheduled to begin two days later, on Monday, Oct. 30—500 conventional bombing raids per day, for five days, followed by a ground invasion of the island. Some of the Soviet missiles were already armed with nuclear warheads; they might have been launched in retaliation. And, though it wasn’t known at the time, the Soviets had secretly deployed 40,000 troops on Cuba to fend off a possible U.S. invasion. In other words, by taking Khrushchev’s deal, John Kennedy might have singlehandedly prevented World War III.

What does all this have to do with the Ukraine crisis of 2022? Putin has proposed a way out—keep Ukraine out of NATO—that everyone, in this case including Biden, is denouncing as unacceptable, even while admitting that Ukraine won’t be allowed into NATO for a long time, if ever.

The simplest solution would be for Biden to just take Putin’s deal—bar Ukraine from ever entering NATO. But there are three problems with that idea. First, it’s an impossible promise; even if Biden wanted to make it, there’s no way to shut out Ukraine forever. Second, U.S. influence in the world would tumble; every other ally would soon be looking for another protector. Even John Kennedy, back in 1962, knew that he couldn’t accept Khrushchev’s deal publicly. He had to make it in secret. (He even lied to his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower. When he informed the former five-star general that the crisis was over, Eisenhower asked if he’d made a backroom deal. Kennedy said that he hadn’t.)

Would it be possible to keep such a pledge secret in today’s media-soaked environment? Back in 1962, Kennedy and his advisers met for 13 days in the Cabinet Room without any mention of the meetings being leaked to the press. That would be unthinkable now. But what about a secret deal with Putin, a man who has no problem with secrets?

Here is one way to do this—maybe. Biden could secretly send an emissary to see Putin. CIA Director William Burns would be a good choice; he has made low-profile trips Moscow before. Burns could bring along this assurance: Ukraine will not join NATO for as long as Biden is president; in practical terms, that is the most that any president could promise. However, he could add, if Putin makes this pledge public, the deal would be off—and, in fact, he could count on Ukraine joining the alliance next week.

In addition, Burns could go on, if Russia pulled its troops away from Ukraine, back to their original bases, Biden would do all the things he has proposed in recent talks, and take various confidence building measures to put U.S.-Russian relations on more stable footing.

Some possibilities: Re-open arms control treaties that President Trump abrogated. Open up all military exercises and missile deployments in the region to inspectors. Convene a conference on European security, to include consideration of Russian interests and concerns. Open negotiations to settle ambiguities in the Minsk Agreements, the ceasefire accord that Russia and Ukraine signed in 2015 but have never implemented because of differing interpretations. Senior U.S. and Russian officials have mentioned the revival of Minsk as a way out of the crisis. It is now time to test the proposition.

### Solvency---Ext

#### Negotiating Putin’s complaints about Europe opens the door to good faith negotiations.

Juan Diaz-Prinz 22, Acting Director at the Inclusive Peace Processes and Reconciliation, 6/12/2022, “Another Way to Help Ukraine: Prepare Now for a Peace Process,” <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/another-way-help-ukraine-prepare-now-peace-process>, RH

Why, then, prepare for peace talks now? A first reason is the unpredictability of war, which dictates that the advantageous moment for a shift to negotiations could appear without warning — and could disappear just as suddenly. A full strategy of support for Ukraine requires that its supporters help to prepare it to make the most of negotiations if and when Ukraine has the opportunity to benefit from them.

Thus, even as Western democracies rush arms and assistance to Ukraine, strategic preparation now for an eventual peace process can lead to a broader set of choices, with a better chance of success, as Ukraine’s government calculates its options. That preparation also positions Ukraine and its allies to more quickly halt bloodshed whenever conditions emerge for negotiations.

Russia and Ukraine currently have nothing to offer each other that could support peace talks to halt the war. Thus, a starting point in strategically preparing for talks is to envision a structure for negotiations that offers each side the chance to bargain for something it wants. In many wars — and assuredly in this one — enticing an aggressive belligerent like Russia into a peace process may require expanding the field for negotiations beyond the issues that triggered the hostilities.

A way to draw Putin into eventual peace talks — and into negotiating over his control of Ukrainian territory — will be to offer him the chance to bargain directly with the United States over his broader complaints. Essentially, this will mean a negotiation over what Putin thinks is Russia’s unfair marginalization as a great power and the security and economic threats to Russia of expanding NATO and EU strategic influence. Indeed, some have argued (against most evidence) that a root of the conflict lies not in Ukraine but in the Russian desire for a reform of the European security architecture. A viable peace process that creates a path for Ukraine to seek a recovery of territory seized by Russian arms will need to include these two elements:

Broaden a peace process beyond simply Russia-Ukraine negotiations to include a separate negotiation that includes Europe and NATO. To encourage Russia to make difficult concessions to Ukraine (notably a withdrawal from territories Russia has seized in war), the peace process should proceed simultaneously on three levels. Russia-Ukraine talks would address their bilateral disputes. Second, Russian talks with the European Union and Ukraine would aim to reset their relations (disrupted since 2014) and seek agreement on economic and security arrangements for countries, like Ukraine, that lie between Russia and the EU zone. Given the failures of earlier diplomacy, involving the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to resolve the Russia-Ukraine crisis, it will be necessary to reform that organization and re-establish it as a long-term confidence-building measure to prevent future regional conflicts. Finally, Russia talks with NATO and the United States would take up issues of strategic stability and the U.S.-Russian relationship in the world order. While some would argue that broadening the negotiations would just reward Putin for his use of force, only this full combination of negotiations, equal and interlocking, might entice him into making concessions to Ukraine.

Keep the status of Ukrainian territories seized by Russia undetermined pending the completion of negotiations. To avoid the risk of Russia consolidating its control over parts of Ukraine it has captured, a peace process could establish that space as a buffer zone under U.N. or other third-party control until negotiations are complete. This would require a peacekeeping mission of some kind in that zone. This step also would serve as a confidence-building measure until a negotiated solution can be reached. The longer the war goes on, the more opportunity Russia will have to cement its hold on the substantial swaths of territory Ukraine has lost already with “facts on the ground,” and to cover up war crimes there. Internationalizing the negotiations and inserting peacekeepers could win time and space to achieve a better outcome through non-military means.

As in any war, the lengthening of the conflict, the losses on each side and the political entrenchment of belligerents’ demands can make it more difficult, or even politically dangerous, for leaders to make concessions. The better chance of winning concessions will come from a broad process that can address the many issues in dispute, including many that risk hardening in place a new Cold War. These will include nuclear arms control, cyber warfare, Russia’s role in distant conflict zones, and mutual accusations by Russia and the West that each is interfering in the other’s political systems. While Ukraine’s territorial integrity and status seem like the biggest obstacles to a peace deal, issues such as the investigation of war crimes, accountability for rebuilding Ukraine and Russia’s future role in the region may prove more difficult.

Critically, the European Union and Russia will have to reset their relationship, which collapsed after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. Europe’s sanctions on Russia and divestment from dependency on Russian oil and gas pose long-term costs for both sides. Enticing Putin to offer concessions to Ukraine might be achieved by creating a broader zone for negotiating his complaints against Europe, the United States and NATO. The key to all three negotiations is to ensure that they include regional neighbors and that all sides see a chance to make political and economic gains at different tables while also creating disincentives for prolonging the war. The question is not whether to talk to the Russians or not, it’s what to talk to them about — and when.

#### Putin’s clearly signaled he seeks improved relations.

Sumantra Maitra, 22 (4/22; National Security Fellow at the Center for the National Interest., PhD in International Relations from University of Nottingham; “A lost opportunity of a grand bargain: Security architecture between NATO and Russia” Research Gate https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360203440\_A\_lost\_opportunity\_of\_a\_grand\_bargain\_Security\_architecture\_between\_NATO\_and\_Russia) // LVL

In that light, however, several CBMs can be thought of. First, a further NATO enlargement pause should be seriously considered, regardless of a war in Ukraine. Russia seeks a new grand bargain, not tinkering within the old order. The morphing of an alliance from a defensive one to a political one is the thorny issue here, not a superficial alteration in force posture. NATO expansion has been a cause of serious debates since the early nineties, and with new evidence, the older strategic debates are returning to the forefront. In the current structural format, one can even argue that NATO has outlived its original purpose. While reversing any enlargement of NATO or curtailing the NATO bureaucracy remains out of the question due to sheer political necessity, any further enlargement will jeopardize regional balance to the point where it might lead to an unnecessary conflict. An alliance is a grouping of states based on shared interests, and the interests in a bloated diluted group are fundamentally diverse, resulting in the hollowing of a core security guarantee and encouraging freeriding in some parts of the alliance and evangelical values promotion in other parts. In fact, evangelical smaller powers who genuinely worry about a revanchist Russia and American interest declining and its security umbrella weakening, should oppose any further expansion, as that would almost inevitably result in further erosion of strategic interests. Realism for a great power is to avoid needlessly being dragged into a potential great power conflict to defend peripheral interests, on behalf of smaller, unimportant, strategically insignificant but ideologically evangelical powers.14 A potential review of the weapons and platforms available to Ukraine might be a stick to the aforementioned carrot. Recently, military aid packages were delivered to Ukraine, a continuation of long-term aid which included anti-tank missiles, small arms, training, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, night-vision, and patrol boats. While this continued the bloodletting on both sides, it failed to nullify Russia’s advantage. However, this could be a bargaining chip as it is within the rights and capability of the US to massively increase the cost of Russian misadventure. Russia should be reminded that while it has the capability to invade and overwhelm Ukraine, an insurgency aided by Western weapons in that region would be far more brutal, compared to Chechnya in the mid-nineties, in the eventuality of an actual war. Concurrently, a grand bargain to pull Russia back into the European fold, and further isolate China, would also include temporary ceasing of what the Russians consider NGO warfare, and a financial aid and promotion of “rights” and “civil societies” in post-Soviet space, in case Russia is dissuaded from an invasion. It is a hard sell in Washington, DC as much as it is a hard sell in parts of Eastern Europe, and would require a deft back-channel diplomacy. Finally, since the Russian side needs a security guarantee of a no-expansion pledge, a counter concrete written assurance from Russia and deft back-channel diplomacy to secure stability and a potential grand bargain is to be expected, one that will entail a much-needed focus on the Asian theatre. The Russian president Vladimir Putin’s statement contained a reference to the “Euro-Atlantic region” that would include the US and Canada. Russia does not always use this particular rhetoric. It was not an ultimatum to practiced ears, but a plea for a grand bargain. While the total EU GDP, not to mention manpower, dwarfs Russia, Russia still is a great power and has enormous mischief power in its near abroad. Clever diplomacy could initiate a Ukrainian state official neutrality, in a model similar to the Austrian Neutralitatserkl ¨ arung ¨ in 1955, an idea that is increasingly gaining traction among a certain section of Washington’s policy circles.15 Combined, all of these policies could potentially end the conflict and initiate a “negative-peace,” stop the loss of lives and bloodletting, potentially stabilize Russian insecurity, and in the long run result in better Russian-Western relations, as well as provide a neutral buffer space and a potential long-term security architecture. While chances of a war are high, and bringing Russia back into the mainstream European fold is a long-term aim, for now, a peaceful eastern frontier of EU and NATO would be beneficial for a long-term pivot towards the Asia-Pacific.

### Solvency---Key---2NC

#### Only a grand bargain solves escalating tensions---NATO concessions key to avoid nuclear war.

Zeeshan Aleem, 22 (3/4/22; Political columnist and editor at MSNBC, Masters in sociology from University of Chicago; “Russia's Ukraine invasion may have been preventable” <https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-may-have-been-preventable-n1290831>, LVL)

But the abundance of evidence that NATO was a sustained source of anxiety for Moscow raises the question of whether the United States’ strategic posture was not just imprudent but negligent. The fact that the NATO status question was not put on the table as Putin signaled that he was serious about an invasion — so plainly that the U.S. government was spelling it out with day-by-day updates — was an error, and potentially a catastrophic one. It may sound cruel to suggest that Ukraine could be barred, either temporarily or permanently, from entering a military alliance it wants to be in. But what’s more cruel is that Ukrainians might be paying with their lives for the United States’ reckless flirtation with Ukraine as a future NATO member without ever committing to its defense. Analysts say it’s widely known that Ukraine had no prospect of entering NATO for many years, possibly decades, because of its need for major democracy and anti-corruption reforms and because NATO has no interest in going to war with Russia over Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Russia has meddled and backed armed conflict for years. But by dangling the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO membership for years but never fulfilling it, NATO created a scenario that emboldened Ukraine to act tough and buck Russia — without any intention of directly defending Ukraine with its firepower if Moscow decided Ukraine had gone too far. But for the West to offer to compromise on Ukraine’s future entry into NATO would have required admitting the limitations of Western power. “It was the desire of Western governments not to lose face by compromising with Russia,” Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow on Russia and Europe at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of “Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry,” told me. “But it was also the moral cowardice of so many Western commentators and officials and ex-officials who would not come out in public and admit that this was no longer a viable project.” The West didn't want to set limits on NATO's enlargement and influence or lose face. So what it did was gamble. “The choice that we faced in Ukraine — and I'm using the past tense there intentionally — was whether Russia exercised a veto over NATO involvement in Ukraine on the negotiating table or on the battlefield,” said George Beebe, a former director of Russia analysis at the CIA and special adviser on Russia to former Vice President Dick Cheney. “And we elected to make sure that the veto was exercised on the battlefield, hoping that either Putin would stay his hand or that the military operation would fail.” What's happened has happened, and there’s no going back. But it still matters. The U.S. must do everything it can do to end this war — which is already brutalizing Ukraine, rattling the global economy, and could quite easily spiral into a nuclear-armed confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, if things get out of hand — as swiftly as possible, including negotiating on Ukraine's NATO status and possible neutrality with an open mind. And over the longer term, Americans must realize that in an increasingly multipolar world, reckoning with the limits of their power is critical for achieving a more peaceful and just world. NATO was originally formed as a military and political alliance between the U.S., Canada and several Western European nations in 1949. It was meant to serve as a collective defense organization to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and its most important provision, Article 5, held that an attack on one member of the alliance was an attack against all of them. In 1990, the West led the Soviets to believe NATO would not expand further eastward across Europe in exchange for Germany reunification and the agreement that the new Germany would be a NATO member. Most famously, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker once assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the NATO alliance would move “not one inch eastward” in exchange for this agreement, but as the late Princeton University scholar Stephen Cohen pointed out in 2018, this pledge was in fact made multiple times by several Western countries. These assurances were not honored, and NATO has expanded eastward over the years to include many more countries, all the way up to Russia’s borders. “It is the broken promise to Gorbachev that lingers as America’s original sin,” Cohen said then. NATO’s expansion was hugely controversial in policy circles in the 1990s. As foreign policy commentator Peter Beinart has noted, around the time the Clinton administration was considering NATO in the '90s to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — a debate that almost caused President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense William Perry to resign — many influential voices dissented: “George Kennan, the living legend who had fathered America’s policy of containment against the Soviet Union, called NATO expansion “a strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.” Thomas Friedman, America’s most prominent foreign policy columnist, declared it the “most ill-conceived project of the post-Cold War era.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan, widely considered the most erudite member of the US Senate, warned, “We have no idea what we’re getting into.” John Lewis Gaddis, the dean of America’s Cold War historians, noted that, “historians—normally so contentious—are in uncharacteristic agreement: with remarkably few exceptions, they see NATO enlargement as ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all ill-suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world.” The major concern was that expansion would backfire — that it would, as Kennan put it in 1997, “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” Indeed, Russia hated it. As Lieven previously told me, for decades the Russian political establishment and commentators have vociferously objected to NATO expansion and “warned that if this went as far as taking in Georgia and Ukraine, then there would be confrontation and strong likelihood of war.” Russia is no longer at the helm of a global superpower, but it is still, at the very least, a regional great power, and as such it devotes considerable resources to exerting its influence beyond its borders and using the states around it as buffers. Russia views Ukraine, a large country to which it has long-running cultural and historical ties, as a particularly critical buffer state for protecting its capital. The issue that Russia saw in NATO was not just an expanding military alliance, but one that had shifted gears to transforming and proactively intervening in global affairs. After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s raison d’être no longer existed, but instead of disbanding, its mission shifted to democracy promotion. The carrot of membership in NATO was used to encourage countries to adopt liberalization and good governance and align with U.S. political, economic and military interests. Of particular concern to the Russians have been NATO’s operations outside of NATO countries. The Russians were shocked by NATO’s bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, where NATO not only intervened in the affairs of a non-NATO country, but took sides against the Serbs, allies of the Russians, and did so without United Nations Security Council approval. NATO has also been involved in regime change and nation-building projects in places like Libya and Afghanistan. “NATO is a defensive organization; I don't think it had any plans on Russia,” Thomas Graham, a former special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, said regarding NATO’s expansion of territory and widening scope of operations. “All that said … if you put yourself in the position of people in the Kremlin, you can see why they came to that conclusion.” Things turned up a notch in 2008, when NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members” of NATO. It did not specify a timeline, and it was assumed that it was conditional on the countries adopting political reforms, but it infuriated the Russians. As a way to reassert its dominance in the region, Russia invaded Georgia later that year. In another sign of Russia’s intolerance of losing out to Western influence in those countries, Putin annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014 in the wake of the protest-spurred ouster of Ukraine’s Russia-friendly president, which the West favored. John Mearsheimer, an international relations scholar at the University of Chicago, argued that a number of factors, including Ukraine’s potential integration into the Western European economy, played a role in Russia’s concerns in 2014, but NATO enlargement was the “taproot” of the crisis and Russia wanted to make sure that, among other things, a NATO base couldn’t be set up in Crimea as Ukraine drifted toward the U.S. Mearsheimer also warned that this was foreshadowing, and Ukraine’s pseudo-membership status was going to bait Moscow and result in catastrophe. “The West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path, and the end result is Ukraine is going to get wrecked,” he said in a lecture. Russia has grown concerned again about Ukraine for a number of reasons. Analysts like Lieven and Beebe point out that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has taken a number of sharp measures to eradicate Russian influence in Ukraine recently by doing things like banning the use of Russian language in schools and state institutions, shutting down Kremlin-linked television stations and arresting some of the most prominent Russo-sympathetic leaders in the country — all while cooperating on the ground with NATO. Russia read this as a sign that Kyiv was throwing its lot in with the U.S. and the prospect of an agreement ensuring autonomy for the separatist-held Donbas region, crucial to Russia’s plan to thwart Ukraine’s NATO entry, might be dead. All this brings us to the crisis at hand. The takeaway of this very quick survey is not to convince you to agree with Russia’s assessment that NATO posed an existential threat to it or that it is justified in its great power politicking. As Beebe put it, whether or not Russia’s perception is accurate or justified “is immaterial to whether that perception is genuinely held and to whether they will act on that perception.” What matters is that there is clear evidence that Russia sees NATO as destabilizing, pro-democratic and anti-Russian — and clear evidence that it was willing to use force to counter NATO's enlargement. Moreover, Putin sent clear signals that he was serious about pulling the trigger if he didn't get something. Shifting some 150,000 troops along Ukraine’s border for weeks was a real cost, and it placed pressure on him to not back down without extracting a major concession and risk losing face in front of Russia’s political elite. “I thought, and continue to think, that we should have made a deal, that there was a deal to be had — not a deal that we liked, obviously, but a deal that the realities of the situation that we're facing required,” Beebe said.

### Solvency---AT: Russia Bad---2NC

#### Russia doesn’t threaten the US.

Bandow, 21 (Doug Bandow, 6-8-21, assistant to President Ronald Reagan and fellow specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Time to Make a Deal with Vladimir Putin,” <https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-make-deal-vladimir-putin>)/MS

This still doesn’t justify Moscow’s brutal response in Ukraine, of course. But having destroyed Iraq based on a lie, thereby destabilizing the region, unleashing al‐​Qaeda/​ISIS, empowering Iran, wrecking minority religious communities, and unleashing a tsunami of sectarian violence that killed hundreds of thousands of people, Washington officials should dispense with the sanctimony. Or they might ask Mexico, which lost half of its territory to an aggressive, young United States. Georgia and Ukraine are stuck in a bad neighborhood with a belligerent big neighbor, and America can’t change that.

Four points stand out. First, though Ukraine has been badly treated by Moscow, the issue matters not much for American and European security. Ukraine long was part of the Russian Empire (in both old and new variants). Washington never worried about Kyiv’s status since Moscow was the key player.

Ukraine is closer to Europe, which therefore should have a greater interest in that nation’s stability. The Europeans, however, recognize that Russia’s mistreatment of Ukraine — seizing Crimea and backing separatism in the Donbass in the east — is sui generis. Putin has done nothing to indicate he wants to try to swallow Ukraine, an impossible task, and if he won’t do that he isn’t likely to launch a blitzkrieg to overrun Europe (with three times Russia’s population).

The main impact of [Moscow’s Ukrainian misadventure](https://spectator.org/ukraine-russia-united-states/) is making Kyiv’s membership in NATO unlikely, since present rules bar admitting a country with active border disputes with a neighbor. But that fits with European opposition to Ukraine’s inclusion. Since the conflict started in 2014, the more distant U.S., pushed by a curious coalition of pro‐​war Republicans and anti‐​Trump Democrats, has been most determined to confront Moscow.

Second, Putin’s government doesn’t threaten the United States. A direct attack on America is inconceivable. As for the Europeans, even they, at least those not on Russia’s border, dismiss the likelihood of war: if they were worried, they would be spending more than 1 percent plus change on their militaries. There is a lot of sparring between America and the Russian Federation in peripheral areas — Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, Libya — but these are of marginal importance. And if Washington did not treat Moscow as an enemy through sanctions and more, the latter would be less likely to reciprocate by routinely challenging U.S. interests. Russia’s human rights situation is atrocious, but murder, kidnapping, torture, mass imprisonment, and foreign aggression don’t bother American officials when conducted by Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and more.

Third, current U.S. policy is bizarrely pushing Moscow and Beijing together. Richard Nixon transformed the Cold War by engaging China and turning the geopolitical gap between them from a ditch into a chasm. Now Russia and the People’s Republic of China are working together against America. Some analysts seek to reassure by insisting that the two will inevitably break up. Others counsel that nothing can be done to prevent such cooperation.

### Solvency---AT: Russia Blocks---2NC

#### Russian open to US negotiations without NATO – solves European security, Ukraine, arms control

Michael McFaul, 22 (PhD in International Relations from Oxford, Professor of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, served for five years in the Obama administration, and as U.S. Ambassador to Russia; “How to Make a Deal With Putin”, Foreign Affairs [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-02-11/how-make-deal-putin)//](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-02-11/how-make-deal-putin)/) LASA LVL

Vladimir Putin has the world on edge. The Russian president has deployed more than 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders and threatened “military-technical” measures if NATO continues to cooperate with Kyiv. He unilaterally drafted two extraordinarily aggressive treaties in December designed to constrain the organization and its members. They contain demands that are such nonstarters—most centrally, closing NATO’s open door to Ukraine and prohibiting organizational forces and weapons in nations that joined after May 1997—that they read more like predicates for war rather than sincere overtures for negotiations. Nonetheless, U.S. President Joe Biden and NATO provided detailed written replies in January, attempting to start a dialogue with the Russian leader. If Putin spurns these offers, war is likely. But Moscow has not yet wholly rejected negotiations. Conquering Ukraine would be no cakewalk, and Putin understands that killing thousands of people from a nation he describes as “part of Russia” would be hard to explain to his citizens, especially if the Russian military also suffers major casualties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said the United States’ response to the initial proposal contained “a kernel of rationality,” and Putin is still speaking and meeting with Western leaders, including Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. If Putin does agree to negotiate, then Biden and his team should not just offer defensively minimal concessions to freeze the crisis. Instead, in concert with allies and partners, Biden should seize the diplomatic offensive and counter with a comprehensive, grand bargain for enhancing European security. Call it “Helsinki 2.0.” This agreement could refresh and modernize the Helsinki Accords signed during the Cold War, which stabilized the continent even as U.S.-Soviet competition grew in other parts of the world. It could resuscitate and amend defunct arms control agreements and provide a bigger framework for European security, and in the process help solve the issues surrounding Ukraine. Convening a major summit to renegotiate European security will give Russia an international platform that Putin does not deserve. But that symbolism shouldn’t stop Biden, NATO leaders, and other European democracies. The Helsinki Accords recognized the Soviet Union as a superpower, and that affirmation helped persuade Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to make concessions. Putin also likes attention, and the West should be prepared to offer cheap pageantry not only to prevent a new Russian invasion into Ukraine but also to repair Europe’s broken security architecture. The United States and Europe must have the courage to move beyond defensive patchwork fixes and instead pivot to bold, aggressive initiatives to make the continent safer. On the surface, the 1970s were not an auspicious time for Soviet-U.S. compromise. Many observers believed the Kremlin’s power was rising and Washington’s was falling. Communists were taking power in parts of southeast Asia and southern Africa. Tension between the world’s main blocs was running high. But in the middle of the decade, Canadian, Soviet, U.S., and European diplomats set aside their broad and fundamental disagreements to discuss an issue of shared concern: European security. After several years of negotiations, they produced and signed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which codified ambiguous issues left over from World War II. At the heart of the accords was a central compromise: Western states de facto recognized the borders that resulted from Soviet conquests after World War II, and in return, the Soviet Union agreed to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or beliefs, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) tasked with implementing these obligations. The Soviet Union and the West also tacitly agreed to disagree on the precise definitions of government accountability, human rights, economic rights, and non-intervention in internal affairs . Ambiguity, they showed, is sometimes necessary for effective diplomacy. In the first two decades after the accords were signed, Europe saw an explosion of new security agreements and treaties, particularly after Soviet reformer Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. In 1987, he joined U.S. President Ronald Reagan to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating a whole class of highly destabilizing weapons. In 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty came online, substantially reducing the size of conventional forces deployed on the continent. The 1990 Vienna Document, signed by Canada, the Soviet Union, the United States, and most of Europe and Central Asia, expanded transparency about weapons and military training exercises. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia and the West continued to make deals that helped keep Europe secure. The 1992 Open Skies Treaty, which followed the Vienna Document, allowed signatories to fly reconnaissance missions through one another’s territories to collect information on military activities. The ambitious 1990 Charter of Paris trumpeted that all European signatories would “build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.” It declared prematurely that “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.” The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine sent Kyiv’s nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for promises that Moscow, the United Kingdom, and the United States would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act established mechanisms for the two parties to collaborate, marking a high point in cooperation.

### Solvency---AT: Bad Faith---2NC

#### Arms control negotiations will open post-Ukraine---both sides will participate in good faith.

TASS 22, Russian news agency, 6/6/2022, “Russia interested in nuclear arms talks with US — Kremlin spokesman,” <https://tass.com/politics/1461157?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com>, RH

MOSCOW, June 6. /TASS/. Moscow is interested in nuclear arms talks with Washington but negotiations are unlikely to take place in the current situation, Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Monday.

"We are interested [in such talks] as we believe that [it’s necessary] to continue talks and discuss this issue given the tectonic shifts in the field of European and even global security. Such talks are necessary, the whole world needs them," Peskov said in response to a TASS request to comment on US Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan’s remark that US-Russia nuclear arms talks were unlikely to resume in the current situation.

"Perhaps, we should agree with the ambassador that it looks unlikely at the moment but sooner or later we will need to return to this issue," the Kremlin spokesman added.

The US envoy said in an interview with TASS earlier that he hadn’t been instructed by Washington to prepare for such negotiations. At the same time, Sullivan emphasized that it was "one of the most significant issues between the US and Russia".

### Solvency---AT: Treaty Violations---2NC

#### Treaty violations are reciprocal but the US has failed to attempt negotiation – caused the breakdown of European security

Pifer 20 [Steven, 11-19-2020, nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. "The looming US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/19/the-looming-us-withdrawal-from-the-open-skies-treaty/>] EZAY

The Trump administration’s antipathy toward arms control will strike again on November 22, when the United States withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty. That is a mistake. While Russia has violated the treaty, the United States has reciprocated. NATO allies support the treaty — which focuses first and foremost on enhancing European security — and wish the United States to remain a party.

Whether the treaty can continue following the American departure remains to be seen and will depend on what Russia does. When it takes office, the Biden administration should consider reentering the agreement, though that may require some creative international lawyering.

THE TREATY

The Open Skies Treaty, which entered into force in 2002, permits countries to fly unarmed aircraft with cameras and other sensors over the territory of the treaty’s other 34 members states. Based on an idea advanced by Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, Open Skies provides for the collection of imagery of military installations and activities in order to foster transparency.

Each party to the treaty has two annual quotas: the number of flights it may conduct over other treaty-parties (active quota), and the number of overflights that it must accept (passive quota). Aircraft are inspected before conducting an Open Skies flight, and personnel from the country to be overflown are on board during the flight.

The treaty offers several advantages. While the capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance satellites are superior to those of Open Skies aircraft, all 34 treaty-parties have access to imagery from the flights (whereas satellite imagery is highly classified). The treaty gives U.S. allies and partners, who lack sophisticated imagery satellites, the opportunity to gather confidence-building data. Moreover, aircraft offer greater flexibility than satellites in flight plans and can fly under cloud cover. Open Skies flights can also be used to send political signals: After Russia instigated the conflict in Donbas in 2014, for instance, the United States targeted flights at eastern Ukraine and the bordering Russian territory in order to send a message of U.S. support for Kyiv.

By 2019, the 34 parties had conducted a total of more than 1,500 overflights. During the treaty’s first 15 years of operation, the United States conducted 196 flights over Russia and Belarus (the two are paired for treaty purposes), while Russia conducted 71 flights over the United States.

Unfortunately, Russia has violated the treaty by imposing restrictions on certain flights over its territory. In response, the United States imposed reciprocal restrictions on Russian flights over U.S. territory. While the Russian violations are problematic, Washington has not declared that they constitute a material breach — that is, a violation that vitiates the central purpose of the treaty. Nevertheless, on May 21, Secretary of State Pompeo released a statement saying that, unless Moscow returned to full compliance, Washington would leave the treaty in six months’ time. The U.S. government provided formal notification of its intention to withdraw to the other treaty parties the following day; hence, the U.S. withdrawal will take effect on November 22.

A SERIAL KILLER OF ARMS CONTROL?

By all appearances, the Trump administration sees little value in arms control and nonproliferation arrangements. In 2018, President Trump decided to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Iran can produce the fissile material for a nuclear bomb in a much shorter time today than three years ago. Meanwhile, the United States stands isolated, with close allies such as Britain, France, and Germany staying in the agreement and ignoring Washington’s requests to apply sanctions on Tehran.

In 2019, the Trump administration withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an agreement signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that banned an entire class of missiles. Russia had violated the agreement by deploying a prohibited missile, but President Trump’s team showed no interest in preserving the treaty, eschewing military and political measures that could have pressured Moscow to return to compliance.

In 2020, administration officials reportedly considered conducting an underground nuclear test. That would violate a long-standing test moratorium observed by the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would prohibit all nuclear tests, has not entered into force). A U.S. nuclear test would open the door to tests by others, eroding the nuclear knowledge advantage the United States enjoys from having conducted more tests than the rest of the world combined.

Happily, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) appears safe. True, the Trump administration could in its final days give notice of an intention to withdraw, but the intention could only be carried out three months later. President-elect Biden supports New START and supports its extension; he would revoke any such notice.

However, Open Skies looks to be the outgoing Trump administration’s next — and last — victim.

WHAT NEXT FOR OPEN SKIES?

The Open Skies Treaty focused on strengthening confidence and security in Europe, one reason why the Trump administration should have given the views of its allies greater weight. A major question now turns on what Moscow will do, given that the U.S. departure will mean that Russia can conduct flights over European territory and Canada but not the United States.

If Moscow decides to withdraw from Open Skies, perhaps citing the treaty’s decreased value because it can no longer overfly American territory, the treaty will collapse. NATO allies will see little point in overflying other allies or partners such as Sweden and Finland. Alternatively, Moscow could decide to remain in the treaty, at least for a time, in part to score propaganda points over the U.S. withdrawal.

## Internal---Relations

### Internal---Relations---2NC

#### NATO spurs escalation – Russia requires abandonment of exercises and withdrawal of arms

Gotev ‘22 [Georgia; 2-18-2022; "Russia asks US to withdraw arms, personnel from new NATO members," euractiv, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russia-asks-us-to-withdraw-arms-personnel-from-new-nato-members/>, smarx, AZM]

Russia told the US on Thursday (17 February) it should withdraw arms and personnel from new NATO members, and that it and NATO must legally commit to stop NATO enlargement eastward.

The demands come following US proposals aimed at defusing tensions at the Ukraine-Russia border. As diplomatic affords to try and calm the situation, the latest details come following reports in media including Russian news agency RIA Novosti and Spanish newspaper El Pais.

On 2 February, the latter released what it said was a leaked copy of a US response to Russian demands, in which Washington offered talks with Moscow on an agreement for both sides to refrain from stationing offensive missiles or troops in Ukraine. The authenticity of the 11-page leaked document has been confirmed.

On Thursday, US Ambassador John Sullivan received the Russian response in Moscow, a senior State Department official said.

According to RIA Novosti, the main thrust of the Russian reply is as follows:

Russia considers that the US “distorted” Russia’s proposals for security guarantees in the direction of creating benefits for Washington and its allies, ignoring the package nature of the proposals, choosing convenient topics;

Russia considers as unacceptable the Western requests that Russia withdraws troops from certain areas of its own territory;

Russia says that for de-escalation around Ukraine, Kyiv must comply with the Minsk agreements, that arms supplies from Western countries to Ukraine must stop, and those already delivered be withdrawn, that all Western advisers and instructors should be withdrawn, and NATO must abandon exercises with Ukraine;

Russia insists on withdrawal of all US forces and weapons from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics;

Russia expects concrete proposals from the United States and NATO on the content and forms of the alliance’s legal engagement not to expand eastward.

Russia has reportedly stated that arms control issues cannot be considered in isolation from other protection measures.

### Internal---Relations---AT: NATO Not Key---2NC

#### Diplomacy is possible BUT Putin hates NATO – concessions are the only way to revive US-Russian relations

Mahshie '22 [Abraham Mahshie; 2/15/2022; M.A. at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, the Pentagon Editor for Air Force Magazine with two decades of experience and served as a diplomat and defense contractor; "'Cautious Optimism’ as Moscow Hints at Diplomacy, Withdrawal Ahead of NATO Meeting," Air Force Magazine, <https://www.airforcemag.com/cautious-optimism-as-moscow-russia-hints-at-diplomacy-withdrawal-ahead-of-nato-meeting/> smarx, AZG]

Smith underscored that the U.S. and NATO position was two-track: to pursue diplomacy by welcoming continued dialogue with Russia; and to reinforce NATO against potential Russian aggression.

The U.S. has already unilaterally reinforced eastern flank allies by sending 5,000 troops to Central and Eastern Europe, including 3,000 Soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division to Poland and 1,000 from a U.S. Stryker squadron at Vilseck, Germany, to Romania.

Stoltenberg said the U.S. additions are meaningful.

“I saw the Stryker units coming into Romania, coming into Constanta, and there are more U.S. planes, there are more German, Italian, and other allies [who] have also stepped up,” he said.

In addition to troop movements, the U.S. Air Force has now sent eight F-16s and 16 F-15s to the eastern flank.

Eight additional F-15s from the 336th Fighter Squadron, 4th Fighter Wing, at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., deployed to Lask Air Base, Poland, on Feb. 14 to augment the eight F-15s already there from the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath, U.K., U.S. Air Forces in Europe confirmed to Air Force Magazine. Eight F-16s from the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, deployed to Fetesti Air Base, Romania, on Feb. 11. The fighter jets in both locations will take part in NATO enhanced air policing missions and joint training.

The U.S. also maintains on high alert an additional 8,500 troops in the United States to act as a NATO Response Force if called upon.

A NATO official from the eastern flank told Air Force Magazine the alliance has “not seen anything specific” with regard to threats emanating from Russia, but that hybrid activities, including propaganda against border areas of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, continue.

A heavy Russian troop presence in Belarus, which borders the Baltic countries, is also worrying because it has shrunk indications and warning time.

The official said the Alliance is watching Russian activities closely to see if actions match recent statements.

“I think everybody is waiting and watching with caution for those messages to be confirmed,” the official said.

A Feb. 14 move by the Russian lower house Duma to draft resolutions recognizing the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, in southeast Ukraine, as independent states also worries NATO.

“That would obviously be a new shift in in the escalation,” Smith said, adding that the recognition would violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity and break Russia’s commitment to the Minsk protocol, which reduced conflict in 2014 after Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.

The NATO eastern flank official also cited the Duma resolutions as concerning.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III was scheduled to leave Washington, D.C. Feb. 15 to attend the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence, scheduled for Feb. 15-16, before traveling on to Poland and Lithuania, where he will meet with his counterparts and American troops. Before leaving Brussels on Feb. 17, Austin and the other defense ministers of the 30-member Alliance will meet with the defense ministers of aspiring members Ukraine and Georgia.

Putin has made clear that he does not want NATO to expand eastward, and he has specifically called for barring Ukraine and Georgia from entering the alliance. NATO and the United States have stood firm on the so-called NATO “open-door policy” that allows any country to pursue membership.

Still, NATO leaders believe there is a possibility of averting a Russian invasion.

“We believe the best path is through dialogue and de-escalation. And we have urged them at every turn to come back to the table,” Smith said of dialogue with Russia. “We do not understand fundamentally, none of us do, what is inside President Putin’s head. And, so, we cannot make any guess how, where all of this is headed.”

#### Negotiations possible but NATO hostility poisons talks.

Masters **’**22 [Masters; 01/20/22; MA in social theory from the New School, leads writers and editors who produce wide-ranging content for CFR.org, including Backgrounders, visual stories, and events, rites on foreign policy and national security and work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, and Bloomberg; "Why NATO Has Become a Flash Point With Russia in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations; <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-nato-has-become-flash-point-russia-ukraine#chapter-title-0-2> //smarx, AZG)

Tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have reached the point of crisis. The government of Russian President Vladimir Putin is threatening a wider military incursion into Ukraine unless the U.S.-led alliance makes several major security concessions, including a commitment to cease expanding eastward.

Russia says that the United States and NATO have continually violated pledges allegedly made in the early 1990s that the alliance would not expand into the former Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, alliance leaders have said they are open to new diplomacy with Russia on arms control and other matters but that they are unwilling to discuss forever shutting NATO’s doors to new members.

What is the source of Russia’s dispute with NATO?

Russian leaders have long been wary of the eastward expansion of NATO, particularly as the alliance opened its doors to former Warsaw Pact states and ex-Soviet republics in the late 1990s (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and early 2000s (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Their fears grew in the late 2000s as the alliance stated its intent to admit Georgia and Ukraine at an unspecified point in the future.

For the Kremlin, the notion that Ukraine, a pillar of the Soviet Union with strong historic ties to Russia, would join NATO was a red line. “No Russian leader could stand idly by in the face of steps toward NATO membership for Ukraine. That would be a hostile act toward Russia,” Putin warned U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns, who is now director of the CIA, in the weeks leading up to NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit.

Although NATO did not announce a formal membership plan for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest Summit, the alliance did affirm “that these countries will become members of NATO,” and it extended formal invitations to accession talks to Albania and Croatia, which became members in 2009. NATO expanded again in 2017, admitting Montenegro, and in 2020, welcoming North Macedonia.

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union that it would freeze NATO expansion?

Russian officials say that the U.S. government made a pledge to Soviet leaders not to expand the alliance’s eastern borders, a commitment they say came during the flurry of diplomacy following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and surrounding the reunification of Germany in 1990. Proponents of this narrative often cite the words that U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker said to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” They say the United States and NATO have repeatedly betrayed this verbal commitment in the decades since, taking advantage of Russia’s tumultuous post-Soviet period and expanding the Western alliance several times, all the way to Russia’s doorstep in the case of the Baltic states.

However, many Western analysts and former U.S. officials involved in these discussions dispute what they say is a selective view of history. They point out that, in early 1990, the focus of the diplomacy between the so-called Two Plus Four (East and West Germany plus the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) was the future of Germany and the question of whether the soon-to-be unified country would be part of NATO. (West Germany was already an alliance member, while East Germany was part of the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact.) They say that the discussions were not about NATO’s long-term plans for eastward expansion, which would have made little sense at that time; the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union still existed, and there was scant indication they would dissolve as quickly as they did, in a matter of months. In a 2014 interview, Gorbachev said as much: “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was never discussed. It was not raised in those years.”

The diplomacy between U.S. and Soviet leaders during this period focused on Germany and included discussions of various post-unification security options, including the potential for Germany to become part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for Germany to be nonaligned, and even for the Soviet Union to join NATO. Early in the talks, Soviet leaders insisted that a unified Germany never become part of NATO, though they eventually accepted Germany’s right to decide for itself. Similarly, the United States stepped back from Baker’s initial language on not expanding “NATO’s jurisdiction,” which he reportedly used only in the discussion about whether NATO troops would be based in what was then East Germany. In the end, the treaty recognizing German unification that the Two Plus Four powers signed in the summer of 1990 stipulated that only German territorial (non-NATO) forces could be based in East Germany while Soviet forces withdrew. After that, only German forces assigned to NATO could be based there, not foreign NATO forces. The treaty doesn’t mention NATO’s rights and commitments beyond Germany.

### Internal---Relations---AT: Impossible---2NC

#### US-Russia relations are walking a tightrope – direct US action is necessary now

Mahshie '22 [Abraham Mahshie; 2/15/2022; M.A. at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, the Pentagon Editor for Air Force Magazine with two decades of experience and served as a diplomat and defense contractor; "'Cautious Optimism’ as Moscow Hints at Diplomacy, Withdrawal Ahead of NATO Meeting," Air Force Magazine, <https://www.airforcemag.com/cautious-optimism-as-moscow-russia-hints-at-diplomacy-withdrawal-ahead-of-nato-meeting/> smarx, AZG]

NATO defense ministers from across the alliance arrived in Brussels on Feb. 15 eager to verify Russian claims that it is withdrawing forces and open to a diplomatic solution to end the Russia-Ukraine crisis, even as tens of thousands of Russian troops remained on Baltic borders.

With more than 130,000 Russian troops surrounding Ukraine on three sides and a continuous buildup of military equipment, Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to change course Feb. 14. In a televised exchange with Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested a diplomatic solution was still possible. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced Feb. 15 that some units had completed their tasks and were returning to their military garrisons.

But NATO is hesitant to take Putin at his word.

“What we need to see is a significant and enduring withdrawal of forces, troops, and not least [of which] the heavy equipment,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at a pre-ministerial press briefing Feb. 15, in response to a question about Lavrov’s comments a day earlier.

“So far, we have not seen any de-escalation on the ground from the Russian side. Over the last weeks and days, we have seen the opposite,” Stoltenberg added. “A continued military buildup with more troops, more battlegroups, more high-end capabilities, artillery, air defense missiles, and a lot of support elements that makes it possible for Russia to move into Ukraine for full-fledged invasion or a more limited military incursion with hardly any warning time at all.”

However, Stoltenberg said there is “some ground for cautious optimism” based on the signaling from Moscow.

A Russian Ministry of Defence article Feb. 15 describing joint exercises with Belarus and planned live fire exercises Feb. 19, also mentioned that some troops were preparing to return.

“The units of the Southern and Western military districts, having completed their tasks, have already begun loading onto rail and road transport and will begin moving to their military garrisons today,” the story read.

U.S. permanent representative to NATO, Ambassador Julianne Smith, told reporters early Feb. 15 that she was hopeful for a diplomatic solution and that claims of a drawdown by Russia must be verified.

“This is something that we’ll have to look at closely and verify in the days ahead,” Smith said during a teleconference from Brussels, noting that Russia made a similar claim in late December.

“What’s important is that we try to verify based on the fact that we’ve seen other instances in the past where Russia has claimed to be de-escalating, and in fact, facts on the ground didn’t prove that to be true,” she added.

After the comments, reports emerged that Ukraine’s defense ministry and two banks came under cyberattack. Defense officials have of late voiced concerns that Russia would commence any conflict with cyber, informational, and hybrid warfare tactics.

Meanwhile, the ranking members of House committees for Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence introduced a bill to sanction Russia now instead of threatening sanctions should Putin order an invasion of Ukraine. The bill cites Russia’s military buildup and the hybrid warfare tactics already committed against Ukraine, and calls for additional support to Ukraine and allies on NATO’s eastern flank.

## Impact---Relations

### Impact---2NC

#### Arms racing goes nuclear

Litwalk, 5-3 (Robert Litwak, 5-3-22, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies at the Wilson Cneter , “Russia’s Nuclear Threats Recast Cold War Dangers: The ‘Delicate balance of terror’ Revisited,” <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/russias-nuclear-threats-recast-cold-war-dangers-delicate-balance-terror-revisited>)

As the United States convened a meeting of 40 nations in late April to coordinate their military aid to Ukraine, Russia responded with renewed nuclear saber-rattling. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, echoing earlier statements by President Vladimir Putin, charged the United States and NATO with waging a “proxy” war against Russia in Ukraine and asserted that the risk of nuclear war is now “[considerable](https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2022/04/26/dont-underestimate-threat-of-nuclear-war-russian-foreign-minister-warns/?sh=4044b81d6edb).” While President Biden has called Russian comments about nuclear war “[irresponsible](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/28/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-request-to-congress-for-additional-funding-to-support-ukraine/),” CIA Director William Burns warned, “Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to [tactical nuclear weapons](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/us/politics/putin-nuclear-weapons.html) or low-yield nuclear weapons.”

Crisis instability over Ukraine is playing out during a period when emerging developments are eroding strategic stability in the nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and Russia. This confluence threatens to recast and elevate two traditional dangers of the bipolar Cold War era.

Throughout the nuclear age, the U.S. strategy of deterrence has aimed to keep low a low probability event with high consequences. While the probability of Russian nuclear use remains low, the Ukraine War has elevated this risk to a level not seen since the most fraught moments of the Cold War. As Putin warns that any Western interference in Ukraine will be met with a “[lightning fast](https://www.nbcnews.com/now/video/putin-warns-of-lightning-fast-retaliation-to-foreign-intervention-in-ukraine-138812997985)” response from Russia, the crisis contains the risk of escalation—such as a geographical spillover of the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Crisis stability and strategic stability are linked: strategic stability has been defined by U.S. administrations as the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis. With the near-total collapse of the arms-control architecture from the last fifty years, the two great powers are now locked in an unconstrained arms race—through their nuclear modernization programs (including the development of a new generation of strategic nuclear systems, tactical nuclear weapons, and [hypersonic missiles](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/us/politics/russia-hypersonic-missile-attack-claim.html)), as well as the extension of their competition into the emergent domains of cyberspace and outer space.

The first danger of the Cold War being recast and elevated in this emerging strategic environment is the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the possibility for conflict at lower levels on the continuum of military force. After both the United States and the Soviet Union acquired thermonuclear weapons in the early 1950s, British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart speculated, “To the extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.” Policy analysts would later refer to this as the “[stability-instability paradox](https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/402911/the-stability-instability-paradox/)”—that strategic stability at the nuclear level could generate instability by encouraging rival powers to pursue tactical gains through non-nuclear means in regions peripheral to the central conflict in what was then called the “Third World.”

But even with the ideological overlay of the Cold War, these stakes were less than vital and the conflicts typically involved one superpower against the proxy forces of the other (e.g., Soviet backing of the North during the Vietnam War, U.S. support for the Afghan Mujahedeen by the Carter and Reagan administrations). These constraints significantly mitigated the risks of escalation. By contrast, the potential flashpoints between the United States and Russia are not peripheral but vital interests.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reset the debate over Vladimir Putin’s revanchist intentions. The scale of the Russian invasion—and the Russian dictator’s initial objective of regime change in Kyiv—accompanied by nuclear saber-rattling is unprecedented and, forebodingly, without geographical limits. The Kremlin has asserted a right to “protect” ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond Russia’s borders (which it says numbers some 25 million people) and has even offered citizenship to millions of ethnic Russians living in neighboring former Soviet republics, including the three Baltic states that are NATO members

The second revived danger of the Cold War era are threats to the stability of nuclear deterrence. RAND Corporation strategist Albert Wohlstetter challenged the assumption of an inherently stable nuclear deterrent in a 1959 Foreign Affairs article, “The Delicate Balance ofTerror.” Wohlstetter’s concern then was the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear forces to surprise attack and that in a crisis the Kremlin leadership might perceive an incentive to go first—to launch a preemptive strike. This dynamic led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles on Cuba to target the U.S. East coast was a desperate bid to redress the strategic balance with the United States and precipitated the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War. After the profound shock of that near Armageddon, the Soviet Union began to match the U.S. deployment of large numbers of secure second-strike nuclear forces. The crisis highlighted the potentially catastrophic consequences of a “delicate” balance that incentivized one side to go first.

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, assured retaliation—eliminating incentives for a surprise first strike—has been the sine qua non of strategic stability. The risk for crisis stability is that arms race instability could revive those incentives, making the deterrent relationships more “delicate.” With the advent of new technologies, escalation during a crisis could occur in a non-traditional domain—cyber or space—and could misleadingly be viewed as non-escalatory because it would be non-kinetic. But an inadvertent escalatory spiral could be set off by a Russian cyberattack to interfere with U.S. communications with its nuclear systems or an attack on reconnaissance satellites to blind the United States. Hints of that potentiality are already manifest: Russia conducted an [anti-satellite missile test](https://www.space.com/crussian-anti-satellite-missile-test-world-condemnation) last November and, during the Ukraine war, has carried out extensive [cyberattacks](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks-ukraine.html), often in coordination with its battlefield operations.

In the Ukraine war, as during the Cuban Missile Crisis, inadvertent escalation remains a major risk. Putin is a risk-taker (whose agents used a military-grade nerve agent in a 2018 assassination attempt on a Russian military defector in Britain) and he is prone to miscalculation. His assumptions going in to Ukraine—that the conflict would be short and decisive, that the Zelensky government would fold quickly, and that the West would be feckless in its disunity—were all miscalculations that ironically led many Western officials and analysts to conclude that he would threaten but not invade.

Given Putin’s propensity for risk-taking and miscalculation, the Biden administration is exploring scenarios in which Russian military “setbacks” and “desperation” (as CIA Director Burns’ warned) lead to the use of chemical or nuclear weapons. Under what U.S. officials describe as Russia’s “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy, Putin might double down in the face of adversity by employing a single weapon for its demonstration effect—to shock the Ukrainian and Western leaderships into acceding to terms favorable to the Kremlin. While the Biden administration has not laid down an explicit deterrent marker specifying the U.S. response, a senior official warned that any Russian use of nuclear weapons would mean “[all bets are off](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/us/politics/biden-russia-nuclear-weapons.html)”—a tacit signal that such a violation of the nuclear taboo could move the United States and NATO to become directly involved in the war. The Biden administration could strengthen that deterrent message, as Stanford Professor of Political Science [Scott Sagan](https://news.stanford.edu/2022/04/20/u-s-must-can-prevent-russian-military-crossing-nuclear-threshold/#:~:text=Stanford%20scholar%20Scott%20Sagan%20found,of%20civilians%20in%20another%20country) has recommended, by communicating directly to the Russian military that an order from Putin to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be illegal, a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and should not be obeyed.

#### Goes nuclear---extinction threat is real.

Scoblic and Mandel, 6-28 (Peter Scoblic and David Mandel, 6-28-22, opinion contributors for CNN, “Opinion: How to assess the risk of nuclear war without freaking out,” <https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/28/opinions/nuclear-war-likelihood-probability-russia-us-scoblic-mandel/index.html>)

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine four months ago, a question that keeps popping up in conversation with colleagues -- and with relatives, from Washington to Paris -- is: Should they get out of town before the nuclear missiles start flying?

In reality, there's no way to outrun a strategic nuclear war, which would [kill untold millions](https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/03/opinions/nuclear-war-talk-russia-helfand-christ/index.html), destroy the economy and poison the planet.

But there's no doubt the fears are real. In March, an [Associated Press poll](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-cold-war-nato-c0acbb51f5fda41475287a4113ada3fd__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacXUj72KL0$) found that three-quarters of Americans worry that Russia will use nuclear weapons against the United States, and over half worry that the Russians would target their hometown specifically.

Likewise, a [report](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/russians-and-americans-sense-new-cold-war__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacXdE4pBMU$)the following month from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 69% of Americans fear a US nuclear exchange with Russia.

On the one hand, this reaction seems alarmist. After all, the cold logic of nuclear deterrence still applies. [Mutual assured destruction](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.britannica.com/topic/mutual-assured-destruction__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacXBjgQ2S0$) remains mutual and assured. On the other hand, Putin's nuclear saber-rattling is scary. Indeed, from the first day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine he [warned](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-23-22/h_d48db5391abae0b336a8217487043536) that any outside interference would lead to "consequences as you have never experienced in your history."

Meanwhile, Russia's ambassador to the US raised tensions when he [complained:](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.newsweek.com/russia-ambassador-us-says-nato-not-taking-nuclear-war-threat-seriously-1703968__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacX6g7CJ3g$) "The current generation of NATO politicians clearly does not take the nuclear threat seriously." Perhaps to make sure they did, Russian TV recently [showed an animation](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a39879099/russian-state-tv-threatens-to-annihilate-the-uk-with-1600-foot-tall-nuclear-tsunamis/__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacX_-4_xro$) in which a 100-megaton nuclear torpedo turned Britain "into a radioactive desert."

For those of us who grew up in the shadow of the Cold War, the resulting fear is all too familiar, reviving memories we thought were safe to jettison. The threat from nuclear weapons did not dissolve with the Soviet Union, but the existential terror they spawned did.

Over the years, mass demonstrations calling for nuclear disarmament faded, images of Armageddon ceased to drive pop culture and artifacts that once stirred dread came to seem like campy relics of another age. (Today, you can buy a ["Fallout Shelter Nuclear Retro Vintage Look Rusted Reproduction Metal Sign"](https://www.ebay.co.uk/sch/i.html?_from=R40&_trksid=p2380057.m570.l1313&_nkw=Fallout+Shelter+Nuclear+Retro+Vintage+Look+Rusted+Reproduction+Metal+Sign&_sacat=0)for less than $20 on eBay.) If public expressions of fear were any indicator, the danger no longer existed.

Students at a Brooklyn middle school 'duck and cover' during a practice drill for a nuclear attack in 1962.

Now, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has revived those fears -- and those fears have been officially sanctioned by everyone from the [CIA](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/iac.gatech.edu/news/item/657503/director-highlights-international-challenges-importance-diversity-georgia__;!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacXCMQbeLY$) to the [European Union](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-safety-security-and-safeguards-implications-situation-ukraine-delivered_en*_blank__;Iw!!AQdq3sQhfUj4q8uUguY!l0O0MwAKiCxKy8F4HJzAp7C7vikM6J7EaQSfIgDmtJr2h69ZBHAitfT3pmvvcHSw95mxXr_OxJ2lP2_2VacXuO2L8lw$)and beyond. As UN Secretary General António Guterres [told reporters in March](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2022-03-14/secretary-generals-remarks-the-press-the-war-ukraine-delivered), "The prospect of nuclear conflict... is now back within the realm of possibility."

### Impact---Ext

#### **US-Russian relations solve a litany of impacts – cooperation will be geographically and politically strategic**

Einhorn ’16 [Robert; 02/26/2016; Master’s in public affairs and international relations from Princeton University, former State special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control; "Prospects for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/prospects-for-u-s-russian-nonproliferation-cooperation/> smarx, AZG]

As long as overall bilateral relations remain in their current adversarial condition, the opportunities for productive cooperation on nonproliferation issues will be limited. But given the stake that both governments share in preventing proliferation and the responsibility they have as leaders of the global nonproliferation regime, it is important that they look for areas where they could work together to promote common goals.

• Dialogue. With the demise of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission in the wake of Russian actions in Ukraine, bilateral interactions on arms control and nonproliferation issues have been limited and focused on immediate matters of concern, such as Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Under current conditions, resurrecting wide-ranging, senior-level forums such as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in the 1990s is not realistic. However, the two sides should hold periodic meetings—led at the undersecretary or assistant secretary level and supported by interagency teams—to discuss a range of nonproliferation issues, compare notes on the prospects for proliferation in various regions of the world, and explore possible areas of common ground.

• Combating nuclear terrorism. The United States and Russia are founders and co-chairs of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a voluntary, multilateral partnership of 86 countries dedicated to strengthening the capacity of its members to prevent, detect, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism. It has sponsored more than 70 multilateral activities in such areas as nuclear detection, forensics, and response and mitigation. Despite the downturn in bilateral relations and the termination of most bilateral nuclear security programs, the Russians have been eager to continue the initiative, in part because of the co-leadership role they play in it. Especially given continuing concerns about terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons and other WMDs, this remains a promising area of bilateral cooperation.

• Iran. Russia will play a crucial role in implementing the Iran nuclear deal, including by accepting regular shipments of Iranian enriched uranium and leading the conversion of the Fordow uranium enrichment facility into a nuclear research center. Russia is Iran’s closest friend among the P5+1; as such, its cooperation with other P5+1 partners in insisting on strict enforcement of the agreement will be essential to convince Tehran to comply. While much U.S.-Russian interaction on Iran will take place in multilateral bodies, such as the agreement’s Joint Commission, the United States and Russia, as leading stakeholders, should also consult bilaterally.

• North Korea. In light of recent nuclear and missile tests and Kim Jong-un’s apparent intention to continue strengthening DPRK strategic capabilities, North Korea will occupy a higher place on the international nonproliferation agenda in the period ahead. While Russia does not feel as directly threatened as the United States, it is surely concerned by North Korean actions, not least because the actions could trigger a U.S. response that Moscow doesn’t like (as evidenced by its criticism of a possible deployment of a U.S. antiballistic missile system, THAAD, in South Korea). Although Russia is a less important player on North Korea than China, it is probably less protective of the Kim regime than is Beijing and may be more receptive to increasing pressure on Pyongyang. The United States should explore options with Russia for addressing the North Korean threat.

• Chemical weapons in Syria. Although Russian cooperation on Syrian chemical weapon issues has diminished since the elimination of the 1,300 tons of chemical weapon agents, the Russians apparently continue to accept some responsibility for the fate of the U.S.-Russian initiative. They have dragged their feet on calls for investigations, but have eventually come around. Washington should press them to see this process through, especially to ensure that Syria eliminates its entire chemical weapon capability and stops using chlorine or any other chemical agent. And the two governments should cooperate in investigating and stopping the Islamic State’s use of mustard agent.

• Civil nuclear cooperation with third countries. While the nonproliferation commitments the United States asks its nuclear cooperation partners to accept are required by law and are a matter of public record, the commitments Russia seeks from its partners—aside from what Russia is required to seek as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group—are not publicly known. The United States and Russia should consult on the question of conditions of nuclear supply, addressing such issues as whether supplier consent should be required for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing and the disposition of spent reactor fuel. While the competitive commercial environment may limit what would be discussed, and there is little prospect of arriving at common conditions of supply, such consultations could usefully explore how to minimize the likelihood that nuclear cooperation with third countries will lead to proliferation.

• Nuclear materials security. Although Russia’s termination of nuclear security programs and the U.S. Congress’s funding cutoff have ended most cooperation, some joint work may be salvageable and could at least keep alive the possibility of additional cooperation in the future. For example, cooperation in repatriating HEU-bearing fuels to Russia from Poland and Kazakhstan can continue. Further joint studies of converting Russian HEU-fueled research reactors to operate on low-enriched uranium fuels may also be possible. The two sides also need to discuss the long-delayed implementation of the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement under which each side has agreed to dispose permanently of 34 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium.

In the current environment, bilateral cooperation will not be easy. But given the importance to the global nonproliferation regime of the United States and Russia playing leading roles, it is essential that the two governments do what they can to preserve the cooperation that exists and seek to build on it wherever possible.

#### US-Russia arms racing goes nuclear--- new threats over Ukraine and empirical relations US-Soviet

O’Connor, 3-4 (Tom O’Connor, 3-4-22, senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, “Ukraine Conflict Risks New U.S.-Russia Arms Race, World Closer to Nuclear War,” https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-conflict-risks-new-us-russia-arms-race-world-closer-nuclear-war-1684362)

The thunderous eruption of Europe's worst war in decades has torn asunder already fissuring relations between the world's top two nuclear powers, Russia and the United States, with nuclear threats being discussed as never before in the 21st century only days into the conflict in Ukraine.

What comes next, experts and insiders fear, is an acceleration of the Cold War-era arms race that never truly ended and soon may enter a new, even more dangerous phase.

"I am deeply concerned we have arrived at the most dangerous moment in our collective nuclear history since the Cuban Missile Crisis," Joan Rohlfing, president and chief operating officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, told Newsweek. In fact she said, "this is probably a moment as dangerous as the Cuban Missile Crisis."

In the 75 years since the U.S. introduced the world to atomic warfare in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the standoff between U.S. and Soviet warships in the Caribbean more than half a century ago still marks one of the most fraught moments in nuclear history, bringing the two superpowers to the brink of unleashing their weapons of mass destruction against one another.

Rohlfing has a long career of seeking to rein in the threat of nuclear war. Before joining the Nuclear Threat Initiative and participating in leading projects such as the establishment of the World Institute for Nuclear Security and Nuclear Security Project, Rohlfing served in senior positions at the Department of Energy and the [Pentagon](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/pentagon).

And now, in response to Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/vladimir-putin)'s recent decision to raise the readiness level of his nation's nuclear triad amid deteriorating ties with the U.S. and its [NATO](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/nato) allies, she spells out explicitly why she's concerned in this moment in history.

"We are at a significantly escalated risk of nuclear use," Rohlfing said.

As the conflict in Ukraine marks Europe's worst war in decades, nuclear threats are being discussed as never before in the 21st century, worrying experts and insiders of an acceleration of the Cold War-era arms race between the United States and Russia. Above, Russian personnel stand at attention as the armed forces prepare to move nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles to Moscow for a victory parade in this still from a video published February 25, a day after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the "special military operation" in Ukraine.RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

President [Joe Biden](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/joe-biden) has sought to downplay the likelihood of mounting U.S.-Russia tensions culminating in a nuclear exchange. Asked by a reporter Monday if the U.S. should be concerned about the possibility of a nuclear war, the president simply responded, "No."

But recent reports of a new U.S.-Russia military hotline opened in Europe indicate a growing worry of the potential for direct clashes between the two powers, by design or miscalculation, as both seek to flex their strategic deterrence.

Matching Russia's own nuclear actions, the U.S. has flown nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to NATO's eastern flank, a region that has been at the center of the Kremlin's enmity toward the West due to the alliance's expansion since the fall of the Soviet Union 30 years ago. Putin, who has been in power for two of those past three decades, has also overseen the collapse of the arms control architecture painstakingly, sometimes begrudgingly, built by Washington and Moscow throughout the Cold War.

First, the U.S. pulled out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002, early on in Putin's tenure and shortly after the 9/11 attacks pivoted Washington's attention away from rebuilding U.S.-Russia relations toward fighting the "War on Terror" that continues to this day. Five years later, Moscow withdrew from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), arguing that the level of restrictions imposed on Russia no longer made sense in the wake of the USSR-aligned Warsaw Pact's dissolution.

The most recent casualty to non-proliferation efforts was the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), scrapped by former President [Donald Trump](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/donald-trump) in 2019 after longstanding U.S. accusations that Russia had violated the accord with the production of a new missile that breached the 500-5,500-kilometer ban on ground-based weapons systems.

Russia, for its part, argued that the U.S. was already in violation of the INF with the deployment in Eastern Europe of missile defense systems that Moscow has argued could not only neutralize the country's own firepower but also be fitted with offensive weapons. The INF's looming death only further pushed Putin to pursue the development of new nuclear-capable platforms he touted as "invincible" to existing and even prospective defenses.

"They didn't listen to us, so listen to us now," Putin proclaimed during his 2018 unveiling of nuclear-capable systems such as the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile, the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-power cruise missile and, perhaps the biggest game-changer of them all, the Poseidon unmanned underwater torpedo, a weapon believed capable of producing fiery, radioactive waves across a radius of thousands of square miles.

The U.S. has largely dismissed Russia's stated concerns, arguing that NATO was solely a "defensive" alliance, so the continued pursuit of Washington and its allies of state-of-the-art weapons of their own and even the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, meant no offense to Moscow.

But just as the Kremlin watched with wariness at NATO's physical expansion, so too has Russia witnessed a historic rival coalition broaden its military mandate to include intervention in the Balkans and Libya. And after unrest first broke out in Ukraine eight years ago with the ousting of a Moscow-aligned government for one seeking to join the Western alliance, here too NATO took a larger role in arming and training Kyiv's security forces against a Moscow-backed separatist insurgency as Russia moved to annex the Crimean Peninsula amid an internationally disputed referendum.

While Rohlfing emphasized that the U.S. and NATO's past actions in no way justified Putin's intervention last week, she acknowledged a need to reflect on how we arrived at this low point with Moscow.

"At some point when we get out of this crisis, we're going to need to go back and take a careful look at how could we have done better in listening more closely to Russian concerns and addressing them rather than continuing to take actions that they perceived to be a threat to their security interests," Rohlfing said.

Michael Krepon, who co-founded the Stimson Center think tank and previously served in the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the administration of former U.S. President [Jimmy Carter](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/jimmy-carter), also saw missteps in the U.S. approach to European security after the fall of the Soviet Union, errors he felt were now hard to correct.

"Open-ended NATO expansion was, in my view, an error in judgment, but once this door was opened, it was hard to close," Krepon told Newsweek.

#### Western influence in Europe threatens Russian forces and causes miscalc—leads to nuclear annihilation

Scientific American, 6-1 (Scientific American, 6-1-22, “To Prevent Nuclear Annihilation, Resume Negotiations Immediately,” <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/to-prevent-nuclear-annihilation-resume-negotiations-immediately/>)

“It is either the end of nuclear weapons, or the end of us,” wrote 16 winners of the Nobel Peace Prize in an open letter in March that has since been [signed](https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/no_nuclear_war_loc/) by more than a million people. Decades after the end of the cold war and mere months after the U.S., Russia and other members of the United Nations Security Council agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” the specter of nuclear apocalypse again looms over humankind.

Western powers contemplating intervention in the war in Ukraine “must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history,” President Vladimir Putin warned in a not so veiled threat of nuclear retaliation on February 24, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. Days later he raised the alert levels of Russian nuclear forces.

If the prospect of nuclear war does not terrify you, it should. If either Russia or NATO used shorter-range [“tactical”](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/) nuclear weapons in a European conflict, researchers at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security [concluded](https://sgs.princeton.edu/the-lab/plan-a) in a 2019 analysis, it could rapidly escalate into a thermonuclear war that would kill or injure more than 90 million people within a few hours. Further, the one treaty constraining the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the U.S. will expire in 2026. The extreme level of distrust between the adversaries makes it hard for them to negotiate; nevertheless, they must urgently strive to reduce the nuclear threat.

The crisis in Ukraine could provide an impetus. In 1962 the U.S. and the Soviet Union narrowly averted nuclear war over the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The terrifyingly close call sparked an era of arms control. Ten years later the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, constraining the development of defensive shields against incoming missiles, and also agreed to limit the numbers of intercontinental and other ballistic missiles. Another agreement in 1987 banned intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 forced significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. These treaties created “guardrails,” says Daryl Kimball of the [Arms Control Association](https://www.armscontrol.org/), without which “one side or the other could go over the nuclear cliff.”

The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, held that neither superpower could initiate an attack without itself facing annihilation. But in 2002 the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty and [began to build](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-cant-count-on-missile-defense-to-defeat-incoming-nukes/) a missile defense system, destabilizing this uneasy balance and sparking a new arms race. In 2019 then president Donald Trump went further, abandoning the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

These eliminations leave the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, negotiated by former presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, as the only constraint on the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiations for renewing and possibly expanding the agreement were scheduled to begin this year; these talks have now been suspended. But if New START is allowed to lapse, a new arms race will begin. If then unregulated nuclear warheads were combined with other unregulated technologies, such as [hypersonic](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-physics-and-hype-of-hypersonic-weapons/) or [autonomous](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fully-autonomous-weapons-pose-unique-dangers-to-humankind/) weapons, the consequences would be unimaginable.

### Impact---Turns Case---2NC

#### US-Russia conflict collapses international institutions – MAD isn’t perceived as effective

Thomas Graham, 22 (3/8/22; cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University, professor on U.S.-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism, PhD in Political Science from Harvard University; “Preventing a Wider European Conflict”; Council on Foreign Relations [https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict)//](https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict)/) LASA LVL

In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war. Likewise, a broader conflict in Europe would stress, perhaps to the breaking point, the United Nations and many of its auxiliary organizations. Already stymied by a growing rift between the Western permanent members and Russia and China, the Security Council would have failed in its primary reason for being—to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. It could continue to exist as a forum for the airing of grievances and acrimonious debate, but it would serve little purpose as a platform for addressing major global issues. Finally, the humanitarian costs of a wider conflict in Europe would be staggering, particularly given the destructiveness of modern weapons. Beyond the physical destruction and loss of life, untold numbers of refugees would flow across borders not only into Central East Europe but perhaps further West depending on the scale of the fighting. The strain on the socioeconomic systems—coming on top of the stress of the two-year-old pandemic, economic dislocation, and mounting inflation—could bring some close to collapse.

### Impact---Arms Control---2NC

#### US-Russian relations solve arms control – foundational talks can defuse Ukraine and Russia-NATO war while avoiding miscalc

Kimball et al. ’22 [Daryl, Kathy Crandall Robinson, Tony Fleming; 02/07/2022; B.A. in Political Science and Diplomacy/Foreign Affairs from the Miami University of Ohio, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association; "The Role of Arms Control in U.S.-Russian Relations," Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2022-02/inside-aca, <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2022-02/inside-aca> //smarx, AZG]

The ongoing major Russian military buildup around Ukraine creates the potential for a catastrophic war that can and must be avoided through serious and deft diplomacy.

Among the many factors that have led us to this point is the breakdown of important conventional and nuclear arms control agreements that helped bring an end to the first Cold War. These crucial guardrails, including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the INF Treaty, are no longer in effect. As a result, trust in each others’ intentions has eroded, concerns about military capabilities have grown, and the risk of miscalculation is higher.

We are working hard to emphasize how and why U.S. and Russian leaders should elevate action on diplomacy and arms control to help defuse the crisis through their “Strategic Security Dialogue,” and why, given the risks that nuclear weapons pose, a direct confrontation between the U.S./NATO and Russia should be avoided.

Although Russia’s written proposals on certain issues, such as guarantees against further NATO expansion, are “non-starters” for U.S. and NATO leaders, on other issues, there are proposals to address mutual concerns about military capabilities that provide a basis for talks. To the credit of the Biden administration, Washington’s written responses are serious and they show there is room for negotiations designed to resolve mutual security concerns.

In particular, we believe U.S. and Russian leaders can and should negotiate new agreements to scale back large military exercises, avoid close military encounters between Russian and NATO forces, and prevent the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe or Western Russia.

In collaboration with experts in Russia, Europe, and the United States, we are also pointing out that Biden and Putin cannot afford to lose sight of the need to conclude new agreements to further slash their bloated strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces and set limits on long-range missile defenses by 2025 and before New START expires in early 2026. Otherwise, the next showdown between Russia and the West will be even riskier.

In the nuclear age, the U.S. and Russian leaders have a special responsibility to avert military conflict and to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Failure is not an option.

#### **Solves nuke war and preserves strategic stability against emerging technology.**

Sokolsky and Rumer ’20 [Richard and Eugene; 06/15/20; Sokolsky, B.A. from Vanderbilt University, Rumer, B.A. from Boston University, "U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/15/u.s.-russian-relations-in-2030-pub-82056> //smarx, AZG]

Resuming a productive U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue will be difficult. To get traction for the talks and begin the slow process of rebuilding mutual trust and confidence, the two countries should develop a framework for cooperation to deal with areas of common or compatible interests and common threats, as well as for managing disagreements. Given the scale and scope of the challenge and the baggage that both sides will bring to the table, small pragmatic steps should be given precedence in the U.S. approach over big, ambitious goals. As relations and other circumstances permit, the priority among these should be: avoiding a U.S.-Russian conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area and reducing the risks of inadvertent conflict and escalation; retooling strategic stability in response to the erosion of arms control and the development of new military technologies; cooperating to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons; preserving peace and stability in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf; preventing China from establishing hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region; and managing U.S.-Russian competition in cyberspace.

AVOIDING U.S.-RUSSIAN CONFLICT

Avoiding a conflict between the United States and Russia, and especially nuclear war, should be the paramount U.S. priority in the bilateral relationship. Arguably, there is a much greater risk of an inadvertent war between the two countries arising from an accident or miscalculations and miscommunications—for example, a military reaction to a false warning of attack—than from a premeditated attack.5 The highest risks are in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, where alliance members are most vulnerable to an attack with little warning and NATO and Russian forces operate in close proximity. By the end of the next decade, if not sooner, the alliance and Russia should mutually aspire to deterrent and defensive force postures in both regions that have eliminated or reduced to near zero the risk of a conflict between them. However difficult to imagine, restoring a measure of trust is necessary to improve the bilateral relationship. One way to do this is for the United States and Russia to restore a serious and strategic high-level dialogue, focused initially on building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region.6 The two sides should address several questions.

How worried is Russia about the risks of escalation and inadvertent conflict in the European theater? If there is concern about the impact of new weapons and technologies, what measures would Moscow consider desirable and feasible for addressing the challenge of short warning times available to the national command authorities to deescalate a crisis before it precipitates armed conflict? What are Moscow’s views about how a crisis between NATO and Russia might begin and what different escalatory paths it could take? How are changes in military, surveillance, and other relevant technologies affecting Russia’s crisis calculations?

Should the United States and Russia, in addition to maintaining strict compliance with their obligations under Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreements, consider more robust transparency measures on force movements and notifications of exercises; restrictions on the size, nature, and location of military exercises; and geographic limits on where armed forces and weapons that can strike deep into NATO territory and Russia can be deployed? Should they consider new arms control negotiations in Europe that would constrain deployments of destabilizing conventional weapons systems?

How can existing channels of communications for crisis management be upgraded to mitigate the risks of confrontation? Should the two sides, for example, create new bilateral civilian-military channels, starting first perhaps at the operational level, that would work out and test new procedures for crisis management?

MAINTAINING STRATEGIC STABILITY

Strategic stability, defined here as a condition in which neither the United States nor Russia has an incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons, has been an enduring feature of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship for well over sixty years. In fact, mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack, based on secure second-strike capabilities, has proven to be highly resilient in the face of significant changes in strategic force postures and military technologies. The United States and Russia share a common interest in maintaining strategic stability and eliminating all incentives for the use of any nuclear weapons—a goal that will become increasingly difficult to achieve in the face of emerging weapons systems and technologies that could destabilize the nuclear relationship.

In the near to mid-term, the risk of a premediated, large-scale nuclear attack is extremely low. In the longer term, however, a confluence of developments—the end of U.S.-Russian strategic arms control if the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is not renewed and the incorporation of new and potentially destabilizing technologies into each country’s conventional and nuclear arsenals—could have far-reaching effects, eroding strategic stability. More critically, it also could increase the risk that an accident or blunder could trigger a conventional conflict between the two countries with the potential for nuclear escalation.

By 2030, if not sooner, it is conceivable that the United States and Russia might be open to establishing a new regime to rebuild and adapt the collapsing U.S.-Russian arms control architecture. Such a structure would help maintain strategic stability as both countries seek to incorporate cyber weapons, strategic conventional weapons, hypersonic missiles, space-based missile defense interceptors, ASAT weapons, and AI systems into their force postures and doctrines. This goal should become the central focus of a renewed high-level U.S.-Russian dialogue on the requirements of strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction. For this dialogue to be meaningful, it would need to address the following questions.

### Impact---Arms Control---Ext

#### **Arms control with Russia can prevent an unimaginable nuclear war – Ukraine provides us the opportunity to act now**

SA ’22 [06/01/22; "To Prevent Nuclear Annihilation, Resume Negotiations Immediately," Scientific American, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/to-prevent-nuclear-annihilation-resume-negotiations-immediately/> smarx, AZG]

“It is either the end of nuclear weapons, or the end of us,” wrote 16 winners of the Nobel Peace Prize in an open letter in March that has since been signed by more than a million people. Decades after the end of the cold war and mere months after the U.S., Russia and other members of the United Nations Security Council agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” the specter of nuclear apocalypse again looms over humankind.

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The crisis in Ukraine could provide an impetus. In 1962 the U.S. and the Soviet Union narrowly averted nuclear war over the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The terrifyingly close call sparked an era of arms control. Ten years later the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, constraining the development of defensive shields against incoming missiles, and also agreed to limit the numbers of intercontinental and other ballistic missiles. Another agreement in 1987 banned intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 forced significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. These treaties created “guardrails,” says Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, without which “one side or the other could go over the nuclear cliff.”

The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, held that neither superpower could initiate an attack without itself facing annihilation. But in 2002 the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty and began to build a missile defense system, destabilizing this uneasy balance and sparking a new arms race. In 2019 then president Donald Trump went further, abandoning the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

These eliminations leave the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, negotiated by former presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, as the only constraint on the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiations for renewing and possibly expanding the agreement were scheduled to begin this year; these talks have now been suspended. But if New START is allowed to lapse, a new arms race will begin. If then unregulated nuclear warheads were combined with other unregulated technologies, such as hypersonic or autonomous weapons, the consequences would be unimaginable.

There is reason for hope: much of the rest of the world has been doggedly pursuing arms control. Almost all nations signed multilateral conventions that came into force in 1975 and 1997, banning biological and chemical weapons, respectively. These agreements may be hard to enforce, but they confirm that the global community deems the use of such weapons morally repugnant.

The U.N.'s Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, advanced by civil society in partnership with nonnuclear states, came into force in January 2021. It aspires to “completely eliminate” nuclear weapons. None of the nuclear-weapons states signed on. But the U.S. and Russia are both signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, in which nations without nuclear weapons agreed to never acquire them; in exchange, they got access to peaceful nuclear technology and, crucially, a promise from nuclear-armed nations to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.

Elimination admittedly seems elusive. Still, the U.S. could immediately make the world a safer place by pledging to never be the first to use nuclear weapons. And as difficult as it may be, the U.S. must strive to resume negotiations with Russia to reduce the danger of nuclear warfare. We have lived long enough with this grotesque cold war relic.

### Impact---Proliferation---2NC

#### **US-Russia cooperation stops proliferation.**

Sokolsky and Rumer ’20 [Richard and Eugene; 06/15/20; Sokolsky, B.A. from Vanderbilt University, Rumer, B.A. from Boston University, "U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/15/u.s.-russian-relations-in-2030-pub-82056> //smarx, AZG]

The United States and Russia had a robust nonproliferation agenda before their relationship cratered in 2014 and the United States pulled out of the JCPOA. Both countries share a common interest in preventing the growth of more nuclear-weapons states and keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. Moreover, very few nonproliferation problems can be resolved without U.S.-Russian cooperation or Russia’s tacit acquiescence.10

Regional challenges: Over the next decade, North Korea will continue to pose a growing nuclear weapons threat to the region and possibly the United States. Iran has the potential to return to an active nuclear weapons program if it breaks free from all JCPOA restrictions and there is no successor agreement. Russia has played a positive role in nuclear negotiations with both countries and particularly Iran, where its role was essential, and it will likely be constructive if the United States seeks to reenter the JCPOA or negotiate a new agreement. The United States and Russia have a mutual interest in the denuclearization of North Korea, with potential for cooperation should serious negotiations ever get off the ground. Both countries also have a common interest in stemming the flow of technology to both North Korea and Iran that would contribute to their capabilities. That said, Russia’s control over exports of sensitive equipment and technology has been uneven.

Civilian nuclear cooperation with third countries: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey are in various stages of developing and operating civilian nuclear reactors, and other countries will have incentives to develop civilian nuclear power. Thus, it will be more important than ever for Moscow, which has pursued robust civilian nuclear cooperation programs abroad, to adopt more stringent standards in providing third countries with the full nuclear fuel cycle of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. A renewed dialogue should encompass consultations on the conditions for nuclear supply as well as on enhancing the safety of nuclear reactors and finding solutions to the problem of nuclear waste.11 The United States, France, and other countries are getting out of the civil nuclear export business, which Russia (and China) will dominate in the future. It is not clear that Moscow will feel obligated to embrace and strengthen existing norms, but it does not want to see the emergence of new nuclear-weapons states.

#### Proliferation causes extinction.

Cupitt ’21 [Richard; 10/27/21; Cupitt, Ph.D., M.A., and A.B. at the University of Georgia, served as the Special Coordinator for U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 in the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives, "Undermining Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: International Governance on the Cheap," Stimson Center, <https://www.stimson.org/2021/undermining-efforts-to-prevent-the-proliferation-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction-international-governance-on-the-cheap/> smarx, AZG]

Constrained and sometimes arbitrary financial support from member states to many international organizations, particularly those with critical international security functions, risks shortchanging their long-term confidence and makes balanced and objective planning difficult. For organizations devoted to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this can negatively impact the deliberation and diligence they require to investigate, analyze and act against state or other actors seeking to unbalance global security norms and architecture. The United States has a pivotal role to play in building support for a global WMD nonproliferation system that works to support U.S. national interests and global security. This will also necessarily involve building international consensus on institutions that do not provide good nonproliferation value-for-money, and seek to reform those organizations so they work towards the common good.

What? Me Worry?

Less government means better government, as propounded by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, became in the twilight of the last century, a mantra of many western political leaders and the “Washington Consensus.” Coupled with residual distrust of foreign entanglements, this view permeated not just the U.S. domestic political arena, but U.S. foreign policy as well. For many international security institutions, including those seeking to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the consensus came to mean small zero-growth regular budgets, deferred investment in critical infrastructure, diverting existing funds to the crises of the moment, and increased reliance on voluntary donations – in some organizations accounting for more than the annual budget.

Adam Smith would not be amused. Smith saw the international arena as largely ungoverned interactions between states, not at all akin to an overly regulated domestic economy. Indeed, he recognized the need for effective international institutions to manage international relations. Moreover, Smith believed that the arguments for less government intervention and free trade did not apply to matters of national security and foreign policy. And, truly, in this case, two wrongs do not make a right.

Let’s focus on the impact this restrictive funding approach has had on an existential global security problem – WMD proliferation. The awareness of the risk posed by WMD proliferation increased significantly in the early twenty-first century.1 However, efforts to stop the spread and use of WMD prior to 9/11 focused on actions taken by states. Thus, the international order on WMD included agreements such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1970), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC, 1975), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 1997), the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM, 1987), and the four main export control supplier groups, i.e., the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

However, after 9/11 and other mass casualty attacks, attention shifted to non-state actors and their pursuit of WMD, including the use of the mail to spread Anthrax, the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, and the interest in WMD shown by Al-Qaeda and other terrorists. This shift led the United Nations (UN) Security Council to identify the proliferation of WMD to terrorist groups as a major threat to international peace and security in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in April 2004. UNSCR 1540 changed the perceptual dynamic about the potential of terrorists and others to use WMD, and it quickened the development of new nonproliferation institutions.2 In addition to UNSCR 1540, the early years of the century saw the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the G7 (then G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GCINT), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and the amendment strengthening the CPPNM, among others.

In parallel, several existing international institutions adapted to these new threats and risks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gained a greater mandate to address nuclear security (further enhanced through the four Nuclear Security Summits). The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) increased its focus on chemical security to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons programs and took on even greater responsibilities with the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. The UN Security Council took unprecedented actions in seeking to end the WMD programs of Libya, the DPRK, and Iran, while the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs took on new responsibilities for investigations on the use of chemical and biological weapons and other nonproliferation activities. Several organizations added or expanded the prevention of WMD proliferation in their portfolio, such as the Financial Action Task Force, INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organizations. Similarly, several of the aforementioned supplier groups adapted their controls to increase their focus on non-state actor threats or threats from pre-existing state WMD programs.

The United States has had a leadership role in creating and maintaining every one of these agreements and institutions, as the nonproliferation of WMD became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, especially after the end of the Cold War. The United States drove the development of the international legal and diplomatic landscape of WMD nonproliferation through the creation of these institutions, agreements, arrangements, and regimes. Proliferation of WMD has almost always depended upon international cooperation, so not surprisingly, effective efforts to prevent proliferation depend on multilateral cooperation and coordination.

Has the United States found these institutions useful? Conduct a simple thought experiment: Without them, which countries or non-state actors would now have significant stockpiles of, or access to, WMD that currently have none? How well could a single country (or the international community) credibly detect or effectively limit clandestine WMD programs in their absence? The United States has found the value of these institutions so great that even during the Cold War it found ways to create and cooperate in these institutions with its greatest adversary – such as its bilateral negotiations with the USSR to draft the NPT.

### Impact---Proliferation---Ext

#### US-Russia relations solve nonproliferation – its geographic and political power make it essential for success

Einhorn ’16 [Robert; 02/26/2016; Master’s in public affairs and international relations from Princeton University, former State special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control; "Prospects for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/prospects-for-u-s-russian-nonproliferation-cooperation/> smarx, AZG]

Russia—An Increasingly Unreliable Nonproliferation Partner

• Russia is inevitably a player in most nonproliferation issues by virtue of its many roles: as one of three NPT depositary governments, a leading member of the IAEA board, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a participant in both the Iranian-P5+1 talks and Six-Party Talks with North Korea; as a potential source of sensitive equipment, materials, and technology; and as a traditional friend of countries of proliferation concern.

• Few nonproliferation problems can be resolved without Russia’s active support or at least acquiescence, and Moscow is often well-positioned to play a spoiler role.

• Russia and the United States have common interests in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD to additional countries, preventing terrorists from getting their hands on WMD and related materials, and avoiding a direct military confrontation.

• But Moscow has often given nonproliferation a lower priority relative to other Russian goals: demonstrating its support for friendly states, promoting its commercial interests, asserting its major-power status, thwarting U.S. objectives, and opposing (U.S.-led) economic sanctions.

• Despite their many differences, the United States and the USSR often saw eye to eye on nonproliferation, starting with the negotiation of the NPT (which for the Soviet Union was a means of preventing a nuclear-armed Germany). But post-USSR, post–Cold War cooperation has been uneven and has deteriorated sharply since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

RUSSIA’S RECORD IN KEY AREAS

CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

Nuclear technology is one of Russia’s few industrial strengths. Especially given Moscow’s bleak economic outlook, it is aggressively marketing its nuclear reactors and related services in several regions of the world.

• Russia is the only reactor supplier willing to take back plutonium-bearing spent fuel to its territory, something that is good both for nonproliferation and for Rosatom’s sales pitch (because returning the spent fuel to Russia eliminates the burden of storing it for prospective customers).

• However, Russia is believed to be less demanding than the United States in terms of nonproliferation conditions and assurances required of cooperation partners. A significant difference is that the United States strongly discourages the acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, while Russia is more tolerant of countries acquiring such capabilities and counts on legal restrictions and IAEA safeguards to prevent countries from using fuel-cycle facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY

U.S.-Russian cooperation since the early 1990s greatly reduced the proliferation risks stemming from the collapse of the USSR. Among the highlights were security upgrades at Russian military and civilian nuclear facilities, the blend-down of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Soviet-era nuclear weapons that was then sold to the United States for use as nuclear reactor fuel, and the repatriation of Russian-origin HEU-bearing reactor fuels from Central and Eastern Europe.

• But Russia, chafing at the donor-recipient optic and suspicious of the presence of American monitors at sensitive Russian facilities, terminated practically all bilateral nuclear security cooperation in 2013–2014, and, in the wake of the Crimea annexation, the U.S. Congress prohibited the use of U.S. funds in Russia, effectively precluding even the few remaining areas of cooperation.

• Russian authorities argue that they can effectively secure their nuclear materials and facilities without U.S. help. But U.S. observers assert that there is much unfinished nuclear security business in Russia, and they strongly doubt that Moscow has either the resolve or the financial resources to do the job itself, especially given pressures on the Russian budget from sanctions and low oil prices.

• A symptom of the U.S.-Russian divorce on nuclear security was the Russian decision not to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit on March 31–April 1, 2016. The decision, which the Russians say was based on the heavy-handed, dominating preparatory role played by the United States, was widely seen as President Vladimir Putin’s post-sanctions snub of President Barack Obama, the host.

#### Existential nuclear weapons will be used inevitably – only US-Russian cooperation can solve

Ban Ki-Moon and Mary Robinson 20 [Ban and Mary; 01/23/20; Ki-Moon, former UN Secretary General and former South Korean foreign minister, Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; "We are faced by a gathering storm of extinction-level consequences, and time is running out," The Elders, <https://theelders.org/news/we-are-faced-gathering-storm-extinction-level-consequences-and-time-running-out> //smarx, AZG]

Unveiling the 2020 Doomsday Clock in partnership with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Mary Robinson calls for an urgent change of mindset to challenge the existential threats facing humanity.

The following is a transcript of her 23 January speech

Thank you Rachel. Governor Brown, Chair Bob Rosner, ladies and gentleman.

On behalf of myself, Ban Ki-moon and all The Elders: it is a great honour to be here today, for what can only be described as a solemn occasion.

I must say when I revealed the new time, I felt more and more anger, the reaction of an angry grandmother, at what is happening.

When Nelson Mandela founded The Elders in 2007, he spoke of the need to “support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict and inspire hope where there is despair”. I often recall these words, but rarely do they feel as important as they do today.

The Doomsday clock is a globally recognised indicator of the vulnerability of our existence. It is a striking metaphor for the precarious state of the world but, most frighteningly as we have just heard, it is a metaphor backed by rigorous scientific scrutiny. This is no mere analogy. We are now 100 seconds to midnight and the world needs to wake up.

Our planet faces two simultaneous existential threats: the climate crisis and nuclear weapons. We are faced by a gathering storm of extinction-level consequences, and time is running out.

The science of the climate crisis makes it imperative that we take urgent action in 2020. We need a change of mindset in politics, finance, business and civil society, one that enables us to keep temperature rises at or below 1.5°C, whilst protecting the rights, dignity and livelihoods of those affected by the shift to a carbon neutral economy.

Not to do so will be a death sentence for humanity, and yet, world leaders continue to ignore the science: international climate summits fail to reach agreement and investment in the exploration and exploitation of fossil fuels continues to increase.

Despite this dire picture of failing leadership and narrow self-interest, we can draw hope and inspiration from the young schoolchildren and activists who are striking under the banner “Fridays For Future”.

Here in the United States, I have been hugely inspired by the way so many people from politics, business, labour unions, faith groups, women’s and youth movements declared they were “Still In” the Paris accord despite the Federal Administration’s withdrawal – including of course Governor Brown in California.

However, whilst public pressure gives us a sliver of hope for our climate, the opposite is true on nuclear.

As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is inevitable that they will one day be used, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. Yet the scale of a potential catastrophe, and discussion on what can be done to deescalate the risk of a nuclear war has been given a shockingly low amount of consideration by political decision-makers, opinion formers and the public.

This is why The Elders have proposed a ‘nuclear minimisation’ agenda that, we believe, would significantly contribute to reducing the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Our positions are summed up by what we call the “4 D’s”:

Doctrine: every nuclear state should make an unequivocal “No First Use” declaration;

De-alerting: almost all warheads should be taken off high alert status;

Deployment: substantially reduce the one-quarter of all nuclear warheads that are currently operationally deployed;

Decreased numbers: dramatically cut the number of nuclear weapons in existence.

However, such proposals will never come to pass if we do not first defend and strengthen the nuclear arms controls that still exist.

The Elders believe this must begin with the United States and Russia negotiating the extension of New START – the only remaining bilateral agreement between these two nuclear super powers – without delay.

I note that President Putin has explicitly said he is ready to do this, so I urge President Trump to respond in kind so both men can get down to business. They should recall and reiterate the declaration of their predecessors Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. These were pioneering words at the time and the world needs to hear them again.

Such a step would help create an environment for nuclear disarmament ahead of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference later this year and inspire other leaders to take similarly bold steps.

Let such a nuclear détente be the way the world marks both the 75th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the 50th anniversary of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Let this year be the start of new era of nuclear negotiations. Let us hope to return here in a year’s time to reveal the hands on this clock are further from midnight than they are today.

### Impact---Proliferation---Iran---Ext

#### US-Russia relations solve Iranian prolif – Russia can make Iran dependent on Russsia

Einhorn ’16 [Robert; 02/26/2016; Master’s in public affairs and international relations from Princeton University, former State special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control; "Prospects for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/prospects-for-u-s-russian-nonproliferation-cooperation/> smarx, AZG]

Iran. Although Moscow was willing to accept a larger Iranian civil nuclear program than the United States or the Europeans, opposed economic sanctions in principle, and sought throughout the nuclear talks to maintain good bilateral relations with Tehran, Russia played a key positive role in the negotiations, including by gaining Iran’s agreement to ship virtually its entire stock of enriched uranium to Russia. Its nonproliferation and commercial interests coincided. By supporting low limits on Tehran’s enrichment capacity, Moscow could ensure that Iran would remain dependent on Russia to provide fuel for its Russian-supplied power reactors.

### Impact---Terrorism---2NC

#### US-Russian relations solve terrorism.

Kseniya ’18 [Konovalova; 05/15/2018; Master Student, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University; “РОССИЯ И АМЕРИКА В СОВРЕМЕННОМ ГЛОБАЛЬНОМ МИРЕ,” <https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/19598/1/119204_Российск.-американ.%20семинар%20в%20печать.pdf#page=167> //smarx, AZG]

Counter-terrorism policy includes the practice, military tactics, techniques and strategy that government, military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies use to fight terrorism. Counter-terrorism strategies also attempts to counter financing of terrorism. In case terrorism arises due to border insurgency, counter-terrorism may use counter-insurgency measures to curb it.

Vladimir Putin became the Russian president in 2000, and his central idea for Russian-U. S. cooperation was coordination on anti-terrorism policy. Chechnya was an important element for Putin. Even before the 9/11 event, Putin has repeatedly warned the United States of the connection between Russia’s Chechen insurgency and fighting international terrorism but the U. S. has never paid attention. U. S.-Russia counter-terrorism initiatives have been hampered by “the problematic legacy of the cold war and the lack of a post-cold war security system competent of incorporating revised attitudes and meeting new international challenges, for instance may it be Kosovo conflict in 1999, the military operation in Iraq (2003), the Russia-Georgia crisis (2008), NATO’s operations in Libya (2011) and in the Ukraine crisis” [7].

The tragic events of 9/11 marked a turning point in the deteriorating U. S.-Russia relations particularly in combating terrorism. Russia’s reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U. S. was quick and constructive. President Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush to express his condolences and offer help. On request of Washington, he cancelled a few ongoing military exercises and ordered Russian armed forces to terminate their standard operation responses to U. S. nuclear forces’ heightened state of alert [8]. Putin delineated Moscow’s support to the U. S. military campaign in Afghanistan — “Operation Enduring Freedom” in terms of intelligence sharing, opening of Russian airspace for U. S. planes carrying humanitarian aid, help in search-and-rescue operations in Afghanistan, enhanced military assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and implicit endorsement for the offer made by former Soviet Central Asian States of logistical support to the U. S. military [9].

The attack of 9/11 gave Putin an opportunity to substantiate the Second Chechen War as part of the “Global War on Terror” and it was a justification of his stand on the global nature of terrorism, of which Chechnya was only a manifestation. He advocated for a intensive global effort to tackle the threat caused by international terrorism.

In May 2002, President Bush and President Putin signed the treaty of Moscow. This treaty considerably lowered the levels of operationally deployed warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 [10]. They offered a combined condemnation of all terrorist attacks, and pledged to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Russian-U. S. Working Group on Fighting Terrorism was an important mechanism which was formed in 2002. This group considers issues related to counter terrorist, nuclear and WMD threats. It also undertakes coordinating actions in blocking the means of financial support of terrorism and combating against illegal drugs trafficking, which has been the major source of income of terrorist financing.

The increasing cooperation on anti-terrorism between the two countries resulted in greater understanding between the two powers. However, tension erupted over the U. S. plan of invasion in Iraq under the pretence of accusation of the Saddam regime possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Russia insisted on peaceful resolution of the Iraq dispute and along with France and Germany, it strongly opposed the U. S. plan to attack Iraq without the UN Security Council sanction. It condemned the unilateral action of the U. S. invasion in Iraq in March 2003 supported by Britain.

Despite these disagreements, the USA and Russia continued to cooperate on anti-terrorism issues. In March and October 2004, the U.S.-Russia Counter Terrorism Group met fostering cooperative operational contacts between various U.S. agencies and their counter parts in Russia. In December 2004, Chiefs of FBI and FSB signed a comprehensive memorandum of cooperation on counterterrorism, according to which both the countries would timely share the terrorist threat information. They also decided to expand their cooperation to include information on WMD. After the terrorist bombing of two Russian civil aircrafts in August 2004, Russia also cooperated with the Transportation Security Agency to raise airport security. However, Russians expressed their criticism regarding lack of reciprocity in the information sharing. Isakova mentions that Russia had provided vital intelligence data on Afghanistan to United States; while the CIA was providing their Russian counterparts just basic data and accountability of known facts. The Russian side was disappointed with such disproportionate cooperation.

In February 2006, the USA designated three Russian organizations as terrorist bodies on the demand of Russia. They were the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, which carried out Dubrovka Theatre attack (2002), the Riyadus-Salikhin Recon-naissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs which carried out Beslan School Attack (2004) and the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), which operates in North Caucasus and whose Arab leaders are the main channel for Islamic funding of the Chechen Guerrillas.

In January 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the president of the USA. In July 2009, he visited Moscow; he had meetings with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. Speaking at the New School of Economics Obama told that, “America wants a strong, peaceful and prosperous Russia. This belief is rooted in our respect for the Russian people, and a shared history between our nations that goes beyond competition” [11]. In March 2010, the United States and Russia reached an agreement to reduce their accumulation of nuclear weapons. On April 8, 2010 the new nuclear arms reduction treaty, which was called the New START was signed by President Obama and President Medvedev. This agreement reduced the number of long-range nuclear weapons held by each country to around 1,500 from 1,700–2,200 set by the Moscow Treaty of 2002 [12]. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which expired in December 2009 was replaced by the New START.

In March 2012, Vladimir Putin was re-elected as the President of Russia for the third term. In September 2013, the United States and Russia made an agreement that placed Syria’s chemical weapons under international control with successive annihilation. It was enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 2118 at its 7038th meeting on 27 September 2013 [13]. In July 2014, the U.S.government officially accused Russia of having breached the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a banned medium-range ground-launched cruise missile (probably R-500, a modification of Iskander) [14]. The U.S. were also concerned by the test-firing in 2014 of the Russian RS–26 Rubezh Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which was capable of evading the existing anti-ballistic missile defenses. In June 2015, the U.S. State Department reported that Russia has failed to correct the violation of the I.N.F.Treaty [15]. Since then the Russia-US relation have been deteriorating with every passing day. The Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 added more fuel to the fire. Due to the Ukraine crisis, the relations between Russia and the U.S.are at their worst since the end of the Cold War.

In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected as the president of the USA. Putin and Trump met at G–20 summit in Hamburg, Germany in July 2017. Trump confronted Putin about tampering the 2016 US elections, but Putin denied Russia’s involvement. Apart from this, both leaders discussed counterterrorism, cybercrimes, Syria, Ukraine, etc. As a result, both countries even announced a ceasefire in southern Syria. In December 2017, the CIA informed Russia about terrorists who were planning the explosion in St. Petersburg [16]. The attackers intended to detoned usually overcrowded sites including the Kazan Cathedral. Vladimir Putin expressed his gratitude to the CIA, and the Russian FSB agents found explosives and weapons and the suspects were taken into custody. The U. S. missile strike on Syria in April 2018 led to a dramatic rift between the two countries. Russia condemned U. S. for its actions against Syria. After the attack the Kremlin decided to suspend the 2015 memorandum of understanding on the air operations. Under the agreement, the two countries have traded information about flights by US-led coalition targeting the Islamic State and Russian planes functioning in Syria in support of the Assad government. The Defense Ministry reported that Moscow was taking this action, because it regarded the U. S. strike on Syria “as a grave violation of the memorandum.” President Putin believed that “the American strikes against Syria are an aggression against a sovereign government in violations of the norms of international law, and under a far-fetched pretext”.

### Impact---Terrorism---Ext

#### US-Russia relations defeat global terrorism combined technological and economic capacity solves

Kseniya ’18 [Konovalova; 05/15/2018; Master Student, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University; “РОССИЯ И АМЕРИКА В СОВРЕМЕННОМ ГЛОБАЛЬНОМ МИРЕ,” <https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/19598/1/119204_Российск.-американ.%20семинар%20в%20печать.pdf#page=167> //smarx, AZG]

To conclude we can say that although at present the relations between

Russia and America are at their lowest, certain steps could be taken by the

governments to improve them. At the moment, the ISIS remains a major

problem for all parties involved in Syria and Iraq. If possible, the U. S. and

Russia should coordinate air strikes against the ISIS to prevent collisions

and aerial accidents while also maximizing the air strikes’ effectiveness. Establishing a joint task force explicitly to target designated extremist groups

with agreed-upon rules of engagement could more effectively disrupt those

groups. Coordination would require the selective sharing of intelligence related to the ISIS and groups like Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which would build

trust and increase the efficiency of both countries’ air campaigns.

Cooperation between Russia and the U.S. will be prolific for both countries. Even slight changes in their relations influence the whole world. During

the last war in Afghanistan, their cooperation brought positive results not

only to themselves but also to the international community. In co-operation

both countries can successfully deal with any terrorist organization like the

ISIS, as both of them are technologically advanced and economically strong.

Thus, cooperation between the United States and Russia will be fruitful

for both countries and the world community. They can use their technology, intelligence and armed forces in countering terrorism. Moreover, cooperation between the U. S. and Russia can bring positive changes in general

struggle against terrorism and attain a peaceful global order.

## Solvency---Ukraine

### Solvency---Ukraine---2NC

#### Negotiations possible but American concessions are key.

**Ryabkov 22** [Sergey Ryabkov; 1/13/22; A Russian politician, currently serving as the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation since 2008; “Russia unsure of US, NATO concessions on security guarantees but dialogue continues”; [https://tass.com/politics/1387689?utm\_source=google.com&utm\_medium=organic&utm\_campaign=google.com&utm\_referrer=google.com]//AL](https://tass.com/politics/1387689?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com%5d//AL)

MOSCOW, January 13. /TASS/. Russia is not sure whether its US and NATO partners will resort to concessions regarding proposed security guarantees, but the dialogue on this issue is still underway at various levels, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in an interview with the RTVI television channel. Asked whether Moscow hoped for concessions on behalf of Russia’s US and NATO partners regarding security guarantees, Ryabkov said: "Hope springs eternal." "However, in this case, we are rather uncertain that this is possible," the high-ranking Russian diplomat said. "We need to continue being insistent to achieve the right course and the right evolution on the Western side. This is what we will continue doing." "I must reiterate that dialogue is still underway at many levels and in many directions," Ryabkov added. The negotiations between Moscow and Washington dedicated to Russia’s proposed security guarantees concluded on January 10 in Geneva. On January 12, Russia discussed its security concerns in Europe, as well as its drafts on security assurances at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, and on January 13 is discussing the same issue at the Vienna session of the OSCE Permanent Council. On December 17, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry published the draft agreements between Russia and the US on security guarantees and the measures of ensuring the security of Russia and NATO member states. NATO ready to hear As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US Representative to NATO Julianne Smith said earlier, the Western-led bloc is ready to hear Russia’s concerns and is ready to begin an open and reasonable dialogue but is not ready for compromises, especially on the issues of its expansion. Moscow’s security demands are addressed to the United States and European nations. Moscow has not sent them to such international organizations as the European Union (EU) and NATO. In a broad outline, Russia’s stance boils down to three key points: the pullout of US nuclear weapons from Europe, the termination of the practice of deploying NATO’s conventional forces near Russia’s borders and creating its military infrastructure there, and NATO’s official refusal to draw Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance. In Moscow’s opinion, these measures will help remedy a serious imbalance in security in Europe that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This will help considerably ease the military and political tension and rejoin the baseline principle affirmed by all of the OSCE member states at their Istanbul summit in 1999 that the security of one state or a group of states cannot be ensured at the expense of the security of other states.

#### US-Russia negotiations are possible---Biden has opened the dialogue post-Ukraine.

Steven Pifer 22, former US ambassador to Ukraine and non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Initiative, 6/16/2022, “U.S.-Russia Relations, One Year After Geneva,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/16/u-s-russia-relations-one-year-after-geneva/>, RH

The June 16, 2021 meeting in Geneva between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a positive impulse to a bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship that was plumbing post-Cold War depths. Both sides made modest progress in the following months, only to be wholly derailed by Putin’s war of choice against Ukraine. It will be a long time before the U.S.-Russia relationship can approach anything that resembles “normal.”

Early on in the Biden presidency in 2021, administration officials made clear their readiness to [push back](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/04/26/the-first-100-days-breaking-with-trump-on-russia/) against Russian overreach, including with the use of additional sanctions. At the same time, they noted the value of guardrails to keep in check the adversarial aspects of the relationship. Less than one week after Biden took office, he and Putin [agreed to extend](https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-and-biden-confirm-extension-of-new-start-treaty/) the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to 2026.

Interestingly, both [Biden](https://www.armscontrol.org/armscontrol2022/POTUSmessage) and [the Kremlin](https://tass.com/politics/1461157?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com) have recently expressed a desire to resume the U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability at some point. That likely will not begin again until well after the Russia-Ukraine war ends, and it would then be a dialogue conducted by two countries coldly seeking to put constraints on what both regard as an adversarial relationship.

Ruling out a reset, U.S. officials spoke of building a predictable and [stable](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia/engage-russia-but-remain-clear-eyed-while-doing-so-blinken-tells-nato-idUSKBN2BG2H6) relationship with Russia. Putin surely did not like it when Biden referred to him as a [killer](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/world/europe/russia-biden-putin-killer.html) in March 2021, but that did not prevent the Russian president from accepting Biden’s invitation to meet in Geneva.

The mistrust and bad blood will make cooperation challenging, even on issues where both countries’ interests converge, such as arms control, climate change, and dealing with Afghanistan. Restoring anything that looks like normalcy in the bilateral relationship will likely require two things. First, Putin’s departure from the Kremlin, something that may not happen for years. Second, when Putin leaves power, his successor likely will have to make significant policy changes to demonstrate that Russia will play by the rules of the international order, no longer seek to use military force to impose its will on neighboring states, and be ready to work with the West for a stable and secure Europe. Unfortunately, that will be some time in coming.

### Solvency---Ukraine---Ext

#### Settlement possible but requires US engagement.

James M. Acton 22, Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/10/2022, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612>, RH

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.”

The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately.

But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils.

Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.)

Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state.

The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

To date, the United States and its allies have sent out mixed messages about sanctions relief. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland indicated an openness to it. By contrast, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has declared “economic and financial war on Russia” with the goal of causing “the collapse of the Russian economy.” In a similar vein, British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss stated that “the purpose of the sanctions is to debilitate the Russian economy.” This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation

U.S. President Joe Biden should clear up the confusion by stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war, not to remove the government of Russia. In coordination with Kyiv, he should dispatch a trusted lieutenant—such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken or CIA Director William Burns—to try to negotiate with Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns, and vice versa, through the implementation of reciprocal arms control measures—as the United States and NATO proposed in January.

Success in this endeavor would be far from guaranteed, and the Biden administration would take heat for even trying. This criticism, however, could be undercut by Zelensky’s stating publicly that he would support sanctions relief for Russia in return for the implementation of any agreement he negotiated.

And what of Putin? Is he willing to negotiate?

This question is difficult to answer because if he is interested in negotiations, he has a clear incentive to downplay that interest right now. It is certainly possible that he will push on, regardless of any concessions that Zelensky might offer. Indeed, he informed French President Emmanuel Macron last week that the objectives of Russia’s invasion “will be fulfilled in any case.”

However, as everyone who has haggled over anything knows, you end up paying a higher price if you make it clear from the start that you’re desperate to buy. In this vein, Putin may be trying to extract greater concessions at the negotiating table by claiming that he has no interest in talking. Ultimately, it is impossible to know whether there is a deal to be had unless we try to get it.

### Solvency---Ukraine---AT: Deal Bad---2NC

#### Negotiated settlement is the best outcome---direct engagement is key.

**Kupchan 22** [Charles Kupchan; 06/15/22; Professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; “Negotiating to End the Ukraine War Isn’t Appeasement”; [https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/15/negotiating-to-end-the-ukraine-war-isnt-appeasement-00039798]//AL](https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/15/negotiating-to-end-the-ukraine-war-isnt-appeasement-00039798%5d//AL)

As the war in Ukraine grinds through its fourth month, defiant Ukrainians continue to bloody Russian’s invasion force. The United States and its allies are backstopping Ukraine’s staunch defense of its territory through a steady inflow of weapons. The goal, as President Joe Biden put it in a recent essay in the New York Times, is “to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict.” A negotiated end to the conflict is the right goal — and one that needs to arrive sooner rather than later. Ukraine likely lacks the combat power to expel Russia from all of its territory, and the momentum on the battlefield is shifting in Russia’s favor. The longer this conflict continues, the greater the death and destruction, the more severe the disruptions to the global economy and the food supply, and the higher the risk of escalation to full-scale war between Russia and NATO. Transatlantic unity is starting to fray, with France, Germany, Italy and other allies uneasy about the prospect of a prolonged war — especially against the backdrop of rising inflation. But if Biden is serious about facilitating negotiations, he needs to do a better job of laying the political groundwork and shaping a narrative that prioritizes arriving at a diplomatic endgame. There is still too much hawkish rhetoric in Washington, with U.S. arms flowing to Ukraine “so that it can,” in the words of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “repel Russian aggression and fully defend its independence and sovereignty.” Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy insists, not surprisingly, that “victory will be ours” and urges Ukrainians to “defend every meter of our land.” And Biden, even as he makes mention of the need for diplomacy, has so far been unwilling to caution Kyiv against those aims, instead affirming “I will not pressure the Ukrainian government — in private or public — to make any territorial concessions.” “We’re not going to tell the Ukrainians how to negotiate, what to negotiate and when to negotiate,” Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, reiterated this week. “They’re going to set those terms for themselves.” But Washington has not only a right to discuss war aims with Kyiv, but also an obligation. This conflict arguably represents the most dangerous geopolitical moment since the Cuban missile crisis. A hot war is raging between a nuclear-armed Russia and a NATO-armed Ukraine, with NATO territory abutting the conflict zone. This war could define the strategic and economic contours of the 21st century, possibly opening an era of militarized rivalry between the world’s liberal democracies and an autocratic bloc anchored by Russia and China. These stakes necessitate direct U.S. engagement in determining when and how this war ends. Instead of offering arms with no strings attached — effectively leaving strategy up to the Ukrainians — Washington needs to launch a forthright discussion about war termination with allies, with Kyiv, and ultimately, with Moscow.

### Solvency---Ukraine---AT: Sanctions---2NC

#### Sanctions built solidarity for negotiations and diplomacy.

**Florido 22** [Adrian Florido; 2/10/22; National correspondent covering race and identity in America; “America's lead negotiator says U.S. diplomacy strategy is working with Russia”; [https://www.npr.org/2022/02/10/1079947520/americas-lead-negotiator-says-u-s-diplomacy-strategy-is-working-with-russia]//AL](https://www.npr.org/2022/02/10/1079947520/americas-lead-negotiator-says-u-s-diplomacy-strategy-is-working-with-russia%5d//AL)

Russia's military forces have formed a horseshoe around Ukraine, surrounding it on three sides. The U.S. and its allies have been working to deter Russia from turning that military buildup into an invasion, in large part through diplomatic efforts. One of the Biden administration's most experienced negotiators is Wendy Sherman. She worked out deals with North Korea during the Clinton administration, then the Iran nuclear deal under Obama. And now Sherman is leading the American effort to de-escalate the tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman joins me now. Welcome to ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. WENDY SHERMAN: Thank you very much for having me. FLORIDO: Let's start by talking about where things are. So far, the strategy has been to threaten severe sanctions. And yet there seems to be very little diplomatic progress. Putin continues to amass forces at the Ukraine border. So do you think it's time to reconsider that strategy? SHERMAN: Well, I think that the strategy is really working very effectively to make the choice very clear to Vladimir Putin. He can choose diplomacy, dialogue and resolving this in a peaceful way, or he can go down the road of determined deterrence and consequences and conflict. I hope he has not made the decision yet. And what we are seeing, which often happens in situations like this, is as we're getting closer and closer to his making that choice, things are in starker attention, and we've seen a flurry of additional diplomacy. Indeed, as you pointed out, there are forces of Russia surrounding Ukraine. Ukraine is no threat to Russia. I think the international community has said in a very solid voice that President Putin should indeed endorse principles that he once agreed to, which was sovereignty, territorial integrity, that countries get to choose their own political future and their own alliances. He has long supported those. Now he appears to put those at risk. FLORIDO: Short of invading Ukraine, Russia could do other things to destabilize the country - cyberattacks, taking down the power grid or communication systems. What have you told your counterparts in Moscow about how the U.S. would respond to that kind of aggression? SHERMAN: I think that Russia knows that whatever they do, whether it is by a further invasion of Ukraine, by coercion or subversion, using hybrid attacks, that there will be consequences. And if any troops go across the border, they will be severe, solid, international and really bite. I think that Putin needs to also understand that there is no question he has the largest conventional military in Europe, but as many have said to him, if indeed he goes forward with a further invasion of Ukraine, there will be body bags returning to Moscow. It will not just be death and destruction in Ukraine. It will have enormous consequences for Russia. And although Putin may be able to take an advance in the first couple of days, I have no doubt that Ukrainians will fight back, that there will be an insurgency and that this will be a very bitter and consequential conflict. FLORIDO: Ms. Sherman, any negotiation involves concessions and sacrifices on both sides. What concessions are you and what concessions is the U.S. offering during this negotiation? SHERMAN: Well, I think that we responded to a non-paper - to "treaties," quote-unquote, that Russia sent to us with a non-paper of all of the areas in which we could increase mutual security through reciprocal actions. So we have yet to get a response from Moscow on that non-paper. But there are many areas in which we can work together. Just this week, there was an OSCE meeting on Tuesday, which I attended virtually, as did my counterparts from all of the nations - I think 44 nations ended up speaking - to embrace the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, countries' ability to make their own choices. OSCE has long had a process to increase security for everyone in Europe, including Russia. They have a seat at the table. So there are many platforms, many venues for these discussions. We hope that President Putin makes the right choice for himself, for the Russian people, for the security of Europe, including Russia's security. FLORIDO: This isn't the first time you've negotiated with Russia. What is it like negotiating with the Kremlin? SHERMAN: Russian negotiators are very smart. They're very well-informed. They're very focused. But so are we. And what we have that is so critical is solidarity, an alliance of many nations who together are saying to President Putin that this is the direction in which he should head for the security of Europe, which includes Russian security. We hope he makes that choice. His other choice to in fact further invade Ukraine will mean that there will be unbelievably consequential sanctions, export controls, visa restrictions, designations. A lot of harm will come to Russia. He doesn't need to have that. He can make a choice to resolve this diplomatically and peacefully. I hope he does. FLORIDO: In 2018, you wrote about your negotiation strategy on the Iran deal and said that often in negotiations, it's necessary to have a realistic sense of one's own power. What is the U.S.' power in this negotiation? SHERMAN: The United States, along with our allies and partners, have enormous power in the solidarity and in that alliance, as I've been describing in this conversation. I think the Russians have been surprised by that solidarity. I think they've been surprised when President Biden says standing next to the German chancellor that the next NS2 pipeline, which has been very controversial, will end if Russia further invades Ukraine. And Chancellor Scholz affirmed that Germany will be united in its response with the United States. We've also slowed some forces and put others on prepare to deploy orders to the eastern flank to ensure that countries who feel most at risk, beyond Ukraine, of course, that we have troops there to send a message to Russia. And indeed, of course, we have showed security assistance to Ukraine, including weapons that they can use to defend themselves. And a variety of other countries have done exactly the same. FLORIDO: Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, thank you for speaking with ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. SHERMAN: Thank you very much.

### Solvency---Ukraine---AT: Ukraine Blocks---2NC

#### Negotiations possible---Ukraine agrees but success requires US leverage and security concessions.

**Powell 22** [Jonathan Powell; 5/11/22; Chief executive of Inter Mediate working on resolving armed conflicts; “A negotiation plan to help Ukraine avoid catastrophe”; [https://www.ft.com/content/528b9bca-da9c-4ef1-a5cc-c33d045f9a64]//AL](https://www.ft.com/content/528b9bca-da9c-4ef1-a5cc-c33d045f9a64%5d//AL)

This is not the time for negotiations in Ukraine. But a window of opportunity will open and we need to be ready when it does. It is not the time because of the fresh outrages committed by Vladimir Putin and his troops in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere. And it is not the time because we have not yet reached what academics call a “mutually hurting stalemate”: Ukrainians are hurting and Russian soldiers are hurting, but Russia’s president is not yet hurting enough. British ministers are outcompeting each other to expand Ukraine’s war aims through aggressive rhetoric, calling for complete victory. This may be satisfying but it is irresponsible. So is crying “appeasement” whenever negotiations are mentioned. We appear dangerously close to being willing to fight to the last Ukrainian. This is not our war, we are not fighting and we don’t decide when it ends. President Volodymyr Zelensky is far more measured and is clear the war cannot be ended without negotiations. Last week he said: “Despite the fact that they are destroying our bridges, I believe that not all bridges have been destroyed yet.” He cannot take risks with rhetoric because he is responsible for Ukrainian lives. We need to be prepared for negotiations — and to avoid the mistakes of the 2014 Minsk agreement. The steps agreed then were sensible but the Ukrainian government was never going to be able to implement them in the sequence in which they were to be taken. Currently, the most likely outcome is that Putin will declare a ceasefire in place after managing to seize more territory or he will carry on a grinding low-level war in the Donbas. He will use this frozen conflict to apply continuing pressure on Ukraine to prevent it from developing into a democratic and prosperous country, free of corruption and moving in the direction of EU membership. The Ukrainians should consider refusing such a ceasefire and instead continue fighting and talking at the same time until Putin agrees to withdraw to the pre-February 24 frontline. We need to consider a new structure for the negotiations. This conflict cannot be solved by Ukraine alone, nor should we return to the failed Normandy format, with France and Germany at the table alongside the two protagonists. The US will have to use leverage. Only Washington can provide what Putin wants in terms of security architecture and a seat at the top table. The security guarantees that Ukraine rightly demands will have to be provided by America and its allies, and it is they who will have to lift sanctions. It may be better therefore to think of this as a triangular negotiation involving Russia, Ukraine and a “Group of Friends” including the US, EU and Nato rather than a simple bilateral negotiation.

#### Zelensky knows total independence is unlikely---they’ll agree to a cease fire.

**Olearchyk 22** [Roman Olearchyk; 3/10/22; Kyiv Post Staff Writer; “Russia and Ukraine have gulf to bridge as negotiations step up”; [https://www.ft.com/content/d9309ade-f9b7-4dba-b65c-6e4e55356a00]//AL](https://www.ft.com/content/d9309ade-f9b7-4dba-b65c-6e4e55356a00%5d//AL)

The foreign ministers of Ukraine and Russia are meeting on Thursday in the highest-level contacts since Moscow’s invasion — but are expected to remain far apart on steps to end the war between the two countries. Ukraine’s Dmytro Kuleba is holding talks with Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of a diplomatic forum in Turkey, their first meeting since Moscow invaded its neighbour on February 24. Three rounds of talks in Belarus, involving sets of political advisers from Moscow and Kyiv, have yielded no long-term results. They have resulted primarily in attempts to establish humanitarian corridors to evacuate civilians from Ukrainian cities under heavy Russian bombardment. Kuleba on Wednesday said Kyiv wants a ceasefire, the liberation of territories under Russian control, and an end to the catastrophic humanitarian conditions devastating large areas of the country. Kyiv has also signalled publicly that it may be willing to compromise on Russia’s demand for Ukraine’s future neutrality. Speaking to Bloomberg on Wednesday Ihor Zhovkva, deputy chief of staff in president Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration, said Kyiv was open to discussing neutrality if in exchange it is given security guarantees by its neighbours. However, differences on other issues including Russia’s territorial claims on parts of Ukraine appeared to make any agreement unlikely. Zelensky’s Servant of the People party on Tuesday said states such as the US, Turkey or Ukraine’s neighbours could act as guarantors, if their concrete political, economic and military responsibilities in this capacity were formalised. However, the party continued to uphold a commitment to Ukraine joining Nato. “For its part, Russia must also legally state that it recognises Ukrainian statehood and guarantees that it will not threaten our state,” the party added. Two people involved in back-channel talks between Moscow and Kyiv said Ukraine’s negotiators have been open to offering concessions since the start of the war, keen to stop the fighting. But whereas Ukraine’s delegation members had a direct line to Zelensky, Russia’s negotiators appeared to be working at least in part in the dark, often appearing unaware what president Vladimir Putin wanted beyond the most general terms, the people added. “The Ukrainians say, ‘what do you want?’ We say, ‘we want Ukraine to declare neutrality!’ The Ukrainians say, ‘great, what wording should we use?’ And our guys have no idea,” one of the people said.

### Solvency---Ukraine---AT: Ukraine Blocks---Ext

#### Ukraine wants a settlement---Zelensky supports concessions.

**Acton 22** [James Acton; 3/10/22; Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin”; [https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612]//AL](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612%5d//AL)

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. James M. Acton Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state.

### Solvency---Ukraine---AT: Russia Blocks---2NC

#### Russia wants to negotiate but requires concessions on NATO.

**Masters 22** [Jonathan Masters; 1/20/22; Writes on foreign policy and national security for the council on foreign relations; “Why NATO Has Become a Flash Point With Russia in Ukraine”; [https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-nato-has-become-flash-point-russia-ukraine]//AL](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-nato-has-become-flash-point-russia-ukraine%5d//AL)

What is Russia demanding of NATO and the United States today? Russia has put forth two draft agreements that seek explicit, legally binding security guarantees from the United States and NATO, respectively: Treaty with the United States. The draft treaty contains eight articles, some of which call for tight restrictions on U.S. and NATO political and military activities. Article 4 calls for NATO to end its eastward expansion, specifically, deny future membership to ex-Soviet states, such as Ukraine. It would also ban the United States from establishing bases in or cooperating militarily with former Soviet states. Article 5 would block both signatories from deploying military assets in areas outside their national borders that “could be perceived by the other party as a threat to its national security.” Heavy bombers and “surface warships of any type” shall refrain from deploying outside the party’s national airspace or territorial waters to areas where they could strike the other’s territory. Article 6 calls for parties to confine their deployments of intermediate- and short-range, ground-launched missiles to their own territories, and only in areas where they could not strike the other’s territory. Article 7 would block the parties from deploying nuclear weapons outside their respective territories and would require related nuclear weapons infrastructure in third-party countries to be dismantled. Agreement with NATO. The draft agreement has nine articles, including several that call for dramatic military concessions from the transatlantic alliance. Article 4 would effectively divide NATO’s Western and Eastern European membership. It would ban NATO countries that were members of the alliance as of 1997 (a grouping that excludes nearly all eastern members) from deploying military assets to “any of the other states of Europe” in excess of what those members had deployed by 1997. Such deployments could only take place “in exceptional cases” and with Russia’s consent. Article 5 would forbid the parties from stationing intermediate- and short-range, ground-launched missiles in areas that could strike the other parties. Article 6 would restrict NATO “from any further enlargement,” including admitting Ukraine. Article 7 would ban NATO members from conducting any military activity in Ukraine, as well as in other Eastern European states and those in South Caucasus and Central Asia.

#### Putin agrees---says there’s no alternative.

**AFP 22** [Agence France Presse; 2/7/22; French private international news agency; “Putin Says Russia Will 'Do Everything To Find Compromises' With West”; [https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-says-russia-will-do-everything-to-find-compromises-with-west-01644271509?scrlybrkr=0d6262c5]//AL](https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-says-russia-will-do-everything-to-find-compromises-with-west-01644271509?scrlybrkr=0d6262c5%5d//AL)

Russian leader Vladimir Putin said after talks Monday with French President Emmanuel Macron that Moscow would do its best to find compromises in the crisis with the West over Ukraine. "As far as we are concerned, we will do everything to find compromises that suit everyone," Putin said, adding that there would be "no winners" if war breaks out on the European continent. The Russian leader also stressed that NATO and the United States had ignored Moscow's demand of security guarantees including NATO's non-expansion and would press them for a firm commitment. "I don't think that our dialogue is over," he said, adding that Russia would soon send a response to NATO and Washington. He also insisted that Ukrainian authorities should respect Western-brokered Minsk agreements on the country's separatist conflict. "I believe that there's simply no alternative," Putin said.

## Impact---Ukraine

### Impact---Ukraine---Climate---2NC

#### The Ukraine crisis is delaying climate change action---complete focus from the US solves

**Hersher 22** [Rebecca Hersher; 5/14/22; Reporter on NPR's Science Desk, reports on outbreaks, natural disasters, and environmental and health research; “The U.S. pledged billions to fight climate change. Then came the Ukraine war”; [https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/14/1098000374/the-u-s-pledged-billions-to-fight-climate-change-then-came-the-ukraine-war]//AL](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/14/1098000374/the-u-s-pledged-billions-to-fight-climate-change-then-came-the-ukraine-war%5d//AL)

The United States owes billions of dollars in climate funding to developing countries. But the war in Ukraine is delaying payments and slowing down U.S. progress to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and that has leaders in low-lying and less wealthy nations feeling frustrated and forgotten. "Effectively, the U.S. owes the rest a climate debt that needs to be paid," says Mohamed Adow, the leader of PowerShift Africa, a coalition that advocates for climate policies across the continent. "Our continent is effectively on the front line, and we are paying for the harms [of] these climate pollutants." In 2021, the U.S. promised to dramatically cut greenhouse gas emissions this decade, and send long-overdue money to help developing countries transition to cleaner energy and protect residents from rising seas, heat waves, food instability and other dangerous climate effects. If the U.S. follows through, it's still possible to keep global temperatures from rising catastrophically and prevent tens of millions of unnecessary deaths, according to scientists and economists. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine might put many U.S. promises on hold. Months after renewing its pledges at the international climate conference in Glasgow, the U.S. has not passed any major climate legislation. The Biden administration has rolled back limits on domestic oil and gas drilling to cope with rising energy prices. This spring, Congress allocated less than one third of the international climate funding it pledged, even as it rushed billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine. "It's very disheartening and worrisome," says Alejandra Lopez, a climate policy expert with Transforma, an environmental think tank based in Colombia. "I don't mean to be disrespectful. [The war] is a major crisis," she says. But "even if this [war] is a very scary scenario, climate change continues to be scarier." The lack of urgent action by the world's wealthiest economy – and the country most culpable for climate change due to historical greenhouse gas emissions – is particularly frustrating for developing countries that are suffering disproportionately from global warming. And where every day of delay puts more people at risk. By 2030, climate change could push nearly 5.8 million people into extreme poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the World Bank. The prognosis is even more dire for island nations that are on track to be entirely underwater by midcentury, and for cities in southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East where heat and rising seas will force millions of people to migrate in order to survive. "We've already lost so many lives to climate change," says Adow. "Whether it's drought, whether it's flood, whether it's cyclones, our continent has paid a huge price. This is deeply unfair." The U.S. owes billions of dollars to developing countries The U.S. owes billions of dollars in climate funding to less wealthy nations. It's not charity, but something akin to reparations. The idea is that countries that industrialized in the early and mid-twentieth century became wealthy in part by burning oil, gas and coal. Climate change driven by emissions from that early industrialization poses the biggest threat to developing countries, which have contributed far less to global warming. At global climate talks, countries determined some of that wealth must now be used to build a cleaner global economy and protect low-income nations from the effects of a hotter Earth. Under the 2015 Paris agreement, developed nations including the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan and European countries agreed to pay $100 billion each year to developing countries. "This is the responsibility of developed countries because their emissions are the primary driver of climate change that the world is experiencing today, a disproportionate burden of which is falling on developing countries," says Rachel Cleetus, an international climate policy expert for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a science advocacy group in the U.S. But that $100 billion has never fully materialized. In 2018, the most recent year for which there is complete data, contributions were slightly less than $80 billion, in part because the U.S. contributed so little. Under the Obama administration, the U.S. delivered just $1 billion, which was about one third of what it pledged under the Paris climate agreement. Then, the Trump administration canceled U.S. membership in the agreement altogether. The Biden administration said it would make good on past promises by contributing more than $11 billion per year to developing countries by 2024. The first step toward that goal came last fall, when the U.S. announced it would send $3.1 billion to climate-vulnerable developing nations. Then, in March, Congress allocated just $1 billion in international climate funding. "When Biden came into office, he was a huge source of hope," says Adow of PowerShift Africa. "I would say some of that hope was misplaced. He's talked a good game, but he hasn't had much of substance. And now we see billions being pumped into the war in Ukraine." In March, the U.S. sent more than $13 billion to Ukraine, and an additional $40 billion in support is making its way through Congress. A spokesperson for the State Department tells NPR that U.S. international climate funding fell short this year, but that the U.S. is nonetheless committed to increasing its climate support for developing countries. The Russian invasion is influencing U.S. climate policy in multiple ways There are many ways that the war in Ukraine is delaying U.S. climate action, according to climate economists. The Russian invasion is contributing to global economic inflation, which feeds opposition to major infrastructure legislation stuck in Congress. That legislation would help the U.S. meet its emissions goals by investing in electric vehicles, solar and wind electricity and energy-efficient buildings. Higher gasoline prices also led the Biden administration to encourage U.S. fossil fuel companies to produce more oil and gas. And then there's the problem of mental bandwidth. "The biggest risk for U.S. climate action is just a lack of focus and attention," says Trevor Houser, a climate analyst at the think tank Rhodium Group in the U.S. "Policymakers in any country have limited attention, and the war in Ukraine is a giant crisis that requires a lot of focus and attention." Houser says the money going to Ukraine is not being directly taken away from climate initiatives. But the focus on the war and its effects is distracting U.S. policymakers from the urgent work of reducing emissions and adapting to climate change around the world. "One of the big challenges of climate is that [climate change] is always seen by policymakers as tomorrow's issue," Houser says. "It's always the issue you can come back to later." This week, United Nations Climate Envoy Mark Carney warned that the war in Ukraine should not delay action to rein in global warming, and cited the worsening effects of climate change on people living in developing countries. This is a pivotal moment for climate investment Developing countries feel the impacts of the missing money acutely, because climate change is causing more severe floods, cyclones, droughts, wildfires and heat waves around the world.

#### Warming causes extinction – turns everything

Siddiqui ’22 [Azizur Rahman; 2-26-2022; PhD on Riverbank Erosion in Majuli Island of Assam from Department of Geography, University of Allahabad, Department of Geography, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, UP, India; Richa Singh; Institute of Environment and Sustainable Development, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, UP, India; Kirpa Ram; PhD degree in Atmospheric Chemistry in 2010 from Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), Institute of Environment and Sustainable Development, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, UP, India; Chandrashekhar Yadav; Department of Geography, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, UP, India; “Climate Change, Disaster and Adaptations: Human Responses to Ecological Changes” in Climate Change, Disaster and Adaptations, p. 121-130] Accessed – 6/30/2022, WWIS

Climate change is long-term change in the earth’s overall temperature, humidity, precipitation pattern, etc. It is a complex global environmental challenge faced by humanity these days which has led to crop failure, disturbed natural ecosystem, scarcity of freshwater supplies and health issues with some extreme climatic conditions like rise in earth’s surface temperature and sea level (Beniston, 2003). The consequences of climate change have impacts on regional as well as global scales which can be witnessed in various earth’s climate systems since the beginning of earth’s formation. However, due to certain man- made activities, climate change shoots up and causes warming of 0.1 °C per decade observed over the last 50 years (Ramanathan et al., 1985).

After the industrial revolution, the human- caused climate drivers have been increasing, and their effect dominates natural climate drivers. Burning of fossil fuels and increased sophistication have disbalanced the natural world. The human-induced environmental crisis is the big-gest problem of these times, and this shoots up the climate changes. The world population has already crossed the planetary boundary. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000; IPCC, 2001), the increase in global mean temperature is largely due to anthropogenic activities such as industrialisation which may likely increase global mean temperature between 1.4 and 5.8 °C by 2100. This exceptional change would result in severe impacts on the hydrological system, agriculture, vegetation cover, wind pattern, sea level, melting glaciers and permafrost, ecosystem disturbances and other related processes. The report further highlights that coastal areas and developing countries, including India, will be more prone to these changes as they have a high emission rate and comparatively high percentage of population having lower economic conditions.

One of the possible reasons behind the present-day climate scenario is failure of policy to reduce greenhouse gas emission and uncontrolled developments without sustainability goals. The policies being made by the international agencies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol are not implemented properly and thus, are insufficient to deal with climate change effectively. This challenge can be addressed with sustainability goals like water conservation, dependence on renewable and efficient energy sources, forest and biodiversity conservation, etc. Due to the poor economic conditions and lack of awareness among the citizens, developing nations like India are likely to face more climate challenges and opt migrations as adaptation strategies.

This chapter summarises the basics about climate changes (e.g. natural vs human-induced climate change) and consequences of climate change which induces extreme events such as cloud burst leading food, landslides, avalanches, etc. Some long-term changes like increase in earth temperature leading to melting of ice cover, sea level rise causing to coastal area food, etc. are also discussed. We also elaborate on the impact on cropping pattern, biodiversity loss as well as human survival and poor economic condition of the country due to climate change.

Natural Versus Human-Induced Climate Change

Earth is continuously receiving solar radiation in which ~29% is radiated back into space, 23% absorbed in the atmosphere and the remaining 48% absorbed at the surface (Wald & Basics, 2018). This radiation energy is absorbed by the land, water and other components of atmosphere and then reradiates back in the form of heat. This heat energy warms the atmosphere. The mixing of gases traps some energy and obstructs them escaping directly into space. Due to this, the atmospheric blanket gets warm and maintains optimum temperature to support life called as greenhouse gas (GHG) effect. Figure 10.1 represents the driver of climate change and their effects.

Earth surface emits radiation in the form of molecules having various vibration frequencies, some having in the range of infrared radiation. When this IR radiation interacts with the GHGs, the molecular vibrations are enhanced because there is a match between the wavelength of the light and the vibrational frequency of the molecule. This makes vibration more vigorous and in turn heating the surrounding air (Harren & Cristescu, 2019). These molecules also emit IR radiation in all directions, some of which reaches earth’s surface and causes the greenhouse effect (Earle, n.d.).

According to the law of thermodynamics, the total energy absorbed by the earth should be equal to the amount radiated back to space. But in actual conditions, it does not happen; some amount of solar radiation remains entrapped within the atmosphere. Therefore, the difference between the total incoming and outgoing radiation is known as planet’s radiative forcing (Iacono et al., 2008). This climate forcing factor will change the climate system. When the radiation absorbed is higher than the radiation emitted, the planet warms up and is called positive radiative forcing; on the other hand, when outgoing radiation is greater than the incoming radiation, the planet cools and is called negative radiative forcing.

The sun is the main component which impacts longest-term natural forcing. Life and metabolic activities have evolved and changed the atmospheric condition and amount of CO2 and CH4 – greenhouse gases (GHGs) – over geological time scale. Both these GHGs contribute to the temperature balance, and its percentage makes the planet cool enough to make it habitable. But increased amount of CO2 in the atmosphere from fossil fuel burning and increased carbon footprints push climate forcing (Bennington, 2009). This CO2 traps heat from the atmosphere and radiates it back which causes warming.

During volcanic eruption, lava and exploding rock fragments evolved with particulate matter and gases. Sulphur dioxide and CO2 are the most important among them. Sulphur dioxide is an aerosol that reflects incoming solar radiation and has a net cooling effect (Earle, n.d.). Its half-life is short and doesn’t typically contribute to longer- term climate change (Charlson et al., 1992). However, volcanic CO2 emissions can contribute to climate warming. It is widely believed that the catastrophic end-Permian extinction (at 250 Ma) resulted from warming initiated due to eruption of the massive Siberian Traps over a period of at least a million years (Liu et al., 2020).

The increased warming changes vegetation patterns; contributes to the melting of snow, ice and permafrost; causes sea level rise, ocean acidification which reduces the solubility of CO2 in seawater, coral bleaching and toxic habitat; and has a number of other minor effects that are not noticed significantly (Waldbusser & Salisbury, 2014). Most of these changes contribute to more warming. Melting of snow and glaciers acts as strong positive feedback because frozen soil contains trapped organic matter that is converted to CO2 and CH4 (Khvorostyanov et al., 2008). On the other hand, increased CO2 can cause more vegetation growth and thus, reduces the warming effect (negative feedback) (Foley et al., 2005). Recent studies suggest that glaciers and permafrost are melting at faster rates which contribute to positive feedback and warming climate (Adger & Winkels, 2014a, b)

Climate Change Impacts

Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture Sector

The agriculture sector is very sensitive to adverse effects of climate change because it directly affects the output because disturbance in weather patterns like cold wave, heat storm and irregular monsoon can hamper the yield (Masud et al., 2017; IPCC, 2007). It results in the decline of socio-economic condition of farmers. Therefore farmers of developing nations like India are more vulnerable and facing many difficulties with climate change because they are more or less dependent on monsoon for irrigation, etc., which put extra pressure on them (Verchot et al., 2007; IPCC, 2007). The impacts of climate change are more severe to the small-scale farmers than the large-scale because climate change drastically reduces agricultural productivity which adversely affect the rural per capita income and poverty levels (Esham & Garforth, 2013). The impact of climate change on ocean and other ecosystems is presented in Fig. 10.2. According to Redfern et al. (2012), climate change induces a decline in world rice production which led to increase the poverty level of the farmers. The agriculture sector suffers from the following: (i) reduced agricultural productivity; (ii) food scarcity; (iii) increased temperature of air and water; (iv) economic crisis; (v) reduced power generation; and (vi) change in cropping pattern due to change in precipitation, temperature, cloud cover and increased carbon dioxide concentration (Baker & Allen, 1993).

Impact of Climate Change over Polar Regions

One of the worst scenarios of climate change can be seen in the Arctic where the glaciers are melting at an alarming rate resulting in the shrinking of cryosphere cover. According to Comiso et al. (2008) on 14 September 2007, the extent and area of the ice cover were 4.1 × 106 km2 and 3.6 × 106 km2, respectively, which are 24% and 27% less than the previous record of 5.4 × 106 km2 and 4.9 × 106 km2 which was on 21 September 2005. This data is 37% and 38% less than the climatological averages (Comiso et al., 2008). The year 2018 was recorded as the warmest (Cheng et al., 2019). The temperature of air above the Arctic Ocean in September 2018 was 1.5 °C higher than the Arctic land (Kumar et al., 2020). The Arctic sea generally melts during summer and again frozen during winter, but now its freezing speed is lesser than the melting because summer exists for more time than the winter and due to which permafrost not getting enough time to freeze again properly (Abraham et al., 2013). The devastating melting of permafrost results in the increased temperature of the earth as the energy stored in the form of ice or snow comes out and there is additional warming. The Arctic is warming roughly twice as fast as the rest of the world (Taylor et al., 2017).

In the Arctic, polar bears are most threatened. The female bears face lots of challenges in building their den in autumn and feeding their cubs in spring on the sea ice surfaces because of decreased density of sea ice (Kovacs et al., 2011). Their main prey sources are seals which are also suffering from climate changes as they have no ice land to raise their young ones. Due to unavailability of sufficient foods, they are feeding on lesser amounts than they previously did, and consequently their population is declining day by day. It is estimated that its population would decline by 30% by the middle of this century (Derocher, 2004).

The devastating effects of climate change can be clearly seen on the global food supplies, water scarcity, conflict, pandemics and global instability. These all speed up the migration of the human population to suitable place.

### Impact---Ukraine---Climate---Ext

#### Warming causes extinction – turns everything.

Mustak ’22 [Sk; 2-26-2022; PhD in Geography from School of Studies in Geography, Pt. Ravishankar Shukla University, Raipur, India, Department of Geography, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, Punjab, India; “Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement in the Global South: A Review” in Climate Change, Disaster and Adaptations, p. 107-120] Accessed – 6/30/2022, WWIS

Dynamics of Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement in the Global South

Climate change is a natural process, but climate scientists across the globe are of the opinion that the rate of climate change has increased as a result of human activities, and this change has increased the probability of displacement due to associated disasters by 60% compared to that in the 1970s. Climate change, as a driver of mobility, has both short-term and long-term variables. Short-term or fast-onset events are natural disasters like floods, storms, heat and cold waves, and droughts whereas long-term or slow-onset events include changes in temperature and precipitation variables over the years, changes in terms of rise or fall in averages, and changes in frequency and intensity of weather events (Bedarff & Jackobeit, 2017; and Abel et al., 2019). This makes the study of dynamics between displacement and climate change very complex (Fig. 9.4 showing variables of climate change- and disaster-induced displacement in 2019).

Natural disasters have traditionally been associated with sudden, forced, short distance, and temporary displacements, but with climate change-induced slow-onset changes like rise in sea level, salt water intrusion, coastal erosion, increased rainfall, and temperature unpredictability, gradual, long-term, long-distance displacements have also been on a rise in the last 50 years. From over 20 million, climate change-induced displacements between 2008 and 2018, future projections by 2050 vary between 25 and 500 million. In spite of the variability of numbers, it is certain that climate change-induced disasters will become a major displacement force in the coming times (Gemenne, 2011; IPCC, 2012; and Wilkinson et al., 2016).

Although it is a threat to the globe as a whole, in particular, climate change has become an existential threat to the Global South as majority of its countries are still developing, have high density of population, and are located in vulnerable and low-lying areas. Moreover, these nations have a low level of economic development which further enhances their exposure and vulnerability to post-disaster challenges. It is not merely a problem for the future but a present reality that is altering the very nature of global weather events and disasters and causing extreme devastation. Its impacts and mechanisms vary from place to place based on geography; and related losses and impacts are directly influenced topography, location, socio-political structure, and economic development. However, it is obvious that the Global South, owing to the lag in development and research in area of climate change, has an inherent vulnerability to the associated disasters. In this context, this paper reviews major disasters and displacements induced by climate change (i.e., droughts, floods, tsunami, sea level rise) by reflecting upon case studies of different countries and regions in the Global South.

Drought and Heat Stress

Droughts have been increasing in severity, the reason of which cannot be attributed to natural variability alone. Changes in rainfall, runoff, and rise in temperature (which affects the groundwater table, soil moisture, etc.) have changed the characteristics of droughts, which have become more frequent and intense. Due to complexity in identifying different types of droughts and its slow-onset nature, it becomes difficult to monitor displacements triggered by it. Also, it is difficult to discern between voluntary and involuntary movement caused due to drought. For example, in 2016, a drought year, Telangana experienced 1.4 million displacements, but as this region experiences seasonal migration, it became difficult to categorize this in absence of a strict monitoring policy, in spite of the number of migrants being a lot more than usual (GRID-IDMC, 2019). Droughts experienced in Syria, Somalia, Iraq, East Mediterranean, and Turkey from 2007 to 2017 have shown increased inter-linkages with climate change. Data suggests with 98% certainty that these droughts were drier than the last 500 years and are linked with climate change. Moreover, majority of forced migrants from Iraq and Afghanistan point toward shortage of water and increased dry conditions as the reason for their displacement and inability to return home. For example, the result of four consecutive years of below average rainfall and high average temperatures in North-West Afghanistan caused severe drought in 2018 and forced over 370,000 people to migrate, more than 71% of which have no intention of returning even if government assistance is granted (Gleick, 2017; and GRID- IDMC, 2019). Pointing out a direct relationship between intention to move and ultimate displacement, a sample survey on people of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines concluded that slow-onset events like gradual rise in average temperature and increase in heat stress that can lead to drought, food shortage, etc. are responsible for gradual displacement of people (as more than 60% of people showed a desire to move, with nearly 98% claiming the reason as heat stress). Majority of this movement is internal (to a more suitable region) but the more affluent prefer to move across the borders. Although the immediate cause of movement is heat stress, other factors like desire for better living standard, etc. also play a role, and in this context, a better methodology to quantify the same needs to be formulated (Zander et al., 2019).

Floods and Cyclonic Storms

Cyclonic storms occur in tropical and sub- tropical regions, and their linkages with climate change and rising temperature have been studied by various scientific bodies. The IPCC (2012) has pointed out the increasing severity and intensity of cyclones, hurricanes, and typhoons as the result of increasing sea surface temperature and rise in sea level. In 2016 alone, 13 million people were displaced as a result of the damage and losses caused by it. Countries like India and Bangladesh experiencing 3–5 cyclones every year face maximum damages in spite of good early warning systems due to low preparedness level to post-disaster response. Majority of people thus displaced are sent to temporary shelters and have to settle ultimately in poor, informal settlements, thus enhancing the adverse impact of internal displacement (Heslin et al., 2019). This became evident with nearly 2.7 million displacements in India in 2018 after recurring floods (Kerala) and three cyclonic storms (Titli, Phethai, and Gaja) which aggravated the losses of displaced and increased their vulnerability and poverty. Government of the Republic of Suriname (2015) has projected the possibility of displacement of the country’s entire population by 2020 based on its own climate change models and has pointed out its dilemma of deciding whether to focus on building adaptation in the current location or to prepare for eventual forced displacement (Thomas & Benjamin, 2017). In addition to cyclonic storms, increased flooding caused by changes in rainfall patterns has become a trigger for displacement in the Global South. Floods in Niger and Benue rivers of Nigeria displaced 600,000 people from 34 out of its 36 states (i.e., 80% of the country) in 2018. This is in addition to the already displaced two million people as a result of ongoing conflict with Boko Haram and struggle for access to resources. Poor urban planning and unplanned development along the exposed river banks and flood plains have made this African nation vulnerable to frequent floods and forced migration (GRID-IDMC, 2019). The quantitative household survey on intention, mobility, adaptive capacity, and exposure to disaster risks in coastal cities of Bangladesh formulated a displacement model till 2100 (based on coastal flooding and denudation risks), which pointed toward a directly proportional relationship between disaster stress, mobility, and climate change (Adams & Kay, 2019).

Tsunami

In 2007 and 2009, tsunami destroyed parts of Solomon islands and Samoa, respectively, as a result of which, thousands of people were forced to move both temporarily and permanently to either relocate uphill or to settle inland (Tabe, 2019). The 2004 tsunami led to government- funded displacement of 20,000 people from smaller to larger islands in the Pacific Ocean. Although less than half of those displaced returned to their places of origin within 2 years, the rest couldn’t due to damage to islands and habitability conditions.

Sea Level Rise

There has been an average rise of 3.2 mm of sea level every year due to rise in global temperature and melting of ice caps (IPCC, 2012). Millions of people living in coastal regions and their settlements are at the most risk particularly those located at low elevated zones and densely populated coastal cities. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Pacific and Indian Ocean face a high degree of threat from climate change and sea level rise due to their low elevation level. For example, people of Papua New Guinea’s Carteret Islands have been forced to displace to Bougainville Island (Connell, 2016; McLeman, 2018). Both short- and long-term disasters have induced displacement in the region since historical times, particularly in atoll islands like Tuvalu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, etc. where settlements are constructed within a few meter distance from the coast and thus, floods, tsunami, storm surges, etc. force population to displace. The general trend has been of internal displacement within larger islands due to short- term rapid disasters like floods, tsunami, hurricanes, etc., whereas long-term disasters like sea level rise create food, habitation, and health challenges and force people to seek shelter across national borders. In the longer run, these islands are expected to submerge completely as a result of sea level rise, and their entire populations will have to be relocated (Bank & Fröhlich, 2018). Additional challenge of excessive rainfall, increased CO2 emissions causing ocean acidification, etc. have also led to displacement to the extent that 94% of the households in Kiribati have experienced natural disasters, with 80% of them being rise in sea level (Heslin et al., 2019).

Another example is Bangladesh which is expected to lose 17% of its cultivable land, and 30 million of its population are expected to be displaced as a result of 1 meter rise in sea level according to IPCC report, 2012. Being a densely populated nation with a large coastline, it gets hit by cyclones, storm surges, excessive rainfall, floods, etc. on a regular basis. According to Refugee and Migrants Movement Research Unit, over 16 million people are expected to be displaced in Bangladesh by 2050 as a result of climate- induced disasters (Siddiqui & Mahmood, 2015; and Khanam, 2018).

### Impact---Ukraine---Economy---2NC

#### Ukraine has slowed growth and raised inflation---spillover means global disruption

**Kammer 22** [Alfred Kammer; 3/15/22; Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund; “How War in Ukraine Is Reverberating Across World’s Regions”; [https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/]//AL](https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/%5d//AL)

The conflict is a major blow to the global economy that will hurt growth and raise prices. Beyond the suffering and humanitarian crisis from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the entire global economy will feel the effects of slower growth and faster inflation. Impacts will flow through three main channels. One, higher prices for commodities like food and energy will push up inflation further, in turn eroding the value of incomes and weighing on demand. Two, neighboring economies in particular will grapple with disrupted trade, supply chains, and remittances as well as an historic surge in refugee flows. And three, reduced business confidence and higher investor uncertainty will weigh on asset prices, tightening financial conditions and potentially spurring capital outflows from emerging markets. Russia and Ukraine are major commodities producers, and disruptions have caused global prices to soar, especially for oil and natural gas. Food costs have jumped, with wheat, for which Ukraine and Russia make up 30 percent of global exports, reaching a record. Beyond global spillovers, countries with direct trade, tourism, and financial exposures will feel additional pressures. Economies reliant on oil imports will see wider fiscal and trade deficits and more inflation pressure, though some exporters such as those in the Middle East and Africa may benefit from higher prices. Steeper price increases for food and fuel may spur a greater risk of unrest in some regions, from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America to the Caucasus and Central Asia, while food insecurity is likely to further increase in parts of Africa and the Middle East. Gauging these reverberations is hard, but we already see our growth forecasts as likely to be revised down next month when we will offer a fuller picture in our World Economic Outlook and regional assessments. Longer term, the war may fundamentally alter the global economic and geopolitical order should energy trade shift, supply chains reconfigure, payment networks fragment, and countries rethink reserve currency holdings. Increased geopolitical tension further raises risks of economic fragmentation, especially for trade and technology. Europe The toll is already immense in Ukraine. Unprecedented sanctions on Russia will impair financial intermediation and trade, inevitably causing a deep recession there. The ruble’s depreciation is fueling inflation, further diminishing living standards for the population. Energy is the main spillover channel for Europe as Russia is a critical source of natural gas imports. Wider supply-chain disruptions may also be consequential. These effects will fuel inflation and slow the recovery from the pandemic. Eastern Europe will see rising financing costs and a refugee surge. It has absorbed most of the 3 million people who recently fled Ukraine, United Nations data show. European governments also may confront fiscal pressures from additional spending on energy security and defense budgets. While foreign exposures to plunging Russian assets are modest by global standards, pressures on emerging markets may grow should investors seek safer havens. Similarly, most European banks have modest and manageable direct exposures to Russia. Caucasus and Central Asia Beyond Europe, these neighboring nations will feel greater consequences from Russia’s recession and the sanctions. Close trade and payment-system links will curb trade, remittances, investment, and tourism, adversely affecting economic growth, inflation, and external and fiscal accounts. While commodity exporters should benefit from higher international prices, they face the risk of reduced energy exports if sanctions extend to pipelines through Russia. Middle East and North Africa Major ripple effects from higher food and energy prices and tighter global financial conditions are likely. Egypt, for example, imports about 80 percent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. And, as a popular tourist destination for both, it will also see visitor spending shrink. Policies to contain inflation, such as raising government subsidies, could pressure already weak fiscal accounts. In addition, worsening external financing conditions may spur capital outflows and add to growth headwinds for countries with elevated debt levels and large financing needs. Rising prices may raise social tensions in some countries, such as those with weak social safety nets, few job opportunities, limited fiscal space, and unpopular governments. Sub-Saharan Africa Just as the continent was gradually recovering from the pandemic, this crisis threatens that progress. Many countries in the region are particularly vulnerable to the war’s effects, specifically because of higher energy and food prices, reduced tourism, and potential difficulty accessing international capital markets. The conflict comes when most countries have minimal policy space to counter the effects of the shock. This is likely to intensify socio-economic pressures, public debt vulnerability, and scarring from the pandemic that was already confronting millions of households and businesses. Record wheat prices are particularly concerning for a region that imports around 85 percent of its supplies, one-third of which comes from Russia or Ukraine. Western Hemisphere Food and energy prices are the main channel for spillovers, which will be substantial in some cases. High commodity prices are likely to significantly quicken inflation for Latin America and the Caribbean, which already faces an 8 percent average annual rate across five of the largest economies: Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Central banks may have to further defend inflation-fighting credibility. Growth effects of costly commodities vary. Higher oil prices hurt Central American and Caribbean importers, while exporters of oil, copper, iron ore, corn, wheat, and metals can charge more for their products and mitigate the impact on growth. Financial conditions remain relatively favorable, but intensifying conflict may cause global financial distress that, with tighter domestic monetary policy, will weigh on growth. The United States has few ties to Ukraine and Russia, diluting direct effects, but inflation was already at a four-decade high before the war boosted commodity prices. That means prices may keep rising as the Federal Reserve starts raising interest rates. Asia and the Pacific Spillovers from Russia are likely limited given the lack of close economic ties, but slower growth in Europe and the global economy will take a heavy toll on major exporters. The biggest effects on current accounts will be in the petroleum importers of ASEAN economies, India, and frontier economies including some Pacific Islands. This could be amplified by declining tourism for nations reliant on Russian visits. For China, immediate effects should be smaller because fiscal stimulus will support this year’s 5.5 percent growth goal and Russia buys a relatively small amount of its exports. Still, commodity prices and weakening demand in big export markets add to challenges. Spillovers are similar for Japan and Korea, where new oil subsidies may ease impacts. Higher energy prices will raise India’s inflation, already at the top of the central bank’s target range. Asia’s food-price pressures should be eased by local production and more reliance on rice than wheat. Costly food and energy imports will boost consumer prices, though subsidies and price caps for fuel, food and fertilizer may ease the immediate impact—but with fiscal costs. Global Shocks The consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine have already shaken not just those nations but also the region and the world, and point to the importance of a global safety net and regional arrangements in place to buffer economies. “We live in a more shock-prone world,” IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva recently told reporters at a briefing in Washington. “And we need the strength of the collective to deal with shocks to come.” While some effects may not fully come into focus for many years, there are already clear signs that the war and resulting jump in costs for essential commodities will make it harder for policymakers in some countries to strike the delicate balance between containing inflation and supporting the economic recovery from the pandemic.

### Impact---Ukraine---Laundry List---2NC

#### Prolonged Russian-NATO conflict creates a nothing left to lose mindset in Russia – cyberattacks, assassinations, refugee crisis, sanction retaliations, economic sabotage, expanding military front

Thomas Graham, 22 (3/8/22; cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University, professor on U.S.-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism, PhD in Political Science from Harvard University; “Preventing a Wider European Conflict”; Council on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict)//> LVL

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response.

### Impact---Ukraine---Food---2NC

#### Ukraine war collapsed grain infrastructure---continued bans from Europe threaten food security

**Bankova 22** [Dea Bankova; 5/30/22; Graphics Journalist at Reuters, Masters from the University of Oxford in Mathematics and Computer Science; “The war in Ukraine is fuelling a global food crisis”; [https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/FOOD/zjvqkgomjvx/]//AL](https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/FOOD/zjvqkgomjvx/%5d//AL)

Since the invasion, much of Ukraine’s current export grain stock has been stuck in the war-torn country because of damage to rail infrastructure, closed ports and Russian blockades in the Black Sea. Those blockages also mean there won’t be sufficient storage available when the 2022 harvest comes in, according to the WFP. The shortfall could have devastating consequences for many countries who relied on Ukraine and Russia for as much as half of their wheat imports from 2016 to 2020, including Egypt, who recently made a deal with India to help replace some of the 80% of its wheat imports which come from Russia and Ukraine. In Europe, the war in Ukraine has mangled major shipping lines through the Baltic and Black Seas, and several key European countries have also banned Russian-flagged vessels from their ports, blocking some Russian grains. The acute effects of the conflict have only added to global transport issues. An early May study by analysts at Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) found that one-fifth of the global container ship fleet was currently stuck in congestion at various major ports. Global supply chain problems look set to worsen as China's COVID-19 lockdowns, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and other strains cause even longer delays at ports and drive up shipping costs. "Russia’s reckless damaging of these grain silos is a clear-cut example of how Putin’s war directly affects civilians in Ukraine and threatens food security around the world."

### Impact---Ukraine---Food---Ext

#### Independently fertilizer shortages lead to mass famine---stops crop production worldwide

**Bankova 22** [Dea Bankova; 5/30/22; Graphics Journalist at Reuters, Masters from the University of Oxford in Mathematics and Computer Science; “The war in Ukraine is fuelling a global food crisis”; [https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/FOOD/zjvqkgomjvx/]//AL](https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/FOOD/zjvqkgomjvx/%5d//AL)

Crops stalled Sky-high fertiliser prices have farmers worldwide reducing planned harvests and the amount of land they're planting. The fertiliser crisis is in some respects more worrying because it could inhibit food production in the rest of the world that could help take up the slack from stalled Ukrainian and Russian grain deliveries, according to Maximo Torero, chief economist for the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. "If we don't resolve the problem of fertiliser, and trade of fertilisers doesn't continue, then we'll have a very serious problem of [food] supply next year," Torero told Reuters. Western sanctions on Russia, a major exporter of potash, ammonia, urea and other soil nutrients, have disrupted shipments of those natural resources around the globe. China last year imposed fertiliser export curbs to protect its own farmers as global prices soared due to strong demand and high energy prices. Russia and China exported 28% of the world’s fertilisers in terms of trade value from 2016 to 2020 according to a Reuters analysis of UN Comtrade data. Top exporters of fertilisers Note: Between 2016-2020 Source: UN Comtrade Top importers of Russian and Chinese fertilisers The strain can be seen in agricultural powerhouse Brazil, where some farmers are applying less fertiliser to their corn, and some federal legislators are pushing to open protected indigenous lands for the mining of potash. In Zimbabwe and Kenya, small farmers are reverting to using manure to nourish their crops. Man surrounded by maize crops A farmer Boniface Mutize inspects his maize crop during an interview with Reuters at his farm in Domboshava, a village in the province of Mashonaland East outside Harare, Zimbabwe. March 21,2022. "Many smallholder farmers will not be able to come back next season to grow their own food." Those most at risk Those living in poverty and in countries dependent on food imports are most at risk of suffering from the food inflation crisis. According to the WFP, 811 million people are chronically hungry. 276 million are living on the brink of starvation and nearly 49 million live in 43 countries on the brink of famine. Many may reduce meals and the amount of calories they consume, and especially those who are forced to spend a greater portion of their income on food are at risk of being pushed further into poverty to stave off hunger. Food as a share of household expenditures Note: 2017-2019. Calculated on per-capita GDP and excludes food consumed away from home. Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations Safety nets for those on the brink of hunger, like the WFP, are also at risk of depleted stocks. In 2020, Ukraine was the top supplier to the United Nations’ World Food Programme – the world's largest humanitarian organisation that aids some of the most food insecure populations worldwide. Ukraine's supply to the World Food Programme Add a description of the graphic for screen readers. This is invisible on the page. UKRAINE OTHER COUNTRIES 4M metric tons 3M 2M In 2020, Ukraine was the largest supplier, providing 424,000 metric tons of food, mainly wheat and split peas worth $107 million. 1M In 2015, Ukraine was the fourth-largest supplier, providing 147,811 metric tons of food worth more than $48 million. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned Russia’s war in Ukraine will worsen food, energy and economic crises in poor countries. "It threatens to tip tens of millions of people over the edge into food insecurity, followed by malnutrition, mass hunger and famine, in a crisis that could last for years." The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises estimates that about 180 million people in 41 countries and territories will be in a food crisis this year as a result of conflicts, weather extremes and economic shocks, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Those dire forecasts don’t account for the potential impact of the war in Ukraine, but the report warned severe repercussions are also expected at the regional and global level from the conflict.

#### Our food systems are terminally unsustainable – they will cause extinction unless we act now

Barbara ’21[Jack Santa; 05/09/21; Barbara, retired CEO, academic, and philanthropist with an interest in sustainability and social justice issues; "Food is an existential threat beyond climate change," Newsroom, <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/food-is-an-existential-threat-beyond-climate-change> //smarx, AZG]

Studies show our food system is unsustainable; it will not endure. We will only embrace the solutions if we first recognise the serious dilemma we have created with our economic success.

The Climate Change Commission has received over 15,000 replies to its Draft Advice Report regarding how NZ can deal with climate change. This level of response bodes well for how many of us are engaged with this important issue.

But what about all the other existential threats that we continue to face which are not getting attention? In point of fact, there is not a single mainstream human designed system we rely on daily that is sustainable.

If something is unsustainable it means it will not last. If none of the systems we rely on daily are sustainable, what are the implications for our wellbeing if they cannot endure?

Take our most basic energy needs – food production. It takes more energy to produce our food than the food provides. Think about that for a moment. Our food system is unsustainable; it will not endure. This conclusion was reached by both a United Nations study, and another by the World Business Council for Social Development.

Our food production was not always so energy intensive, but with the current use of heavy equipment, heavy artificial fertilizers, wide spread irrigation, global transport systems, storage and refrigeration, distribution and advertising, we have developed a highly complex, and energy intensive food system. In doing so we have created an unsustainable way of meeting our most basic energy needs.

Our use of the word sustainable has been distorted to imply that sustainability is a continuum, and that with continuous technological advances we can increase our level of sustainability. But this is a gross misunderstanding. Being sustainable is more like being pregnant, you either are or you aren’t. Yes, one unsustainable way of doing things can be less unsustainable than another, but both remain unsustainable. Both continue damaging ecosystems and neither can endure. We have to do better than simply being less unsustainable.

The critical threshold is whether or not the system can regenerate itself. For example, if a food system can provide more energy than the energy required to produce it. That is the only way we can do things other than grow more food.

If we look at the macro picture of our human systems (food, transport, construction, energy, housing, medicine, etc) and their cumulative ecological impacts, their unsustainability becomes dramatically evident. Researchers have developed a variety of methodologies for monitoring our collective ecological impact, and it is not a pretty picture no matter which of the several methodologies you look at.

The Ecological Footprint measure, for example, tracks how much natural systems produce annually in terms of food, food and fibre, and how much we collectively consume. It also identifies how much waste natural systems can safely absorb, and tracks how much we emit. In both cases, our production/consumption and wastes all exceed natures’ capacity to continue functioning over an extended time.

On a global basis we use almost twice what the earth produces or can absorb.

While we could sustainably live off the abundance nature provides annually, instead we gobble that up and continue eating into the natural “capital” that produces that abundance. We not only fell new timber, but also old growth; we not only harvest young fish, but also the more mature and fertile fish; we pour more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere than it and the oceans can safely absorb. It’s like first using up the interest from your financial savings and then dipping into your savings as well. Eventually you end up with neither interest nor savings.

Of course, highly developed nations like NZ consume and pollute much more than the global average. NZ’s Ecological Footprint is 4.4 global hectares[1] per capita, whereas the global fair share is only 1.6; we are exceeding our global fair share by 275 percent. Do we really care for fairness and social justice? Do we even appreciate how our lifestyles impact people in poor countries?

Another macro look at humanity’s impact on nature is simply in terms of the amount of natural stuff we consume each year. Research indicates our global material footprint is 90 billion tons of natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable) each year, or 11 tons for every man, woman and child. Many researchers suggest this level is significantly beyond any sustainable level of material use.

From an equity perspective, high income nations, like NZ, use more than twice the sustainable levels of materials, and 10 times the level of low income nations. Do we really need to consume so much?

Another way of looking at our collective impact on nature is the concept of planetary boundaries, those major ecosystems that maintain and sustain us. Again, the data are clear. We are exceeding the biophysical limits of several major boundaries, some areas being at greater risk than climate.

This picture of our collective impact on nature is not new. The Limits to Growth study from the 1970’s issued a warning. Subsequent updates confirm the conclusions of the original projections.

Despite this growing body of empirical evidence we continue to rely on an economic system that requires ever more renewable and non-renewable resources. We have unwittingly constructed an intricate trap for ourselves. We either continue our consumption and waste dispersion, or we reduce our demands on nature (both in terms of using it up at unprecedented rates and emitting more wastes than it can absorb). But if we reduce our use of resources our economy falters. And if we keep growing our economy, nature falters. Either way we are seriously compromised. That is the existential human dilemma which is defining our moment in history; climate change is only one example.

The evidence regarding climate change was clear some 50 years ago. We now have evidence of even broader existential threats to human wellbeing. We must begin taking in this growing body of evidence a whole lot quicker than we did about a climate crisis. Attractive solutions are available. But we will only embrace them if we first recognise the serious dilemma we have created with our economic success.

#### Food production has existential implications – it compounds warming, diseases, and ecosystem destruction

Kurian ’21 [Manoj; 09/22/21; Dr. Kurian, adjunct faculty at the College of Public Health, Kent State University, coordinator of the [WCC-Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance](https://www.oikoumene.org/blog-by-author/370/370), Malaysian medical doctor, worked at the International AIDS Society as the senior manager, responsible for the policy and advocacy work, "Let the food systems nourish people and the planet rather than feed the profits of the privileged," World Council of Churches, <https://www.oikoumene.org/blog/let-the-food-systems-nourish-people-and-the-planet-rather-than-feed-the-profits-of-the-privileged> //smarx, AZG]

Though a lot of progress has been made to decrease poverty and increase food production for a growing population, the number of people suffering from hunger has grown steadily over the last five years. In 2020, more than 811 million people worldwide were hungry, up by 161 million [1]. By 2030, projections are that 656.8 million people will be hungry. This is 6% higher than the number of hungry people in 2015, the year 193 governments committed to zero hunger in the context of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development.

The current food systems that produce more than enough food for all in the world, still leave 9.9 percent of people globally hungry. The system is edging out the time-proven indigenous wisdom that has nourished both the planet and the people, with extractive industrial models that add profit and convenience for the privileged at the cost of workers, the lands, and the waters.

Food is essential for life and binds us together as families and communities, and sharing food is an expression of our love, a way we care for each other. But food is being reduced to a commodity, and the systems that serve it in the current form, are leading us to an existential crisis. Food production now takes up 40 percent of the earth's land surface[2]. Agriculture also makes use of 70 percent of all available water resources[3]. Human activity is primarily responsible for the decline by 60 percent of global vertebrate species—fish, birds, mammals, amphibians, and reptiles over the last 40 years[4]. Agriculture and food production also contributes about one-fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. Global warming attributable to human beings continued its relentless march, causing increased occurrences of high-impact events, including extreme heat, wildfires and floods, and record-breaking hurricane seasons, affecting millions of people. Despite the massive impact of food production on the earth, one-third of the food produced for human consumption is wasted globally. This amounts to about 1.3 billion tons per year[5]. In addition, increasing sedentary lifestyles and diets high in sugars, saturated and transfats, low-fiber foods and high-sugar drinks, and a high intake of fast food and ultra-processed foods contribute to non-communicable diseases and other health problems precipitating a global health crisis [6] and creating with it mass ecosystem destruction. All this is compounded by the threats to human health, food security and economic stability posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Cultivating, fishing, buying food, cooking, and eating are actions that have deeply existential, political, social, economic, and spiritual implications. What we eat, what we drink, where we source it from, how we cultivate or rear livestock, and the policies that guide and govern our food systems, all have a profound influence on the environment, the society, and our own health. We are challenged to live with our eyes open, speak truth to power and walk gently on this earth.

### Impact---Ukraine---Trade---2NC

#### Ending the conflict is key to securing US interests and global trade networks

Stephen M. Walt, 22 (3/29/22; columnist at Foreign Policy, professor of international relations at Harvard University, PhD in political science; “The Realist Case for a Ukraine Peace Deal”; Foreign Policy [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/29/realist-case-ukraine-peace-deal/)//](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/29/realist-case-ukraine-peace-deal/)/) LVL

All the attention on the fighting is understandable, but what matters in the end is how the conflict is resolved. It may be emotionally satisfying to proclaim that the only acceptable outcome is Russia’s capitulation, regime change in Moscow, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s prosecution for war crimes, but none of those outcomes is likely. Making these goals our war aim is also a good way to prolong the fighting and raise the risk of escalation even higher. If we care about Ukraine, our immediate goal should be to end the war before even more damage is done. There are thoughtful pieces by Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon, Michael O’Hanlon, Anatol Lieven, and others that begin to wrestle with this difficult topic, but they all recognize that getting there will not be easy. Moreover, the ultimate goal should be conflict resolution—not just an end to the fighting but a political arrangement that makes a replay later on less likely. You might think that a realist would regard conflict resolution as a naive and idealistic notion popular among woolly-headed academics and largely divorced from real-world concerns. After all, doesn’t realism emphasize the competitive tendencies that are hard-wired into an anarchic political order? Yes, but it’s a mistake to think that realists see no interest in resolving conflicts when one can. Properly understood, there is a hard-nosed realist case for resolving conflicts whenever possible. Let me lay it out for you. The most obvious reason for great powers to try to resolve ongoing conflicts is to remove existing problems from the current foreign-policy agenda. Realists recognize that new troubles are always lurking around the next corner, and every problem or conflict that you can shut down now is something you won’t need to worry about when a new crisis erupts. The nuclear deal with Iran is an obvious case in point. When it was in effect, the United States did not have to worry very much about Iran’s nuclear potential and didn’t have to devote a lot of time or bandwidth to negotiating a new agreement. So long as Iran remained in compliance (and the International Atomic Energy Agency repeatedly certified that it was), the problem could be left on the back burner. By leaving the agreement, however, then-U.S. President Donald Trump put Iran’s nuclear program back near the top of America’s foreign-policy agenda. Not only did his blunder fuel regional violence in ways that undermined U.S. interests, but leaving the nuclear deal forced the Biden administration to devote time, energy, and bandwidth to negotiating a new agreement to reverse Iran’s renewed progress toward a bomb. I’ll bet President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and the rest of their team wishes they didn’t have to spend a minute on this issue right now. A second reason to resolve conflicts is to protect allies and friends who are involved in a regional dispute or likely to get drawn into one. By making them more secure, they will be in a better position to help you in other ways. It’s a win-win, especially for a country such as the United States, which has partners in many places and defines its interests broadly. Third, by definition, resolving conflicts reduces the risk of unwanted escalation. When any war is underway, there is always a chance that third parties will enter it voluntarily or get drawn in as the protagonists try to prosecute the conflict more effectively. The Congo wars in Africa eventually involved nearly all the states bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Vietnam War expanded into Laos and Cambodia (with especially horrific effects on the latter); and the Iran-Iraq War led to attacks on foreign oil tankers and eventually led the United States and others to respond militarily. Stopping the fighting made that problem disappear virtually overnight. Moreover, wars invariably produce a lot of nasty unintended consequences, even for the winners. Supporting the Afghan mujaheddin against the Soviet Union during the 1980s may have seemed like a great idea at the time, and one can argue that it was worth it to bring the Soviet empire down. But it also sowed the seeds of the terrorist movements that attacked Americans from the 1990s onward and eventually provoked the United States into the long and disastrous global war on terrorism. And it certainly did nothing positive for the people of Afghanistan, who have endured more than 40 years of near-constant warfare. Instead of fueling the conflict, maybe doing more to settle it way back then would have left everyone—including the United States—better off. Fourth, helping to stop an ongoing war is an ideal way for a great power to demonstrate its influence and its ability to work for the greater good. In the first decade of the 20th century, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt’s successful mediation of the Russo-Japanese War enhanced America’s status as a newly influential actor on the world stage. Seventy years later, President Jimmy Carter’s stewardship of the Camp David Accords and Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had similar effects. By contrast, the repeated failure to broker a final Israeli-Palestinian peace deal under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations undermined America’s image as a competent and objective mediator. From this perspective, we may one day look back on Russia’s war in Ukraine as a giant missed opportunity for Chinese President Xi Jinping. Imagine the prestige China might have garnered if Xi stepped in and got the Russians and Ukrainians to come to terms. Not only would this action have reinforced Chinese aspirations to be the leading global power of the 21st century, but it would also have underscored its stated commitment to the principle of national sovereignty. Beijing could have boasted to others that the war had demonstrated that decadent and declining great powers such as the United States, its European allies, and Russia simply couldn’t handle their disagreements without fighting, while China’s approach to world affairs could deliver peace. Xi’s failure to seize this opportunity suggests he simply cannot admit that backing Putin so strongly over the past several years was a bad bet. If so, he is displaying the same self-defeating rigidity that helped bring the war about in the first place. Fifth, a world where conflict and war are endemic is a world where trade and investment cannot flow as safely or as freely. Just look at what is happening now, as the war in Ukraine accelerates the retreat from globalization that was already underway. As my colleague Dani Rodrik told the New York Times, the war has “probably put a nail in the coffin of hyperglobalization.” Liberals often argue that economic interdependence promotes peace—and there is some evidence for that proposition—but it may be even more accurate to say that peace facilitates interdependence. Countries at war are generally not attractive investment opportunities, and they must divert resources away from enhancing their citizens’ lives and pour them onto the battlefield instead. Realism’s emphasis on the conflictive elements of world affairs does not preclude it from seeing the material benefits of more integrated global economy, and reaping these benefits requires a world with less war. Last but by no means least, resolving conflicts is desirable because it reduces human suffering and enhances human dignity. Nothing in the realist approach to foreign policy says these things are unimportant, even if states often ignore such concerns when vital interests are at stake. But realists see this situation as part of the tragedy of power politics and welcome practical steps to mitigate it. Conflict resolution is one of the most obvious.

### Impact---Ukraine---AT: Defense---2NC

#### Goes nuclear absent a settlement.

Tulsi Gabbard and Daniel L. Davis, 22 (6/27/22; lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve, senior fellow at Defense Priorities; “Biden’s Endgame Shouldn’t Be Victory for Ukraine”; Foreign Policy <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/27/us-ukraine-russia-war-endgame-victory-settlement-negotiation-biden-putin-zelensky/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921)//> LVL

This disparity in firepower is driving Ukrainian casualties beyond what we believe it can sustain, with up to 200 soldiers reportedly killed each day and around 500 wounded. The toll on Kyiv’s equipment is just as devastating: Most of the Soviet-era equipment Ukraine possessed at the beginning of the war has been destroyed, and it has run out of entire categories of ammunition. No military can sustain those kinds of losses and continue to offer effective resistance—as evidenced by Ukraine’s recent loss of several towns and villages to the Russian invaders and near-encirclement on the Donbas front. Policies in Kyiv and Washington seem to ignore these battlefield realities. Last week, Zelensky reiterated his plans to regain all Ukrainian territory lost to Russia since the first invasion in 2014—currently about 20 percent of Ukraine. On the prospects for a negotiated settlement, he added one day later that “there is no time for talking” to Russia. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks recently said the Pentagon is “well equipped” to support Ukraine for five, 10, or 20 years into the future. Yet our own substantial experience deployed in combat leads us to wonder if Ukraine can hold out for five to 10 months, much less one or two decades. While there is still time, and Kyiv still controls 80 percent of its territory, a change in U.S. policy would provide a chance to save Ukrainian lives and prevent further territorial losses. At minimum, the Biden administration should de-emphasize its goals of weakening Russia and instead prioritize diplomacy, helping Kyiv and Moscow find a negotiated end to the war. It is in the U.S. national interest to prevent the war from escalating in Ukraine or expanding beyond it. Avoiding the risk of direct U.S.-Russian or NATO-Russian confrontation is vital because of the dire global consequences of a nuclear war. The world is already at a greater risk of nuclear war than at any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

#### Without US mediation, Wider European conflict disrupts global international order

Thomas Graham, 22 (3/8/22; cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University, professor on U.S.-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism, PhD in Political Science from Harvard University; “Preventing a Wider European Conflict”; Council on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict)//> LVL

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict. The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests.

### Impact---Ukraine---AT: Sanctions---2NC

#### Economic sanctions don’t alter Russia’s aggression

Stephen M. Walt, 22 (3/8/22; columnist at Foreign Policy, professor of international relations at Harvard University, PhD in political science; “An International Relations Theory Guide to the War in Ukraine”; Foreign Policy <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/an-international-relations-theory-guide-to-ukraines-war/)//> LVL

Anyone trying to figure out how this plays out should study the literature on economic sanctions too. On the one hand, the financial sanctions imposed this past week are a reminder of America’s extraordinary ability to “weaponize interdependence,” especially when the country acts in concert with other important economic powers. On the other hand, a substantial amount of serious scholarship shows that economic sanctions rarely compel states to alter course quickly. The failure of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is another obvious case in point. Ruling elites are typically insulated from the immediate consequences of sanctions, and Putin knew sanctions would be imposed and clearly believed the geopolitical interests at stake were worth the expected cost. He may have been surprised and discomfited by the speed and scope of economic pressure, but nobody should expect Moscow to reverse course anytime soon.

## Competition

### Perm---AT: Do Both---2NC

#### Russia needs binding guarantees when talks start---perm spoils negotiation signals.

Balmforth ’21 [Tom; 12-17-2021; Reporter for the Rueters; Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber; Journalist for the Rueters and Journalist for the English-language Moscow Times; “Russia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine” <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-12-17/>] Accessed – 6/26/2022, WWIS

Russia said on Friday it wanted a legally binding guarantee that NATO would give up any military activity in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, part of a wish list of security guarantees it wants to negotiate with the West.

Moscow for the first time laid out in detail demands that it says are essential for lowering tensions in Europe and defusing a crisis over Ukraine, which Western countries have accused Russia of sizing up for a potential invasion after building up troops near the border. Russia has denied planning an invasion.

The demands contain elements - such as an effective Russian veto on future NATO membership for Ukraine - that the West has already ruled out.

Others would imply the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and the withdrawal of multinational NATO battalions from Poland and from the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that were once in the Soviet Union.

In Washington, a senior administration official said the United States was prepared to discuss the proposals but added: "That said, there are some things in those documents that the Russians know are unacceptable."

The official said Washington would respond some time next week with more concrete proposals on the format of any talks.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Washington would talk to its allies. "We will not compromise the key principles on which European security is built, including that all countries have the right to decide their own future and foreign policy, free from outside interference," she said.

NATO diplomats told Reuters that Russia cannot have a veto on further expansion of the alliance and NATO has the right to decide its own military posture.

"Russia is not a member of NATO and doesn't decide on matters related to NATO," Polish Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lukasz Jasina said.

Ukraine's foreign ministry said Kyiv had an "exclusive sovereign right" to run its own foreign policy, and only it and NATO could determine the relationship between them, including the question of Ukrainian membership.

It urged Moscow to re-engage with a peace process in eastern Ukraine, where some 15,000 people have been killed in a seven-year conflict between Ukrainian government troops and Russian-backed separatists.

'SMOKESCREEN'

Some Western political analysts suggested Russia was knowingly presenting unrealistic demands which it knew would not be met to provide a diplomatic distraction while maintaining military pressure on Ukraine.

"Something is very wrong with this picture, the pol(itical) side appears to be a smokescreen," Michael Kofman, a Russia specialist at Virginia-based research organization CNA, wrote on Twitter.

Sam Greene, professor of Russian politics at King's College London, said President Vladimir Putin was "drawing a line around the post-Soviet space and planting a 'keep out' sign".

"It's not meant to be a treaty: it's a declaration," he said. "But that doesn’t necessarily mean this is a prelude to war. It’s a justification for keeping Moscow’s hair-trigger stance, in order to keep Washington and others off balance."

Presenting Moscow's demands, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Russia and the West must start from a clean sheet in rebuilding relations.

"The line pursued by the United States and NATO over recent years to aggressively escalate the security situation is absolutely unacceptable and extremely dangerous," he told reporters.

Ryabkov said Russia was not willing to put up with the current situation any longer, and urged Washington to come up with a constructive response fast.

He said Russia was ready to start talks as soon as Saturday, with Geneva a possible venue, but Russian news agency TASS quoted him as saying later that Moscow was extremely disappointed by the signals coming from Washington and NATO.

#### The perm’s mixed signals crush talks---risks nuclear escalation.

Acton ’22 [James M.; 3-10-2022; Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and holder of the Jessica T. Mathews Chair; “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612/>] Accessed – 6/26/2022, WWIS

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.”

The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately.

But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils.

Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.)

Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state.

The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

To date, the United States and its allies have sent out mixed messages about sanctions relief. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland indicated an openness to it. By contrast, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has declared “economic and financial war on Russia” with the goal of causing “the collapse of the Russian economy.” In a similar vein, British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss stated that “the purpose of the sanctions is to debilitate the Russian economy.” This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation.

U.S. President Joe Biden should clear up the confusion by stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war, not to remove the government of Russia. In coordination with Kyiv, he should dispatch a trusted lieutenant—such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken or CIA Director William Burns—to try to negotiate with Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns, and vice versa, through the implementation of reciprocal arms control measures—as the United States and NATO proposed in January.

### Perm---AT: Do Both---Ext

#### Err neg---US concessions must be ‘ironclad’ without exceptions.

Maynes ’22 [Charles; 1-12-2022; Journalist/Radio Producer with NPR; "4 things Russia wants right now" <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/12/1072413634/russia-nato-ukraine/>] Accessed – 6/22/2022, WWIS

What does Russia want and why is it so hard for the U.S. to meet Moscow partway? Here's a guide.

1. Russia wants a guarantee Ukraine can never join NATO

Russia's main demand is a commitment from NATO to end its further expansion into former Soviet republics — especially Ukraine. Russia wants NATO to rescind a 2008 promise that Ukraine could someday join the defense alliance. Many observers see it as a distant prospect that Ukraine could join NATO because it doesn't meet membership requirements. But Moscow doesn't see it that way. "We don't trust the other side," Russia's chief negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, said after bilateral talks with the U.S. finished. "We need ironclad, waterproof, bulletproof, legally binding guarantees. Not assurances. Not safeguards. Guarantees. With all the words — 'shall, must' — everything that should be put in."

Russia's reasoning: President Vladimir Putin views Ukraine as an extension of what he calls "historical Russia" — a part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, and within Moscow's "sphere of influence" today. The threat of Ukraine's westward turn after a street revolution ousted the country's pro-Russian president in 2014 was the driving force behind Russia's annexation of Crimea later that year. Ukraine's desire to join the Western alliance also led to Russia's sponsorship of separatists in the country's eastern Donbas region — in effect sabotaging its path to membership by fueling a civil war.

#### Verbal assurances fail---actions and binding guarantees are key.

Litvinova ’21 [Dasha; 12-21-2021; Journalist for AP NEWS; “Putin blames West for tensions, demands security guarantees” <https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-moscow-2a3c3d0bf3834fe2e566f8aca57b57a1>] Accessed – 6/24/2022, WWIS

The Russian president on Tuesday reiterated his demand for guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that NATO will not expand eastward, blaming the West for "tensions that are building up in Europe."

Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at a meeting with Russia's top military brass came just days after Moscow submitted draft security documents demanding that NATO deny membership to Ukraine and other former Soviet countries and roll back the alliance’s military deployments in Central and Eastern Europe – bold ultimatums that are almost certain to be rejected.

The demands – contained in a proposed Russia-U.S. security treaty and a security agreement between Moscow and NATO – were drafted amid soaring tensions over a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine that has stoked fears of a possible invasion. Russia has denied it has plans to attack its neighbor but pressed for legal guarantees that would rule out NATO expansion and weapons deployment there.

Putin charged Tuesday that if U.S. and NATO missile systems appear in Ukraine, it will take those missiles only minutes to reach Moscow.

"For us, it is the most serious challenge – a challenge to our security," he said, adding that this is why the Kremlin needs "long-term, legally binding guarantees" from the West, as opposed to "verbal assurances, words and promises" that Moscow can't trust.

Putin noted that NATO has expanded eastward since the late 1990s while giving assurances that Russia’s worries were groundless.

"What is happening now, tensions that are building up in Europe, is their (U.S. and NATO's) fault every step of the way," the Russian leader said. "Russia has been forced to respond at every step. The situation kept worsening and worsening, deteriorating and deteriorating. And here we are today, in a situation when we're forced to resolve it somehow."

Russia’s relations with the U.S. sank to post-Cold War lows after it annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 – gaining control over long coastlines of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov – and backed a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine that still controls territory there. Tensions reignited in recent weeks after Moscow massed tens of thousands of troops near Ukraine’s border.

Putin has pressed the West for guarantees that NATO will not expand to Ukraine or deploy its forces there and raised the issue during a video call with U.S. President Biden two weeks ago.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu charged Tuesday that more than 120 staff of U.S. private military companies are currently operating in two villages in war-torn eastern Ukraine, training Ukrainian troops and setting up firing positions in residential buildings and different facilities.

Putin said the U.S. "should understand we have nowhere to retreat."

"What they are now trying to do and plan to do at Ukraine’s territory, it’s not thousands of kilometers away, it’s happening right at the doorstep of our house," he said.

Putin added that Moscow hopes "constructive, meaningful talks with a visible end result – and within a certain time frame – that would ensure equal security for all."

"Armed conflicts, bloodshed is not our choice, and we don’t want such developments. We want to resolve issues by political and diplomatic means," Putin said.

## Revisionism

### Not Revisionist---2NC

#### Russia’s acting defensively – US and NATO attempts to contain them backfire.

John Mearsheimer, 22 (3/19/22; PhD in Government, specializing in international relations from Cornell; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago; “John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis”; The Economist https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis )//LVL

THE WAR in Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close. There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. The mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis. But that story is wrong. The West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only threatens to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and NATO. The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. Bush’s administration pushed the alliance to announce that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”. Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, characterising this decision as an existential threat to Russia and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy. These efforts eventually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after an uprising (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. In response, Russia took Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to the current war. The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The process started in December 2017, when the Trump administration decided to sell Kyiv “defensive weapons”. What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and these weapons certainly looked offensive to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region. Other NATO countries got in on the act, shipping weapons to Ukraine, training its armed forces and allowing it to participate in joint air and naval exercises. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters. The links between Ukraine and America continued growing under the Biden administration. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was signed in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.” Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving situation intolerable and began mobilising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” Russia demanded a written guarantee that Ukraine would never become a part of NATO and that the alliance remove the military assets it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO. This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters, the issue at hand is not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees NATO’s actions. Mr Putin surely knows that the costs of conquering and occupying large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine. My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s. America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia. The upshot of my interpretation is that we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and Western policy is exacerbating these risks. For Russia’s leaders, what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future. Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”. America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered. Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war. If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, lasting damage to Russia’s economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr Putin might then turn to nuclear weapons. At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia.

#### Europe can defend any threat from Moscow---claims are exaggerated and risk major conflict.

McMaken ’6-19 [Ryan, 6-19-2022; M.A. in Political Science and International Relations at University of Colorado, Housing Economist for the state of Colorado, Senior Editor of the MISES institute, "NATO To Rip Off Americans Even More As Sweden And Finland Set To Join – OpEd," <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20052022-nato-to-rip-off-americans-even-more-as-sweden-and-finland-set-to-join-oped/>] EZAY

Both Sweden and Finland have applied for membership within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this week, with both countries ending their long-standing policy of neutrality. On Wednesday, several NATO members announced they would immediately extend NATO-like military defense to both Finland and Sweden. In a joint statement, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway announced: “Should Finland or Sweden be victim of aggression on their territory before obtaining NATO membership, we will assist Finland and Sweden by all means necessary.” The Biden administration made an identical pledge, noting in a White House statement that while Sweden’s and Finland’s: “… applications for NATO membership are being considered, the United States will work with Finland and Sweden to remain vigilant against any threats to our shared security, and to deter and confront aggression or the threat of aggression.” Although neither statement mentions Russia, it is clear that both statements were aimed at Moscow in terms of communicating that—regardless of what the formal membership process may be—both Finland and Sweden will immediately become de facto members of NATO. Joe Biden’s move expands the number of counties for which Americans could be expected to die and the number of countries that American taxpayers will be expected to subsidize with their tax dollars. Also within the Biden statement was the often-repeated—and false—claim that the expansion of NATO benefits Americans overall: “NATO guarantees the security of one billion people in Europe and North America…. By joining NATO, [Sweden and Finland] will further strengthen our defense cooperation and benefit the entire Transatlantic Alliance.” But there are numerous problems with this claim. NATO membership has nothing to do with enhancing the defense of ordinary Americans. The American elites love NATO, of course, because it expands regime spending and influence in Europe. But when it comes down to actual military defense, expanding NATO only increases the odds that Americans will be pulled into a major conflict while offering Americans nothing in return. Moreover, the Russian regime’s inability to overrun Ukraine has demonstrated that Moscow presents no threat to Europe that the Europeans cannot quite thoroughly counter themselves. But there’s one way to make the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO a good deal: NATO can add whatever countries it wants so long as the United States leaves as part of the bargain. Two More Countries for Americans to Subsidize Back in March, we examined the extent to which the US taxpayer overwhelmingly covers the costs of NATO. For example, the total military spending of all NATO members combined is more than $1 trillion. So how much of this total is provided by US taxpayers? In the first graph, we see that the US’s share of this is 70.5 percent, and that the top ten contributors constitute 95.0 percent of all military spending. That is, the US contributes 70 percent of all NATO defense dollars while the next nine states contribute an additional 25 percent. The other twenty NATO member states contribute a meagre and forgettable 5 percent of all spending. <<CHART OMITTED>>With the addition of Finland and Sweden, those countries that contribute negligible amounts to NATO’s defense spending will increase to twenty-two. But the situation will remain essentially the same. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden’s total military spending in 2020 was $6.2 billion, which places it between Romania and Norway. Finland’s total spending of $3.9 billion places it between Portugal and Denmark. These tiny numbers aren’t surprising. Finland has a gross domestic product about the size of Missouri’s, while Sweden’s GDP is about the size of Massachusetts’s. <<CHART OMITTED>>It’s possible that adding Finland and Sweden into the mix could drop the US share of total NATO defense spending to 70.0 percent or 69.0 percent. In any case, Europeans can continue to milk the US taxpayer dry for security guarantees. After all, as non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland spend approximately 1.2 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP on military spending, respectively. (It’s 3.7 percent for the US.) As NATO members, there is no real incentive for Finland and Sweden to spend any more. Given that NATO doesn’t really enforce its “rule” that all members must spend 2.0 percent of GDP, we can expect more business as usual should Sweden and Finland join the alliance. What do Sweden and Finland contribute to US security? Biden claims both countries will “benefit the entire Transatlantic Alliance.” Of course, they will do no such thing. Finland, especially, is a net liability due to its long land border with Russia and its maritime border in the vicinity of St. Petersburg. Here’s the problem with that. NATO started out as an arguably reasonable alliance of Western European states with multiple buffer states between NATO and the Soviet Union. The only land border shared between Russia and a NATO state at that time was in the distant north of Norway. Yet, after years of expansion, NATO has expanded right up to Russia itself throughout the Baltic and around Kaliningrad. Since NATO demands an “attack” on one member be treated as an attack on all members, this can turn small regional disputes into a global war. Now, NATO wants to add to the potential for such a situation by adding the Finland-Russia border into the mix. Should Finland or the Baltic states get into a regional conflict with Russia, how many Americans will be asked to die to defend the distant reaches of eastern Europe? The Ukraine War Shows Europe Doesn’t Need the US for Defense If anything illustrates now is a good time for the US to leave the alliance, it’s the lackluster performance of the Russian military. The US should never have pledged itself to Europe’s defense on legal, moral, and practical grounds. But, there always remained the consequentialist argument that without the US in NATO, the Soviets would roll through Paris and Rome and Madrid, imposing Soviet despotism everywhere. Once the enormous Soviet military disappeared from the globe, this same argument was then recycled with “Russia” replacing “Red Army.” The threat of the Soviets to Europe was always exaggerated, but the claim that Russia presents an existential threat to Europe is not even plausible. The situation in Ukraine has made this abundantly clear. The international Western media, after all, has itself told us that Russian military personnel are incompetent and woefully inept when it comes to carrying out the assumed occupation of Ukraine. Western reports routinely assert that Russian troops are retreating, failing, and sustaining heavy losses. Meanwhile, Ukraine is a country with a GDP per capita that’s less than half of Russia’s. Ukraine is thoroughly undeveloped industrially, and relies heavily on weapons gifted by outsiders. If the Russians can’t even make short order of Ukraine—a country right on Russia’s border—how will that same military roll through Prague? Yet, even while the media labels the invasion a complete debacle, we’re also being told by pundits and “experts” that without defense guarantees from the Americans, Helsinki will soon be Russian territory. It’s extremely doubtful that both claims can be true. In any case, whatever the Western propaganda narrative currently claims, the fact is Russia has a second-rate economy coupled with demographic decline at least as bad as that seen in the rest of Europe. Russia’s GDP—and thus its access to military resources—is a small fraction of that of the European Union. In other words, Russia simply lacks what is needed to present any real threat to Europe. The lack of quick progress in Ukraine is only the latest evidence of this. The Europeans are welcome to keep NATO going if they like. They’re more than capable of doing so. But the time has come for the United States to exit.

### Not Revisionist---AT: Ukraine---2NC

#### Russia interprets expansion as aggression -- US bombing of Russian ally, Ukraine seen as buffer in Moscow

William Glucroft, 22 (2/23/22; Freelance reporter; “NATO: Why Russia has a problem with its eastward expansion”; DW https://www.dw.com/en/nato-why-russia-has-a-problem-with-its-eastward-expansion/a-60891681 )LVL

The role of NATO— the trans-Atlantic military alliance founded in 1949 specifically to counter the Soviet Empire in Europe — has been an evolving discussion since the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Back then, many foreign policy experts were urging triumphant Western leaders to establish a new security framework to redefine relations with Russia, which inherited the ruins of the Soviet Union. The West "held all the cards in 1990-1991," Dan Plesch, a professor of diplomacy at the SOAS University of London, told DW. "The Soviet Union managed a [relatively] peaceful end to empire, which is almost unprecedented and for which they got no credit," he said. The demise of the USSR led to a flurry of high-level meetings and negotiations between American and Soviet — later Russian — officials, but "we never made a serious effort to bring the Russians in," according to Plesch. Amid intense political and economic instability in Russia during the 1990s, opposing the Western alliance was one of the few issues that united the country's fractious political spectrum, according to declassified documents maintained by the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. "We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that," Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first post-Soviet president, told reporters at a 1997 news conference with US President Bill Clinton in Helsinki, where the two signed a statement on arms control. Indeed, documents show a pattern of promises US negotiators made to their Russian counterparts as well as internal policy discussions opposing NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. "In the current environment, it is not in the best interest of NATO or the US that [Eastern European] states be granted full NATO membership and its security guarantees," according to a State Department memorandum in 1990, while those states were still emerging from Soviet control as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. "[We] do not, in any case, wish to organize an anti-Soviet coalition whose frontier is the Soviet border. Such a coalition would be perceived very negatively by the Soviets." None of these discussions ever became official policy, and none of the alleged pledges ever made it into a legally binding document with Russia. Moreover, they took place in a specific contemporary historical context: The Berlin Wall had just fallen in 1989. Especially the Baltic Sea states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — which were part of the Soviet Union from the 1940s to 1991 — saw an increased drive for political self-determination and a reorientation of the region's security structure. The three states pointed to the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, which refers to "political independence both internally and externally." After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Eastern European military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, disbanded in 1991. US president Bill Clinton pursued Partnership for Peace, which Russia joined in 1994. However, there was disagreement over whether that was an alternative to NATO membership or a pathway to it. In 1997 NATO and Russia signed the "Founding Act" on mutual relations, cooperation, and security, and the NATO-Russia Council was founded in 2002, both of which were intended to boost cooperation. Moscow received access and a permanent presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels. But this exchange has been largely halted since Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014. All the while, NATO maintained an "open door" policy on membership and stood by all countries' right to choose their alliances. From the Western perspective, keeping NATO to its Cold War borders was only valid so long as Soviet forces remained in Eastern Europe. In the "Two plus Four" negotiations for a reunited Germany in 1990, the two German states and the four World War II allies — the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union — agreed that no NATO soldiers may be stationed on the territory of the former East German communist GDR. To this day, only the German Bundeswehr operates here. Russia's sensitivities over NATO's possible eastward expansion were well known. "No matter how nuanced, if NATO adopts a policy which envisions expansion into Central and Eastern Europe without holding the door open to Russia, it would be universally interpreted in Moscow as directed against Russia," US diplomat James Collins wrote in a State Department cable in 1993. But since 1990, NATO has gone through five rounds of enlargement to include former parts of the Soviet Union and several former Warsaw Pact states. In 2010, NATO's strategic concept, which governs alliance policy, says "NATO poses no threat to Russia" and calls for a "true strategic partnership" between the two sides. The document came out two years after Russia's military intervention in Georgia but before its first attack on Ukraine. It is based on many of the post-Cold War arrangements that Putin now appears to want to abandon. In 2008 NATO floated the possibility of Georgia joining and intensified cooperation with Ukraine in 2014. At the same time, many of the Cold War fail-safes — such as arms control verification and lines of communication — have fallen away. NATO carried out an aerial bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 during the Kosovo war. Serbia was a Russian ally. Vladimir Putin was elected president not long thereafter. He still cites the bombing as proof of NATO aggression — also in the context of the current crisis. The issue has taken a central role as he has ordered his armed forces towards Ukraine's borders, most recently sending some of them into breakaway regions that Russia supports. "If Ukraine were to join NATO, it would serve as a direct threat to the security of Russia," Putin said in televised remarks on Monday, during which he described Ukraine as a "springboard" for a NATO strike against Russia. NATO has dismissed Putin's sense of encirclement, given Russia's massive size that extends to the Pacific Ocean. However, the vast majority of the Russian population lives on the country's European side. JD Bindenagel, a former deputy US ambassador to Germany, told DW that he believes NATO's mistake was not so much the actual enlargement, but with not taking seriously the Russian view that it had been betrayed. "We never engaged with it; we thought this was a ridiculous narrative. And so we would say, 'no that didn't happen,'" he said.

#### Russian policy aims to keep the squo -- even if they’re revanchist they’re not revisionist

Zachary Paikin, 20 (11/10/20; Researcher in the EU Foreign Policy unit at CEPS, PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent; “When Revanchism Does not Equate to Revisionism: Taking Stock of the New U.S.-Russian Great Power Rivalry” Ponars Eurasia <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/when-revanchism-does-not-equate-to-revisionism-taking-stock-of-the-new-u-s-russian-great-power-rivalry/)//> LASA LVL

Nonetheless, although the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis represents a breaking point in Russia-West relations that has inaugurated a period characterized most often by zero-sum hostility, this does not imply that Russian foreign policy has suddenly adopted a distinctly revisionist character. Moscow’s behavior may have grown more assertive in recent years, but Russia’s overall aim of restoring its national power and obtaining recognition of its rights as a great power has not changed. Revanchism does not necessarily equate to revisionism. Spoiler (or even revisionist) tactics employed to achieve status quo aims are not the same as a revisionist strategy. While Moscow may be unhappy with a post-Cold War outcome that has “sidelined its security interests,” the “Western-centric system of liberal democracies” never succeeded in entrenching itself as a fully legitimate and universally accepted global order. Moscow’s attentiveness to European normative pronouncements may have waned as its declared “pivot to the east” has accelerated in the years since the Ukraine crisis. However, Russia still maintains that the EEU is designed to complement the EU through a potential future integration of equals. Nor is Moscow’s deepening strategic partnership with Beijing necessarily a sign of a revisionist global strategy. While Russia and China have been pushed closer together by their respective deteriorating relations with the United States, the process of normalization of ties between them dates to the late Cold War period. It is in Moscow’s interest to pursue good relations with a country with which it shares a lengthy border, just as it is natural for Russia to seek to avoid isolation in the strategic triangle composed of itself, China, and the United States. The assumption until now has been, at the very least, that the rules-based international order—marked by a universal commitment to multilateralism and the proliferation of robust international institutions—is synonymous with the contemporary world order. Yet the growing consensus that global multilateralism is in crisis demonstrates that a plethora of divergent ideas about how to organize the world continue to co-exist. This should encourage Western countries to rethink their policies toward Russia and revisit some of their ingrained beliefs regarding the nature of the contemporary order.

# AFF Answers

## Solvency---Russia

### Solvency---Say No---2AC

#### US action alone is insufficient – Russia requires the removal of ALL NATO commitments to eastern Europe

Roth ’21 [Andrew, 12-17-2021, "Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato>, smarx, AZM]

Russia has put forward a highly contentious list of security guarantees it says it wants the west to agree to in order to lower tensions in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, including many elements that have already been ruled out.

The demands include a ban on Ukraine entering Nato and a limit to the deployment of troops and weapons to Nato’s eastern flank, in effect returning Nato forces to where they were stationed in 1997, before an eastward expansion.

The eight-point draft treaty was released by Russia’s foreign ministry as its forces massed within striking distance of Ukraine’s borders. Moscow said ignoring its interests would lead to a “military response” similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Vladimir Putin has demanded that the west provide Russia “legal guarantees” of its security. But the Kremlin’s aggressive proposals are likely to be rejected in western capitals as an attempt to formalise a new Russian sphere of influence over eastern Europe.

The demands, spelled out by Moscow in full for the first time, were handed over to the US this week. They include a demand that Nato remove any troops or weapons deployed to countries that entered the alliance after 1997, which would include much of eastern Europe, including Poland, the former Soviet countries of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Balkan countries.

Russia has also demanded that Nato rule out further expansion, including the accession of Ukraine into the alliance, and that it does not hold drills without previous agreement from Russia in Ukraine, eastern Europe, in Caucasus countries such as Georgia or in Central Asia.

Those proposals are likely to be viewed extremely negatively by Nato countries, in particular Poland and the Baltic states. They have warned that Russia is attempting to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region and view the document as proof Moscow is seeking to limit their sovereignty.

A senior US official said on Friday that the Kremlin knows that some parts of its proposals were “unacceptable”.

### Solvency---Say No---1AR

#### Can’t solve – Putin wants complete disarmament at the border

Kirby ’22 [Paul; 5-9-2022; "Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>, smarx, AZM]

Ahead of the war, he demanded that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and reverse its eastward expansion, removing its forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance from 1997 and not deploying "strike weapons near Russia's borders". That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

In President Putin's eyes, the West promised back in 1990 that Nato would expand "not an inch to the east", but did so anyway.

#### Russia’s demands can’t be met – NATO says no

Rosenberg ’21 [Steve; 12-17-2021; "Russia Ukraine: Moscow lists demands for defusing Ukraine tensions," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59696450>, smarx, AZM]

In the proposals Russia sets out a series of radical demands, which require countries that joined Nato after the fall of the Soviet Union not to deploy troops or weapons in areas where they could be seen as a threat to Russia. Heavy bombers and warships would not be allowed in areas outside their national airspace or waters from which they could launch an attack.

That would mean Nato not playing any role at all in any of the three Baltic republics or Poland. And Nato would have to abandon any plans for Ukraine and Georgia to eventually join the Western alliance.

Russia asks for the impossible

Diplomacy is the art of the possible. Well it was… until now.

It's virtually impossible to imagine the US and Nato signing the draft documents Russian diplomats have drawn up, without considerable changes.

Russia demanding a veto on who joins the Alliance. A non-starter. Nato has said many times before that Moscow can have no say over who gets to be a member.

### Solvency---Ukraine---Russia Cheats---2AC

#### Good faith negotiations with Russia are impossible---Putin uses peace talks as opportunities to regroup Russian forces.

Steven Erlanger 22, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017, 3/29/2022, “Peace Talks May be Little More than Russian Tactics, Analysts say,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks.html>, RH

BRUSSELS — As envoys made progress in peace talks on Tuesday, Russia offered concessions that signaled a more realistic course for the war in Ukraine, while indicating it is also in no hurry to end the conflict, according to diplomats and analysts.

Russia’s deputy defense minister, Aleksandr Fomin, presented the decision to “sharply reduce” military activity around the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, and the northern city of Chernihiv as a gesture “to increase mutual trust for future negotiations.”

“De-escalation is a euphemism for retreat,” said Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of War Studies at King’s College London. “Russia is adjusting its goals to reality, because war is quite empirical,” he said. “It’s not a ruse to say that they are concentrating on the Donbas, because in reality that’s all they can do.”

Some analysts say such an agreement would, at minimum, have to give Russia control of Mariupol, the besieged port city in Ukraine that is still somehow holding out, to create a secure land route between two areas that Russia occupies: Crimea to the west, and the Donbas to the east. And it would also, they say, have to cede control over the two administrative regions in the Donbas, Luhansk and Donetsk, which Mr. Putin has already declared to be independent republics.

Nor will Mr. Putin easily end the war, Mr. Heisbourg said. If he takes the area east of the Dnieper, “that may be enough for now, but he will rebuild his army and continue.”

For both sides, said Robin Niblett, the director of Chatham House, the London research institution, “the negotiations are not serious, in the sense that negotiations now for both sides are a continuation of the war, not a solution.” Russia can concentrate on the east, and Ukraine will find it hard to move from its agile defense to serious counterattacks, he said. “And Putin hasn’t forgotten about Kyiv.”

Even if Mr. Putin can control and “settle” for another partition of Ukraine in the east, “Ukraine has to sign up for it, and if not, I don’t think we lift the sanctions,” Mr. Niblett said.

His colleague, Mathieu Boulègue, a French scholar who studies the Russian military, agrees that Russia is not negotiating in good faith, but “testing the waters and applying for time, to regroup and re-equip militarily and make more gains on the ground.”

The Russian military appears to have taken control of what might be called Phase 2 of a botched operation, he said, which should have been Phase 1. Taking Mariupol, the land bridge and the Donbas “would have been the grown-up military plan.” Modern warfare is half information warfare, Mr. Boulègue said, “and success is what you make of it,” especially in a repressive media environment as in Russia now.

The Russian forces’ inability to capture cities and keep territory is apparent after a month, he said, “so strategic goals have had to change.”

But to completely withdraw from Kyiv would allow the Ukrainians to reinforce the Donbas region and give them a significant victory, suggested Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, a defense research institution in Virginia, [in a tweet.](https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1508795729728487427)

Traveling in Morocco, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken also cast doubt on Russia’s pledge to reduce hostilities. “There is what Russia says and there’s what Russia does,” he said on Tuesday. “We’re focused on the latter. And what Russia is doing is the continued brutalization of Ukraine and its people and that continues as we speak.”

Russia did not stop fighting after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but actively supported the separatists in the Donbas, said Ian Bond, a former British diplomat in Russia and the head of foreign policy for the Center for European Reform. “I’m a skeptic about the Russians giving up on the war,” he said. “We’ve seen this movie before in 2014 and 2015. I view this as only a pause.”

Ian Garner, a historian of Russian propaganda, [pointed out on Twitter](https://twitter.com/irgarner/status/1508823205011730442) that “Putin’s Russia — indeed, post-Soviet Russia — has been engaged in mucky, endless conflicts for years,” citing Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia and the Donbas, all areas in other countries where Russian forces back separatist movements. “Not ended, maybe,” he said, but “in the intermission.”

Ukrainian and Western officials also suggested that Russia would be willing for a demilitarized Ukraine to join the European Union, so long as it forswore joining NATO or hosting any foreign forces.

But security analysts questioned the sincerity of such an agreement.

Mr. Bond said that the problem with Ukraine’s notion of neutrality is that so far none of the countries it wants to guarantee it would agree to do so. It would be like NATO membership with collective defense by another name, so highly unlikely, he said.

As for European Union membership, Mr. Niblett said, that would represent the largest danger to Mr. Putin, who helped stimulate the 2014 revolt in Ukraine when he forced the then-president, Viktor Yanukovych, to renege on a trade agreement with the bloc. If Ukraine joined now, Mr. Niblett said, the country would develop economically even faster, in contrast to Russia, “and you would end up with a South Korea next to a North Korea, and I can’t see Putin accepting that.”

Even more, he said, the European Union treaties contain a collective defense promise as well.

### Solvency---AT: Relations---2AC

#### US-Russian relations are impossible – political principles, power ambitions, and long-standing conflicts prevent an effective relationship

Goldgeier ’21 [James; 04/06/21; Goldgeier, professor of International Relations at American University, doctorate in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, "U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-04-06/us-russian-relations-will-only-get-worse> //smarx, AZG]

It is hard to imagine that U.S.-Russian relations could get much worse, but sadly, they are unlikely to get better anytime soon. Over the past two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined his country’s interests in ways that are incompatible with the interests of the United States and its European allies. The latter believe that democracy, the rule of law, and the provision of security to eastern European countries enhance stability; Putin, meanwhile, considers the spread of democracy to be a threat to his regime and believes that having vulnerable neighbors enhances Russian security.

Any sustained improvement of relations between the United States and Russia beyond progress on arms control (such as the recent extension of the New START treaty) would require one of two concessions: either the United States shelves its foundational support for democracy and formally recognizes a Russian-privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union or the Russian president decides his interests are not threatened by greater democracy in the region or by having fully sovereign neighbors. Neither is likely to materialize in the near future. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden, who has made support for democracy at home and abroad the centerpiece of his presidency, signals that the United States will not cease to champion traditional democratic values in Europe for at least the next four years. Meanwhile, as long as Putin remains in power, Moscow’s policy will continue to be marked by a fear of democracy and of the full sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors.

THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

U.S. decision-makers approached the post–Cold War world with a clear lesson from the American experience in the twentieth century. Like many others, they drew a link between U.S. disengagement from Europe after World War I and the onset of World War II just two decades later. They also saw the United States’ decision to remain in Europe in the face of potential Soviet aggression after the end of World War II as having saved Western Europe from a communist fate. For U.S. officials, then, continued American dominance over European security through NATO was necessary to keep the peace in the uncertain times following the Cold War. The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia exacerbated those fears, feeding the narrative that without the United States, nationalism was waiting to be unleashed and conflict could erupt anywhere in the region.

But the United States also sought to reassure first the Soviets and then the Russians that the West would not take advantage of the end of Moscow’s domination of eastern Europe to undermine the former superpower’s security. When U.S. President Bill Clinton informed Russian President Boris Yeltsin in September 1994 of plans to move forward with NATO enlargement, he said, “I don’t want you to believe that I wake up every morning thinking only about how to make the Warsaw Pact countries a part of NATO—that’s not the way I look at it. What I do think about is how to use NATO expansion to advance the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration—a goal I know you share.”

That quote succinctly summarizes the differences between the United States and Russia during the Yeltsin presidency. For the United States, NATO was the right instrument to achieve European stability and security because it enabled the United States to remain in charge. The U.S. president argued as much and sought to prove that he was not trying to harm Russia by exploiting the Warsaw Pact’s collapse. But American leadership was precisely what made NATO the wrong instrument from Russia’s perspective. Yeltsin, although he might have agreed with Clinton’s objective of fostering European unity, did not share his American counterpart’s belief that NATO was the best means to achieve it—nor did any other top Russian official. Under the U.S. leadership of NATO, junior partnership would have been the best available option for Russia. But given Russian opposition to such an arrangement, it was ultimately left out of the Europe that the United States sought to build through the alliance.

Yeltsin had staked his political fortunes on bringing his country into the West. Since his domestic political battle with Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning months of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had sought to win favor by being more pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-market than the Soviet leader. He was too weak to oppose American policies, so he took what he could get—not just financial assistance from the United States, its allies, and international financial institutions but also symbols that he was being treated like an equal. These included the NATO-Russia Founding Act—which established a partnership between the West and Russia as invitations to join the alliance were extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—and Russian participation in the G-7 group of advanced industrialized democracies, creating the G-8.

By the end of the 1990s, it seemed that for all the challenges in relations between the United States and Russia (most notably over NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia on behalf of the Kosovars), the United States and Europe had managed to overcome Cold War divisions and stave off the worst of nationalism in Europe. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic was no longer able to unleash terror in the western Balkans; the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO and others were soon to follow; the European Union was moving forward with its own expansion across Europe; and Russia still seemed oriented toward the West. In November 1999, Clinton visited his alma mater, Georgetown University, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was, in a sense, the valedictory of his effort to build on President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a Europe “whole and free.” Clinton reminded his audience that he had set out to “do for the Eastern half of Europe what we helped to do for the Western half after World War II.” As for Russia, he argued, its “transformation has just begun. It is incomplete. It is awkward. Sometimes it is not pretty, but we have a profound stake in its success.”

Clinton also declared, “Now we are at the height of our power and prosperity.” He meant it as a confirmation that the United States was capable of shaping global affairs to its liking. After all, he had made the notion of the United States as the “indispensable nation” a hallmark of his presidency. Unfortunately, the belief that the United States was at the height of its power and prosperity turned out to be a prophecy, as others, including Russia, gained more power, and the United States’ ability to dominate those countries declined dramatically.

RUSSIA’S RETURN

Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia. He believed that the West was working to impose its vision of world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” Putin declared. “As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.”

Putin was not suggesting that he wanted to re-create the USSR. But rather than seek to integrate Russia into the West as his anti-Soviet predecessor had done—which inevitably meant relegating Russia to the role of junior partner to the United States—Putin sought to build an independent great power, one that could engage with the West on its own terms and dominate its immediate neighborhood. Early in Putin’s presidency, his policies were not necessarily antagonistic but sought to free Russia from Western, and especially American, interference.

From an American perspective, NATO enlargement, the 1999 Kosovo war, the 2002 unilateral American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), the 2003 Iraq war, and support for the 2003–5 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine were discrete policies. U.S. officials saw themselves not as harming Russian interests but rather as fostering democracy and the rule of law across central and eastern Europe, protecting the Kosovars from Milosevic’s brutal regime, creating the ability to defend the United States and its allies from Iran’s ballistic missile threat, eliminating the possibility that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction, and supporting reformers trying to build democracy in fragile states.

Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia.

The Russian perspective starkly differed. Officials in Moscow watched the United States not only keep its Cold War alliance but expand it, incorporating territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. When NATO went to war against Serbia in 1999, it did so over Russian objections and without going through the UN Security Council—where Russia’s status as a permanent member would have allowed it to veto the action. A mere four years later, NATO went to war against Iraq, again without Security Council authorization and again brushing aside Russian (as well as French and German) opposition. Many in Moscow viewed the United States’ departure from the ABM Treaty as degrading Russia’s nuclear deterrent (particularly after the George W. Bush administration announced its plans to build a missile defense system with interceptors and a radar to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively). And for Putin, the “color revolutions” were not evidence of civil society flourishing but rather confirmation that the United States was pursuing regime change in Europe, including in Russia. For Moscow, then, the same events that, from the American perspective, were discrete policies having little to do with Russia built a narrative of a United States seeking to impose its will and principles on others to the detriment of Russian interests.

In 2007, Putin went to the annual Munich Security Conference and gave a speech venting his opposition to U.S. actions on these grounds. He complained about American unilateralism: “One single center of power. One single center of force. One single center of decision-making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign.” He argued that “the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with modernization of the alliance,” declaring, “We have the right to ask, ‘Against whom is this expansion directed?’”

And always, there was Ukraine, which Putin told President George W. Bush in 2008 was “not even a country.” Yeltsin a decade earlier had warned Clinton that he could not accept Ukraine’s membership in NATO and sought a private agreement that the United States would not pursue it. By February 2008, U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns was telling his superiors in Washington, “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).” He warned that Russian officials would view offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a step toward NATO membership—to Ukraine (and Georgia) at the upcoming NATO summit as “throwing down the strategic gauntlet.”

French and German opposition to offering Ukraine and Georgia MAPs took the idea off the table, but the compromise forged within the alliance led to a NATO summit declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” By going to war with Georgia in 2008 and invading Ukraine in 2014, Putin confirmed what Burns had warned against: Putin would not tolerate the crossing of certain redlines perceived as too threatening to Russia’s interests.

Putin sought to build an independent great power, one that could engage with the West on its own terms.

The conflicts over Ukraine and Georgia reflected the United States’ and Russia’s divergent definitions of their interests during the George W. Bush and Putin years. As Clinton argued to Yeltsin in 1994, the United States believed expanding Western institutions would offer much-needed stability and security to eastern European countries. Meanwhile, Russia was protecting what it viewed as its privileged sphere of influence from Western norms, rules, and institutions. The West believed sovereign countries could make their own choices about their future, which, in turn, was viewed in Moscow as undermining Russian interests and, potentially, even its regime.

There appeared to be a brief respite from these conflicts with the “reset,” a policy undertaken by President Barack Obama with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (who was keeping the presidential seat warm while Vladimir Putin held the post of prime minister). The reset was a transactional approach to policy, with each side recognizing the other’s core interests. Obama made clear he would not promote Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO and abandoned the missile defense plan launched by the Bush administration in favor of a different missile defense deployment more clearly designed to combat Iran. Meanwhile, Russia agreed to support stiffer sanctions on Iran to induce Tehran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most important, Moscow allowed the United States to create a new corridor to resupply Afghanistan through Russian-controlled airspace, which meant that the United States was no longer completely reliant on Pakistan. The two countries also agreed that it was in their mutual interest to forge a new arms control agreement, the New START treaty, which would further reduce their number of strategic nuclear weapons and provide verification measures to uphold it.

Alas, the reset ended. Although the Russians abstained during the Security Council’s vote authorizing NATO to launch airstrikes against Libya in 2011 to protect the population of Benghazi, Putin fumed when the operation precipitated the overthrow and death of President Muammar al-Qaddafi. Later that year, protests erupted in Russia around the parliamentary elections, and Putin interpreted then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s statements as egging on his opponents. In 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks of National Security Agency documents, followed by his receiving asylum in Russia, grabbed headlines. The relationship truly came undone when Putin annexed Crimea and started a civil war in eastern Ukraine the following year. Large countries invading their smaller neighbors, particularly in Europe, had been part of a bygone era and shocked Europeans who had come to believe that the creation and expansion of the European Union had definitively made war on the continent a thing of the past. In response, the United States and its allies slapped sanctions on Russia. It seemed the relationship could not get much worse.

DOOMED TO FAIL

Any attempt by Donald Trump to improve the relationship was doomed from the start. Having been compromised by Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, Trump could not afford to be seen as doing Putin’s bidding, especially in a number of key areas. Congress, meanwhile, was not only unwilling to lift sanctions on Russia but added to them after the Russian interference was exposed. U.S. officials throughout the government—political appointees and career officials alike—remained committed to continuing the United States’ policy of providing reassurance to NATO’s eastern neighbors and reinforcing deterrence in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including stepped-up air and sea patrols in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions as well as enhanced military exercises and rotations of military deployments. Beyond exacerbating existing political polarization in the United States, Putin achieved very little by interfering in U.S. domestic politics. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy made clear that Russia was now, along with China, a “strategic competitor.” And with the urging of his then National Security Adviser John Bolton, Trump pulled out of the three-decade-old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty over the long-standing complaint of Russian violations.

Although his predecessor had refused to commit to extending the New START treaty, Biden agreed with the Russians on a five-year extension shortly after he entered office. Addressing the dangers of nuclear weapons is the one area in which the interests of the two sides allow for greater cooperation. Arms control emerged as a staple of the relationship in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, focusing first on limiting nuclear testing and later on capping the numbers of missiles and warheads. It is the one issue that creates the optic of two superpowers, thereby giving Russia its cherished status as an equal to the United States. And it is in the interests of both sides to limit nuclear weapons and provide verification measures to prevent breaches.

A BLEAK FUTURE

In 1993, Clinton decided to back Yeltsin as the best hope for a U.S.-Russian partnership. Eight years later, George W. Bush looked Putin in the eye and came away believing he had peered into the Russian president’s soul. Obama took office in 2009 seeking a reset of U.S.-Russian relations with his first-term counterpart, Medvedev. Eight years later, Trump began his presidency under the cloud of Russian interference in the U.S. election but seeming to believe whatever Putin told him.

In each case, early high hopes for the U.S.-Russian relationship soon gave way to bitter realities. The 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia created the worst conflict between the two powers during the Clinton-Yeltsin years. In 2008, the Russian-Georgian war left in tatters a relationship that had foundered since the 2003 U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq. Early in Obama’s second term, Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, leading the West to impose sanctions and bolster its military presence in eastern Europe. And regardless of Trump’s strange affinity for Putin, U.S.-Russian relations continued to deteriorate during his term.

As Biden begins his presidency, one aspect of U.S.-Russian relations is over: the high hopes for what an incoming U.S. president can achieve. The SolarWinds hack, Russian election interference, the conflict in Ukraine, and the poisoning and arrest of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny are just some of the issues that will hinder any return to a more positive U.S.-Russian relationship. But ever since Putin first became president more than 20 years ago, the bigger issue has been the clashing ambitions that U.S. and Russian leaders have for the world and especially for Europe. Although it is possible that Trump would have bowed to Putin’s vision in a second term, Moscow’s and Washington’s conflicting visions will be on full display in the Biden years.

Better relations with another country are never an end in themselves but rather a means to promote national interests, and for the moment, the United States and Russia define theirs very differently. Beyond exploring new arms control agreements to limit strategic nuclear weapons, the bilateral agenda for U.S.-Russian relations is likely to remain pretty thin for the foreseeable future.

### Solvency---AT: Arms Control---2AC

#### The US has no chance at successful arms control negotiations with Russia---they want to hold onto their nukes post-Ukraine.

Steven Pifer 22, former US ambassador to Ukraine and non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Initiative, 5/23/2022, “The Russia-Ukraine War: A Setback for Arms Control,” <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/russia-ukraine-war-setback-arms-control>, RH

The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight. The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows. One casualty: U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

Then, on February 24, 2022, the Russia launched its brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. Washington wound down “business as usual” and suspended the strategic stability dialogue.

Resumption of those discussions almost certainly will have to wait until an end to the war, and likely for some time after that. Arms control skeptics will seize on Russia’s attack to intensify their opposition to any attempt to negotiate with Moscow.

If U.S.-Russian discussions resume at some point, the delay will have an impact. Persuading Moscow to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would bring in a host of complex questions, would have been difficult in any case. Now, however, the sides would have little time to conclude a treaty, let alone for the Senate to discuss ratification, before the U.S. political season cranks up in 2024.

Setting aside the time factor, the Russia-Ukraine war almost certainly will make it harder to persuade Russian negotiators to put non-strategic nuclear weapons on the table. The Russian military attaches great importance to such weapons, seeing them as one means to make up for U.S. and NATO conventional force advantages (to say nothing about China).

Given the abysmal performance by its military against a smaller and out-gunned foe, the Russian General Staff is likely to regard its non-strategic nuclear arsenal as more necessary than ever.

Of particular note, the Russian military has devoted significant efforts in recent years to adding to its arsenal precision-guided conventional weapons, including long-range strike systems such as the Kalibr cruise missile. They demonstrated some of those weapons in Syria.

This will make it harder to get non-strategic nuclear weapons in the negotiation. At a minimum, the price that Russian negotiators will demand, such as limits on missile defense, will increase.

The Biden administration thus has no chance to get an ambitious agreement in its first term. As for a second term, who knows what the American electorate will decide in November 2024?

Arms control offers a useful national security tool that can put guardrails on the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship. As Washington and Moscow find themselves at the most contentious point in their relations since the early 1980s and perhaps since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, keeping such guardrails in place is more important than ever. Unfortunately, the Russia-Ukraine war will make doing that more difficult than ever.

### Solvency---AT: Arms Control---1AR

#### Russia and the US empirically can’t cooperate over arms control

Reuters ’19 [01/31/19; "US, Russia Nuclear Treaty Talks Fail," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-russia-nuclear-treaty-talks-fail/4766558.html> //smarx, AZG]

MOSCOW/BEIJING —

Russia and the United States failed to bridge their differences over a landmark Cold War-era arms treaty at last-ditch talks in Beijing, Russia’s deputy foreign minister was quoted as saying by Russian news agencies Thursday.

The impasse sets the stage for the United States to begin pulling out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) as early as Saturday unless Moscow moves to destroy a missile Washington says is violating the accord.

Moscow has refused to destroy the Novator 9M729 missile, insisting it is fully compliant with the treaty.

“Unfortunately, there is no progress,” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted as saying by the RIA news agency.

“As far as we understand, the next step is coming, the next phase begins, namely the phase of the United States stopping its obligations under the INF, which will evidently happen this coming weekend,” Ryabkov was quoted as saying.

Ryabkov met U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson in Beijing on the sidelines of a meeting of the P5 nuclear powers.

Thompson confirmed to Reuters that the U.S. government will likely announce the suspension of its obligations under the INF with Russia soon.

“The Russians still aren't in acknowledgment that they are in violation of the treaty,” she said in an interview.

Thompson added, however, that “diplomacy is never done” and she anticipated more discussions.

### Solvency---AT: Treaty Violations---2NC

#### Treaty violations are reciprocal but the US has failed to attempt negotiation – caused the breakdown of European security

Pifer 20 [Steven, 11-19-2020, nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. "The looming US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/19/the-looming-us-withdrawal-from-the-open-skies-treaty/>] EZAY

The Trump administration’s antipathy toward arms control will strike again on November 22, when the United States withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty. That is a mistake. While Russia has violated the treaty, the United States has reciprocated. NATO allies support the treaty — which focuses first and foremost on enhancing European security — and wish the United States to remain a party.

Whether the treaty can continue following the American departure remains to be seen and will depend on what Russia does. When it takes office, the Biden administration should consider reentering the agreement, though that may require some creative international lawyering.

THE TREATY

The Open Skies Treaty, which entered into force in 2002, permits countries to fly unarmed aircraft with cameras and other sensors over the territory of the treaty’s other 34 members states. Based on an idea advanced by Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, Open Skies provides for the collection of imagery of military installations and activities in order to foster transparency.

Each party to the treaty has two annual quotas: the number of flights it may conduct over other treaty-parties (active quota), and the number of overflights that it must accept (passive quota). Aircraft are inspected before conducting an Open Skies flight, and personnel from the country to be overflown are on board during the flight.

The treaty offers several advantages. While the capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance satellites are superior to those of Open Skies aircraft, all 34 treaty-parties have access to imagery from the flights (whereas satellite imagery is highly classified). The treaty gives U.S. allies and partners, who lack sophisticated imagery satellites, the opportunity to gather confidence-building data. Moreover, aircraft offer greater flexibility than satellites in flight plans and can fly under cloud cover. Open Skies flights can also be used to send political signals: After Russia instigated the conflict in Donbas in 2014, for instance, the United States targeted flights at eastern Ukraine and the bordering Russian territory in order to send a message of U.S. support for Kyiv.

By 2019, the 34 parties had conducted a total of more than 1,500 overflights. During the treaty’s first 15 years of operation, the United States conducted 196 flights over Russia and Belarus (the two are paired for treaty purposes), while Russia conducted 71 flights over the United States.

Unfortunately, Russia has violated the treaty by imposing restrictions on certain flights over its territory. In response, the United States imposed reciprocal restrictions on Russian flights over U.S. territory. While the Russian violations are problematic, Washington has not declared that they constitute a material breach — that is, a violation that vitiates the central purpose of the treaty. Nevertheless, on May 21, Secretary of State Pompeo released a statement saying that, unless Moscow returned to full compliance, Washington would leave the treaty in six months’ time. The U.S. government provided formal notification of its intention to withdraw to the other treaty parties the following day; hence, the U.S. withdrawal will take effect on November 22.

A SERIAL KILLER OF ARMS CONTROL?

By all appearances, the Trump administration sees little value in arms control and nonproliferation arrangements. In 2018, President Trump decided to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Iran can produce the fissile material for a nuclear bomb in a much shorter time today than three years ago. Meanwhile, the United States stands isolated, with close allies such as Britain, France, and Germany staying in the agreement and ignoring Washington’s requests to apply sanctions on Tehran.

In 2019, the Trump administration withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an agreement signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that banned an entire class of missiles. Russia had violated the agreement by deploying a prohibited missile, but President Trump’s team showed no interest in preserving the treaty, eschewing military and political measures that could have pressured Moscow to return to compliance.

In 2020, administration officials reportedly considered conducting an underground nuclear test. That would violate a long-standing test moratorium observed by the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would prohibit all nuclear tests, has not entered into force). A U.S. nuclear test would open the door to tests by others, eroding the nuclear knowledge advantage the United States enjoys from having conducted more tests than the rest of the world combined.

Happily, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) appears safe. True, the Trump administration could in its final days give notice of an intention to withdraw, but the intention could only be carried out three months later. President-elect Biden supports New START and supports its extension; he would revoke any such notice.

However, Open Skies looks to be the outgoing Trump administration’s next — and last — victim.

WHAT NEXT FOR OPEN SKIES?

The Open Skies Treaty focused on strengthening confidence and security in Europe, one reason why the Trump administration should have given the views of its allies greater weight. A major question now turns on what Moscow will do, given that the U.S. departure will mean that Russia can conduct flights over European territory and Canada but not the United States.

If Moscow decides to withdraw from Open Skies, perhaps citing the treaty’s decreased value because it can no longer overfly American territory, the treaty will collapse. NATO allies will see little point in overflying other allies or partners such as Sweden and Finland. Alternatively, Moscow could decide to remain in the treaty, at least for a time, in part to score propaganda points over the U.S. withdrawal.

### Solvency---AT: Terror---2AC

#### **US-Russia cooperation can’t solve terrorism in the Middle East – differing tactics and barriers make them incompatible**

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Foolish as it would be to argue that U.S. and Russian interests never align, the United States in its broader battle with terrorism cannot cooperate meaningfully with Moscow. On a practical level, there are difficulties in sharing intelligence even with trusted allies, much less in a relationship rife with mistrust, as U.S.-Russia ties now are. More importantly, the argument that Moscow and Washington are fighting a common enemy because both face threats from militant Islamists is misleading: A close look at the battles each is waging reveals that Russia and the U.S. are fighting either different groups or the same groups but for different reasons and using very different approaches. Today Russia is America's adversary and its actions, particularly attempts to fracture NATO, do not align with larger U.S. security goals. Calling Moscow a “partner” in the counterterror fight would hand it a huge PR victory—note that the Putin-Trump call was made public by the Kremlin—and a giant fig leaf to cover up its efforts to undermine the U.S. on the global stage.

Obstacles to Cooperation

Sharing intelligence with foreign countries is easier said than done. Practical difficulties include concerns about revealing sources and methods, as well as strict regulations involving access to information with varying levels of classification. Clearing these hurdles is even more difficult in a political climate where U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts are all but frozen and the U.S. intelligence community believes (PDF) Russia to have waged “an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election,” with several official investigations underway.

Syria ostensibly would be the place to start on counterterrorism cooperation, but Russia has proven to be an unreliable partner on matters less sensitive than intelligence sharing. Earlier this year, the U.S.-led coalition said Russian military officials had rejected a coalition request for permission to strike Islamic State targets near a strategically important garrison at al-Tanf, which is used by U.S. troops. The Pentagon has repeatedly complained of dangerous maneuvers by Russian fighter jets, most recently in December. And U.N. investigators say there is strong evidence suggesting that the Russian-brokered 2013 deal to rid Syria of its chemical weapons did not work, while Moscow has blocked related investigations from continuing. There are also reports that “the Kremlin's diplomatic coordination with the United States is much less intense” under the Trump administration than under Barack Obama's.

It also remains unclear exactly what Russia could provide to the United States of value in terms of intelligence or military capabilities. The U.S. is doing a better job battling Islamic State than Russia is. In areas where Russian-backed forces operate, IS fighters regularly manage to move freely, especially around the middle Euphrates River valley, according to U.S. officials. Moreover, despite Putin's declaration of “victory” in December, Russia's main military facilities in Syria were attacked in January—first with mortars killing two servicemen and then with a dozen armed drones, possibly from territory covered by a Moscow-brokered cease-fire—demonstrating the Russian forces' vulnerability. Overall, despite Moscow's growing influence in the Middle East, the region is still not one where Russia has more knowledge or sway than Washington.

The 'Common Enemy' Fallacy

The primary reason U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation is even under discussion is because of the idea that the two countries are fighting a common enemy—jihadist groups in general, and Islamic State in particular. In reality, Moscow's and Washington's respective wars on terror differ significantly in motives, aims, targets, tactics and strategies, and even who the enemy is, which further dims any prospects for cooperation.

In Syria, for example, the U.S. wants to defeat the Islamic State because it is an engine of international terrorism, while Russia fights the group mainly because it is an enemy of President Bashar al-Assad—whose regime Moscow has saved from collapse. Meanwhile, Russian special forces and warplanes serve as a force multiplier for Hezbollah, a recognized terror group. Differences like these explain in large part why U.S.-Russian cooperation in Syria has been limited to “deconfliction” and avoiding accidents, while the two sides' definitions of the terrorist threat continue to diverge.

Another key difference in the two countries' threat perceptions is that Moscow has long had to fight Islamist terrorism in its backyard, while the U.S. has been doing battle in distant lands. In the mid- to late-1990s, myriad anti-Russian rebel groups, primarily from the traditionally Muslim North Caucasus region, adopted religious ideologies instead of secular separatist aspirations—a shift attributed by many scholars to the growing influence of foreign fighters from the Middle East and Central Asia. Since then, Islamic militants have launched many high-profile attacks on Russian soil far beyond the battlefields of the Caucasus. These have included targeted destruction of transportation infrastructure and meticulously planned operations specifically designed to kill civilians and spread terror throughout the population, such as the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004. The U.S. has suffered far fewer attacks by jihadists on its home turf and has been fighting largely to keep them away from its shores and to help protect allies in Europe. This difference, too, calls for different approaches to counterterrorism: Expeditionary counterterrorism requires a significant deployment of military force, while domestic counterterrorism can rely more on local and federal police and an array of intelligence agencies.

The U.S. and Russia also differ markedly in their approaches to fighting terrorism and it is hard to imagine how these could be made compatible. Roughly put, the U.S. aims to espouse a comprehensive approach that tries to win hearts and minds by finding out about communities' grievances and factoring in socioeconomic development; Russia does not explicitly try to do this, relying instead on heavy-handed methods, many of which the U.S. military could not easily get away with and in fact condemns.

These have included indiscriminate bombing; forced disappearances whose victims got no legal representation, were held incommunicado and were sometimes never heard from again; and collective punishment, including the targeting of suspected insurgents' families, friends and neighbors. Russia's focus has been largely kinetic, as the military has relied on a decapitation strategy to eliminate successive high-ranking insurgent military commanders over the years. This approach has been quite effective in the short term, but also may be myopic, trading (PDF) longer-term stability for short-lived security: Insurgents' social, political and economic grievances have largely been ignored, practically ensuring that future generations of militants will pick up the mantle of jihad. In Chechnya, for example, anti-Moscow militants have been all but wiped out under a ruthless, Moscow-backed strongman, but the insurgency has shifted to neighboring Dagestan. Indeed, thousands (PDF) of Russian fighters have gone to wage jihad in Syria and Iraq and experts are just beginning to assess the threats they will pose in years to come.

In an ideal world Russia and the U.S. would be able to cooperate against jihadist organizations, jointly developing counterterrorist best practices, but for all the reasons listed above this is not realistic at present.

## Revisionism

### Yes Revisionism---2AC

#### Putin’s policy reflects revisionist goals.

Grigoryan, 22 (Armen Grigoryan, co-founder and vice president of the Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies, 5/23/22, New Eastern Europe - A bimonthly news magazine dedicated to Central and Eastern European affairs, "The war in Ukraine and historical revisionism," <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/05/23/the-war-in-ukraine-and-historical-revisionism/> /alundy)

On April 16th, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law imposing fines of up to 15 days in jail for equating the USSR and Nazi Germany’s goals and actions during the Second World War. This law also covers denial of the USSR’s “humanitarian mission during the liberation of European countries”. This is the logical extension of a law adopted in July, which prohibited these aforementioned actions but did not mention punitive measures. Before this, in 2014, public statements containing “false information” about the USSR’s wartime actions or Soviet veterans were criminalised. An amendment to the country’s criminal code imposed large fines or up to five years imprisonment.

Such legal amendments are yet another phase in the ongoing consecration of Soviet victory in the “Great Patriotic War”. The victory is now the principal element in Russia’s memory politics, with corresponding ideology used to legitimise militarism and great power ambitions. These recent developments are not just another step towards the country’s revival of Soviet propaganda narratives. They are also intertwined with the Russian aggression in Ukraine and some of the most tragic events of the ongoing war. These changes once again demonstrate what can happen when governments attempt to deny historical crimes through the use of ideology.

At the same time, this is not very surprising. This became especially clear to me after receiving a Visegrad Scholarship to study some of the roots of current Russian policy at the Central European University and Open Society Archives (OSA) in Budapest.

The OSA collection comprises communist propaganda materials from the Stalin era to the 1980s, the findings of Ray J. Madden’s US Congress committee on the Katyń massacre, Polish samizdat and émigré press, a number of western publications, Soviet publications from the late 1980s, and other materials. Overall, ƒ. Moscow originally denied responsibility for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its consequences, such as the partition of Poland, the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Katyń massacre. The state would only formally admit its guilt in the Gorbachev era.

A new national myth

However, a revival of some Soviet narratives began a few years later under the pretext of fighting against the “falsification of history”. In May 2009, Moscow established the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests. The then head of the president’s staff, Sergei Naryshkin, was appointed chairman of the commission. Since 2016, Naryshkin has been the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. He recently made international headlines following an infamous session of Russia’s Security Council on February 21st. During this meeting, he proposed the recognition of the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” and was ridiculed by Putin.

Soon after the commission’s creation, historian Boris Sokolov predicted rather accurately that its activities would result in efforts to suppress information about the Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states, as well as other crimes committed by the Soviet regime. He also highlighted the existence of an official Soviet foreign ministry memorandum published in 1948. This document was released in response to the publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocols in the US and was titled “Falsifiers of History”. The memorandum, which would provide the basis for Soviet propaganda over the next few decades, denied the existence of the secret protocols and stated that Moscow’s pre-war attempts to form a collective security framework had been undermined by Great Britain and France. As a result, the USSR was compelled to accept the pact in order to win more time to better prepare for an unavoidable war with Germany.

It has also been noted that a gradual return to a Stalinist interpretation of history began, at least in education, right at the start of Putin’s rule. History textbooks published in Russia in the 1990s admitted that the USSR’s territorial gains in 1939-40 happened against the will of the peoples of the Baltic states and Eastern Poland (most of the authors avoided the term “annexation”, likely because it would imply similarities between Stalin and Hitler’s interests and methods). By 2003, however, any mention of the secret protocols was removed from new textbooks. Since 2007, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has been explained in favourable terms, while Stalin has become revered as an “effective manager”.

Soon after the formation of the “falsification of history” commission, the head of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Institute of Military History, Sergei Kovalev, published an article on the ministry’s website. This asserted that Poland had been responsible for beginning the Second World War, as it had declined “justified” German demands. Meanwhile, the USSR needed a non-aggression pact with Germany and had deployed troops in the Baltic states in order to improve border security. The article was deleted from the website the next day and it was explained that it just represented Kovalev’s personal opinion. However, arguments in favour of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and assertions about Poland’s responsibility for the beginning of the war would be repeated later – at a much higher level.

One significant example of the outcomes produced by the commission is a book published in 2011 by State Duma member Vladimir Medinsky, who would later continue developing the state’s new ideology as minister of culture. In The War: The Myths of the USSR, 1939-1945, Medinsky justified the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact using familiar Soviet arguments. He denied that the USSR was responsible for the Katyń massacre, and so forth. Medinsky implied that the European Union was to blame for statements that Stalin had been responsible for the beginning of war, along with Hitler. A rather characteristic favourable review of Medinsky’s book stated that “Almost everything that liberal journalists write about nowadays was invented long ago by Dr. Goebbels.”

Perhaps most significantly, the change of rhetoric could be observed in Putin’s statements. While during a visit to Poland in 2009 he had denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as “collusion to solve one’s problems at others’ expense”, in 2015 he defended it at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, all the while blaming western nations. This falls in line with the old Soviet argument about Great Britain and France’s unwillingness to support a collective security framework. Later on, Putin increasingly appeared obsessed with keeping the Soviet version of history intact. At a Commonwealth of Independent States summit in December 2019, he lectured his counterparts on the causes and events of the Second World War. He made numerous allusions to Soviet propaganda, including speculation on the “Munich Betrayal” in an attempt to exonerate the USSR and put the blame on Great Britain, France and Poland. The extent of Putin’s argument led to a reply from Warsaw’s foreign ministry, which highlighted the Soviet Union’s invasion, occupation, deportations and mass killings. This document also proposed relaunching the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Issues that had operated in the 1990s. Another statement on the issue was later made by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.

In June 2020, Putin expanded on his historical argument in a lengthy article in The National Interest. Among other issues, the piece implied that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the USSR’s actions had been justified, as the “Munich Betrayal” had meant that the West would deal with security issues without taking Soviet interests into account. He also claimed that the USSR entered the war only when it had been attacked by Germany and praised the Red Army’s “liberation mission in Europe”. The Russian leader also defended the post-war division of Europe by referring, even though indirectly, to the Yalta Conference agreements. Most absurdly, the Russian embassy in Berlin [sent](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-baffles-german-historians-with-request-they-supplement-lectures-with-an-article-by-putin/30690752.html) a translation of the revisionist article to a number of German professors, asking them to make use of the work in their lectures.

### Yes Revisionism---1AR

#### Putin’s propaganda is grounded in revisionist tendencies, revising the past.

Mendel, 22 (Iuliia Mendel journalist, ex-press-secretary to the President of Ukraine, and communication consultant, 2-20-22, Putin – the Crude Revisionist who Ignores Lessons of History," KyivPost, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/putin-the-crude-revisionist-who-ignores-lessons-of-history.html> /alundy)

Vladimir Putin wants not only to seize new territories, but to own history. History often falls victim to autocracies and dictatorships. Reshaped historical narratives become compelling explanations of all-powerful leaders and serve their propaganda as one of the instruments to preserve and increase their political weight.

No wonder that Russian President Vladimir Putin comes up with absurdly manipulated historical facts to push his geopolitical policies. But it is more than just lies or manipulation. It is a well-grounded philosophy that not only revises the past, but also becomes his instrument to reshape the present.

Isn’t that what Putin does when he plays the “independent republics” card, with which the post-Soviet space that emerged 30 years ago is generously dotted by his bloody will: South Ossetia in Georgia, Moscow-created Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics in Ukraine and the breakaway Transnistria republic in Moldova – God knows how many more such black holes the Kremlin leadership can create with the help of mercenaries and propaganda.

Putin is offended by the collapse of the Soviet Union. His love for that bygone era is actively cultivated in Russia even 30 years after its implosion. Putin manipulates the notion of democracy by comparing artificially created pseudo-states with the real ones that constituted the USSR. He may indeed not see the difference between Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia and the conjured formations of LPR, DPR, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria. In this way, Putin suspends the understanding of freedom as a hostage to his biggest political intrigue – the confrontation between the West and Russia.

According to this primitive formula, if the U.S. once divided the USSR into some 15 republics, why can’t Russia today break those republics into smaller ones?

Having amassed nearly 200,000 troops with weapons and military equipment around Ukraine’s southeastern borders, Putin refuses to directly talk with the political leadership in Kyiv. Literally, he ignores any attempt at dialogue and sends messages through European interlocutors. This seems to be his response to the Ukrainian leadership’s unwillingness to negotiate with the Russian installed puppets whose Moscow-armed formations have been fighting in Ukraine’s two easternmost regions of Luhansk and Donets for nearly eight years.

The parallels are blustering, but quite possible for a man offended by the historical collapse of the state he seems to consider his homeland, the USSR, and who is already personally expressing doubts about Ukraine’s sovereignty. “I am convinced that Ukraine’s true sovereignty is possible precisely in partnership with Russia,” Putin wrote in a diatribe in July 2021.

Putin acts as if he really sees no difference between the sovereign state of Ukraine and the quasi-republics that are under his own military control. It is as if the Russian leader is trying to teach the world a lesson by creating imitations and empty simulacra on copies of real historical facts.

Putin’s version of history distorts understandable values to help manage his own country. If you don’t know how to create, then ”protect” and take away. Russia’s hybrid or covert invasions of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and Georgia’s Abkhazia, and Moldova’s Transnistria province under the guise of “protection” was done against phantom enemies he conjured.

Isn’t this what happened to the Soviet Union? While the West was recovering from World War II, building democracy and competitive market economies, the USSR was building tanks to defend itself and intimidating its own people with U.S. aggression. A Ukrainian diplomat who survived Stalin’s death as a child recounted how his entire family stayed awake, gazing up into the night sky. “We waited that every second we could see American missiles that were going to destroy us,” he recalled vividly for the rest of his life.

The Soviet Union, in fact, was built on falsehoods, lies, and unrealistic, artificial ideals. Putin is deliberately repeating this failed scheme and therefore risks his empire falling just as loudly.

#### Russia is revisionist --- it is transparent in its intentions to regain power and overthrow the international hierarchy

Pisciotta, 20 (Barbara Pisciotta, 8-9-2019, Associate professor Roma Tre University, Russian revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, <https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/A243776484894C350A663D1AE7DF6621/S0048840219000182a.pdf/russian-revisionism-in-the-putin-era-an-overview-of-post-communist-military-interventions-in-georgia-ukraine-and-syria.pdf> /alundy)

On the assumptions that changing the status quo is the basic aim of a revisionist strategy (Buzan, 2008) and that acceptance of the risks involved in the use of force is a key factor in distinguishing the different forms of revisionism (Schweller, 2015), this study puts forward a new typology of revisionism. The six types identified are based on three dimensions: the means employed (peaceful/violent), the nature of the objectives (territory/norms/power), and the level of action (regional/global). The introduction of a new typology of revisionism can also stimulate further research on the possible change of goals, means, and level of action of the potential claims of the revisionist powers that have economic and military capabilities to act both regionally and globally to change the status quo (see the case of Russia, China and, according to some scholars, the United States). Further research insights can be derived from the application of normative revisionism to the various empirical cases (see the Arab countries and the developing). Our empirical analysis, in particular, confirms the importance of the level of action as a new element with respect to previous typologies and makes it possible not only to demonstrate the central part played by the military option in Russian strategy inside and outside the post-Soviet space but also and above all to confirm the escalation of the revisionist objectives pursued both at the regional level with the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and at the global level with the intervention in Syria. The respectively nationalist (Georgia and Ukraine) and radical (Syria) nature of the interventions emerges in relation both to the means and the level of action of these interventions, and to the objectives. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia obtained the control and/or annexation of territories like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, strengthened its position with respect to neighbouring countries, and impeded the expansion of NATO and the EU. In Syria it obtained control of the port of Tartus, ended the American monopoly in the war on terrorism by asserting itself as a strong party to the peace negotiations, challenged American interests in the Middle East by strengthening the Assad regime, and clearly manifested its determination to halt the decline that set in after 1989. The dual nature of Russia’s objectives – both territorial (annexation and/or control over certain areas) and political (improvement of power and prestige at the regional and global levels) – characterized the country’s revisionist strategy as a whole from August 2008 to March 2016, confirming the importance of the gradual increase in military expenditure and the reforms of the SAP in pursuit of the same. If the spectre of the ‘end of history’ that hovered over the ashes of communism was swept away by Putin at the end of the 1990s and the impact that his long period in power has had on domestic and regional balances is unquestionable, what is instead still in need of discussion is the effect that his plan of radical revisionism has had on the configuration of the international system as a 102 Barbara Pisciotta Published online by Cambridge University Press whole. As matters now stand, any talk of American decline at the military level is misleading and empirically incorrect. It is, however, necessary to take the readiness to use military force as our starting point if we are to understand the nature and the consequences of Russian revisionism at the global level. A power in a position of hegemony cannot in fact hesitate to use all of the diplomatic, economic, and military means at its disposal in order to preserve its status and prevent any destabilizing threats from calling it into question. The USA has made systematic use of force since 1989 to preserve its spheres of influence all over the world and eliminate threats (from figures like Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Qaddafi) to the stability of the liberal world order on which its indisputable supremacy rested. Where it intervened militarily, with or without a resolution of the UN Security Council, it told the rest of the world that it was the only actor authorized – or rather self-authorized – to intervene in defence, at least formally, of human rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Russia’s revisionism is the child of this strategy. In order to alter the status quo in its favour, Putin has operated on at both the regional and the global levels to oppose American expansion in the post-Soviet space and its version of humanitarian intervention all over the world, not hesitating to use force in order to challenge the United States openly and bend the international rules to Russia’s advantage. At the regional level, Georgia and Ukraine have been blocked. Their entry into the EU and NATO will not be possible without Russian consent or the risk of a frontal clash with Moscow. At the global level, the effects of Russia’s strategy will have to be assessed in the medium and long terms. Russia has now revealed its intentions and explicitly threatened the US monopoly in Syria both in words and in deeds. It is clearly not enough for Russia to alter the hierarchy of power. It wants to obtain acknowledgement of its prestige as a great power in both diplomatic and military terms. In other words, Russia wants to play a decision-making part once again in the management of world affairs. It also wants a less centralized system offering the opportunity to regain important margins of power.

### Yes Revisionism---Hybrid War---1AR

#### Revisionism is uniquely proven in hybrid warfare.

Sargeant, 21 (Madison Sargeant, research assistant at Project on the Political Economy of Security, 2/3/2021, Small Wars Journal, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Historical Revisionism and ‘Twiplomacy’”, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russias-hybrid-war-ukraine-historical-revisionism-and-twiplomacy> /alundy)

The rise of digital diplomacy has provided state actors new venues to promote their national interests. Twitter specifically has emerged as a “megaphone and substantive communications medium”[1] for heads of state, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scholars. The Russian Federation has exploited the growing importance of social media platforms to diplomacy in order to seek legitimization and normalization of its 2014 annexation of Crimea, which is recognized almost universally as Ukrainian territory.[2] Despite a robust digital campaign, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe Crimea is Russian territory has actually decreased since 2014. Furthermore, Russia’s social media activity has not strengthened its claim to Crimea, but it does provide insight into how the state uses emerging technologies below the threshold of war to meet strategic objectives.

Background

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine found itself in possession of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Encouraged by both the United States and Russia, Ukraine forewent the arsenal for international security guarantees protecting its independence and territorial sovereignty, as outlined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.[3] In 2014, Russia breached these security guarantees by invading and annexing the Crimean Peninsula after the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Revolution of Dignity (known internationally as the Euromaidan Revolution). The annexation was swiftly condemned,[4] with world leaders pointing to international law as the foundation of their argument against a perceived act of aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded that the security guarantees made in the early 1990s were only valid with the pre-revolution Ukrainian government, insinuating that the post-Euromaidan government was leading a “new”[5] state, and that the Russian military had an obligation to protect ethnic Russians from the “nationalist junta”[6] in Kyiv. With most of the international community rejecting these justifications, Russia launched a revisionist information campaign to legitimize occupation of the peninsula.

Increased use of social media has led to a proliferation of historical revisionism and reframing of current events, though the Kremlin is not a rookie when it comes to contorting the narrative around its behavior. For example, Moscow has long attempted to erase the Red Army’s mass murder of nearly 22,000 Polish soldiers in 1943 in Katyn, Russia by focusing conversations on the destruction of the Belorussian village, Khatyn, by occupying Nazi forces.[7] It wasn’t until 1990 that the Soviets admitted the Red Army was “responsible for the murders,”[8] despite Kremlin-sponsored social media accounts, such as the Russian Mission to the EU account (@RusMission\_EU) denying this fact as recently as May 2020.[9] Russia utilizes internet trolls,[10] bots,[11] and state-affiliated social media accounts to shape narratives by targeting naïve social media users who either inadvertently perpetuate falsehoods or rely on an extreme form of confirmation bias[12] in which they only receive and re-share content they agree with.

Russia’s Digital Activity

In recent years, Russia has honed its social media tactics alongside a contingency of its other information warfare practices. Russia’s information warfare against Ukraine was described in 2014 by U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove as the “most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg.”[13] Social media plays a significant role in the Russian information warfare strategy as it provides “cheap, efficient, and highly effective access”[14] to audiences while maintaining plausible deniability for the Kremlin. The conditions of the social media environment—sense of anonymity, reach, and speed—provide unique challenges to combating information campaigns on such platforms. Social media platforms allow trolls and bots to congregate with real individuals that can be separated into three categories: (1) “useful idiots,” who unknowingly give credibility to Russian propaganda and objectives; (2) “fellow travelers,” who are Russian and Kremlin sympathizers, and; (3) “agent provocateurs,” who are actively being manipulated by the Russian government.[15] Collectively, these individuals and accounts provide ample ground for the Kremlin to engage in narrative-shaping and other disinformation campaigns.

Twitter and other social media present opportunities to the Russian government to export its historical and political narratives to both foreign governments and private citizens in every corner of the world. Those not privy to Ukrainian-Russian relations, international law, or the underlying forces of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity may be more susceptible to Russian propaganda that “Crimea is Russia” and that Russia invaded to “protect Crimea” from the “nationalist junta” that is the post-Euromaidan government.[16] These individuals may promote these views, providing attention to Russia’s stance, further legitimizing and normalizing it. Furthermore, such attention confirms the biases of pro-Russia activists who seek validation of their views online.[17] Political pundits may also accidentally or purposefully contribute to this bias. A November 2019 clip[18] of American political commentator Tucker Carlson asking, “Why shouldn’t I root for Russia? And I am,” regarding the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine went viral and was largely met with condemnation from a variety of Twitter users. Carlson in this instance was a “useful idiot,”[19] and the confidence his comment might provide to pro-Russia activists, while difficult to quantify, should be considered.

#### Russia has only become more bold --- especially in hybrid warfare

Reznikov, 20 (Oleksii Reznikov, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories. 7-8-2020, "Containing the Kremlin: Why the West must rethink policy towards a revisionist Russia," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/containing-the-kremlin-why-the-west-must-rethink-policy-towards-a-revisionist-russia/> /alundy)

Nor is Russia likely to stop there. Spreading instability is a central tenet of Vladimir Putin’s hybrid warfare doctrine, and there is every reason to believe this includes creating greater turbulence in Europe. The Russian president has recently called the borders of all the former Soviet republics into question, [claiming](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcNEb9VZvzw&feature=youtu.be) that numerous unspecified republics left the USSR while in possession of “historically Russian lands.” This thinly veiled threat is not limited to Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan. It also applies to the three Baltic nations, which are all EU and NATO member states.

Putin underlined his ominously imperial thinking towards the Baltic states in a June 2020 [article](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982) for The National Interest that allowed the Russian ruler to share his profoundly unapologetic view of Soviet conduct during WWII. He described the 1940 invasion and annexation of the Baltic states as “the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia,” before going on go claim, “their accession to the USSR was implemented on a contractual basis, with the consent of the elected authorities.” Comments of this nature expose the grim reality of Putin’s revisionist worldview, regardless of the wishful thinking that many of Ukraine’s partners would prefer to believe.

This raises a number of important questions. To what degree is the West aware of the challenge it faces? Does the West recognize that spreading turbulence closer to the heart of Europe is part and parcel of Russia’s strategy? Should Europe help to create a fault line that runs from the Baltic States to the Black Sea? This is no metaphor, nor is it an exaggeration.

The experience of recent years should already have been sufficient to convince Western leaders that appeasement is not an effective way to address the security challenges presented by Putin’s Russia. Failure to confront the Kremlin in Crimea in early 2014 has only encouraged greater Russian boldness. Moscow has expanded its military presence everywhere from Syria to Libya, while at the same time broadening the scope of its hybrid war operations throughout North America, the European Union and beyond.

With examples of Russian aggression increasing in the international arena, the Western world must decide where to draw the line. Ukraine faces no such dilemmas – the country is committed to defending every inch of its territory, even if that means doing so alone. Western leaders can either commit to helping Ukraine defend itself, or face the consequences on their own territory in the near future.

At present, the Western world seems unsure of how best to contain a resurgent and revisionist Russia. As the front line nation in the current confrontation, Ukraine is the most obvious focus for containment strategies. In practical terms, this means revisiting the Minsk Process and adapting the framework of the current dialogue to reflect geopolitical realities. Now is not the time to cling dogmatically to existing arrangements. On the contrary, creative approaches are required in order to safeguard global security and prevent further European destabilization.

As well as supporting a pragmatic approach to implementation of the Minsk Agreements, Western leaders should also revisit the role and functions of the international security institutions involved in the Ukraine peace process. For example, the OSCE has never deployed peacekeepers on a large scale to neutralize a conflict. The time may now be ripe for such a move. We are fully aware of the gravity of the challenge, but a successful outcome would be significant for the entire continent. This would require real leadership and could be a special task for Sweden, which will chair the OSCE in 2021.

If the usual coalitions do not work, we in Ukraine should think about creating new ones and attracting new allies.

The search for new models across various international platforms should be coupled with expanded bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and all countries invested in restoring peace in Europe and preserving it for the wider world. Ukraine has recently progressed to the next stage in its relations with NATO. We are ready to affirm Ukraine’s new Enhanced Opportunity Partner [status](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/nato-upgrades-ukraine/) in collective as well as bilateral security models. This could mean recognizing Ukraine as a Major Non-NATO Ally, for example.

The deteriorating international security climate since 2014 is testament to the failure of the present policies towards a revisionist Russia. There is evidently a need to identify and implement new models that can ensure peace and contain the Kremlin. The most pragmatic approach to this challenge lies in greater support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity via the modification of the failing Minsk Process. Further delays will only lead to additional costs.

### Yes Revisionism---Ukraine---1AR

#### Ukraine uniquely proves --- Russia bases their rhetoric in historical revisionism to justify invasion.

Serhan, 22 (Yasmeen Serhan is a staff writer at The Atlantic, 2-27-22, Who Is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/putin-russia-ukraine-revisionist-history/622936/> /alundy)

Putin is not the only world leader who has harkened back to an ahistorical past to justify his decisions in the present. Right-wing nationalists [around the world](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/11/history-patriotism-right-wing-politics/) have sought to portray themselves as the primary defenders of a glorious past that their enemies would seek to deny or forget. By [whitewashing uncomfortable legacies](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/30/the-kremlin-is-trying-to-whitewash-russias-stalinist-past-a67096) and seeking to cultivate a politics of [historic grievance](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/), Putin has attempted the same. But in his justification for the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s ahistoricism has bordered on delusion. Whether the Russian people or the rest of the world share in it, for now, appears to be immaterial: If there’s one audience this revisionist history is designed for, it’s Putin himself.

The evolution of Putin’s historical revisionism can be seen throughout his public statements over the years. In 2005, he famously [described](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057) the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Two years later, Putin [bemoaned](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034) the aftermath of the Soviet era and the pernicious, unipolar world—one led not by Moscow, but by Washington—that it had created. Last year, in perhaps the clearest articulation of his worldview, Putin said that Ukrainians and Russians are “[one people—a single whole](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843).” On Monday, he took that sentiment even further, declaring Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” whose independence was a product not of self-determination (Ukrainians resoundingly voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a [1991 referendum](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/25-years-independence-the-ukrainian-referendum)), but rather “a mistake.”

Unlike his [2014 address](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l10BsQzOGKM) announcing Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, which was largely framed as a moment of celebration, this was an angry speech—one ostensibly designed to make Russia’s people angry too, and to justify what was to come. “In territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile ‘anti-Russia’ is taking shape,” Putin said in another address ahead of the invasion. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation.”

It’s hard to know what Putin means by historical future (which is, on its face, an oxymoron), though we can take an educated guess. When Putin speaks of Russia today, he speaks of a country whose greatness is defined by its past—namely, its imperial history and its victory during World War II—which he believes must guide its present. “Putin weaponized history by giving it a function,” Orysia Lutsevych, the head of the Ukraine Forum at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told me. As far as the Russian president is concerned, “history is the fortune teller of the future.”

Such historical narratives can be compelling, especially when they elicit the kind of nostalgic nationalism that has proved potent elsewhere, including in the United States (where Donald Trump’s Republican Party has dubbed itself the defender of [“patriotic education”](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/trump-patriotic-education.html)), India (where Hindu nationalists have appealed to pride in India’s past to undermine its secular present), and Hungary (where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán often [invokes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/how-viktor-orban-turned-century-hungarian-history-into-secret-weapon/) the territories the country lost after the First World War). “Putin is not the only person who is old enough to have felt that sense of deep, personalized humiliation and shame that came with the loss of power of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War,” Keir Giles, the author of [​​Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West](https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780815735748), told me. “Anything that reasserts Russia as that great power with a greater status than others and the right to a global presence and global influence in others’ affairs will be popular in those sectors of the Russian population.”

Still, it’s difficult to gauge just how big that sector is or how pervasive the narrative has been among those who don’t share Putin’s semi-mythological view of history. A recent [CNN poll](https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/02/europe/russia-ukraine-crisis-poll-intl/), published the day before the start of Moscow’s military invasion of Ukraine, found that though roughly half of Russians support using military force to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, only 36 percent support doing so as a means of forcing a reunification of the two countries. The lack of support for the latter was most clearly evidenced by [anti-war protests](https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2022/02/photos-anti-war-protests-russia/622914/) that have broken out across Russian cities.

When I spoke with Denis Volkov, the director of the Moscow-based Levada Center, Russia’s last independent pollster, in early February, he told me that though the majority of Russians fear war, few would feel comfortable voicing opposition to it if it came due to fear of reprisals. Indeed, more than [1,700 arrests](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/we-dont-want-this-russians-react-to-the-ukraine-invasion?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Othe) have already been made. Besides, Volkov said, “public opinion will be no limit to the Russian government.”

Though Putin may feel obliged to justify his war of choice to the Russian people, who with Ukrainians will share the costs of a bloody and drawn-out conflict, his revisionist history is designed to appeal to no one more so than himself. By restoring Russia’s control over its former territories, Putin not only corrects what he sees as a historic wrong but also cements his place in Russian history as the leader who restored the country to its rightful status.

The irony is that in his quest to make Russia great again, he risks achieving just the opposite. Invading Ukraine has already resulted in [wide-ranging sanctions](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/sanctions-against-russia-at-a-glance-people-organisations-uk-us-eu) and has all but ensured Russia’s diplomatic isolation. Even Putin’s friends in Europe, such as [Orbán](https://twitter.com/zoltanspox/status/1497099482965721103?s=20&t=imIB8HpI9TF87fiiLNyf0g) and Czech President [Milos Zeman](https://www.reuters.com/business/czech-president-russia-should-be-cut-off-swift-2022-02-24/), have gone out of their way to reiterate their support for Ukraine and their commitment to a joint European Union stance.

“Putin’s views have become more and more extreme over time to the point where they are now more or less unrecognizable and have few points of contact with history as it’s understood in the outside world,” Giles said. “He’s operating in a different plane of reality and in a different century.”

#### Ukraine proves --- revisionism motivates invasion

Baibhawi, 22 (Riya Baibhawi, Senior news write at Republic World, 5/10/22, "US accuses Vladimir Putin of presenting 'revisionist history' in Victory Day speech," Republic World, <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/us-accuses-vladimir-putin-of-presenting-revisionist-history-in-victory-day-speech-articleshow.html> /alundy

White House has accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of presenting a version of revisionist history in his Victory Day speech. As Putin used the occasion of Soviet victory to defend his Special Military Operation on Ukraine, US Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that his words distorted facts. On Monday, the Russian Czar addressed his countrymen from Red Square in Moscow but refrained from announcing victory over Ukraine.

Following the same, Psaki said, “But what I will say is that what we saw President Putin do is give a version of revisionist history that took the form of disinformation that we have seen too commonly as the Russian playbook.”

“You know, our view is that we should remember — and this is why I did this at the top — what this day is actually about, which is something that we have all celebrated, which is the defeat of Nazis in — after World War Two, something that Russians have celebrated in the streets for many years," she added.

'Patently False'

In his speech, Putin blamed the West for triggering the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and said that NATO threatened the security of the Russian Federation. "Russia called on the West for an honest dialogue, to search for reasonable, compromise solutions, to take into account each other's interests. All in vain. The NATO countries did not want to hear us, which means that they had completely different plans. The danger grew every day. Russia gave a pre-emptive rebuff to aggression. It was a forced, timely, and the only right decision. The decision of a sovereign, strong, independent country," Putin said. However, Psaki said that his claim was “absurd” and “patently false.”

On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelsnkyy vowed to defeat Russia on Monday. He said, "Very soon there will be two Victory Days in Ukraine and someone will not have any." Marching on Khreschatyk Street in the country's capital Kyiv, he spoke about two victory days referring to triumph in world war II as well as Ukraine's victory in the ongoing war. The embattled leader said that his countrymen will win the war because they are fighting for their children. “We won then. We will win now. And Khreshchatyk will see the victory parade – the Victory of Ukraine!” he claimed.

### Yes Revisionism---Revanchist---1AR

#### Russian tendencies are revisionist and revanchist --- it threatens the entire LIO

Balachandran, 22 (Gopalan Balachandran, Co-director, Albert Hirshman Centre on Democracy, Professor of international history and politics, 3-7-22, ‘Revisionism, Revanchism, and the War in Ukraine’, Geneva Gradute Institute, <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/revisionism-revanchism-and-war-ukraine> / alundy)

This is a somber moment for all of us. The Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, like everyone else in this room, is committed to a just, democratic, inclusive, and rules-based international order. This order is now beset by fresh and dangerous uncertainties. In co-hosting [this event](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/town-hall-war-ukraine) we would like to underscore the importance of this commitment as we try to grapple with the dangerous uncertainties caused by Russia’s unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has been a revisionist power since the 1990s. Its invasion of Ukraine could be a signal that it is now embarked on a dangerously revanchist project. Time alone will tell how this revanchist tendency might unfold. A revanchist war in Ukraine risks being prolonged, it can also spread and escalate to threaten the entire world. I must underline this obvious point because the European dimension of the crisis has attracted attention. But in the last 250 years, Europe has been remarkably unsuccessful in containing conflicts in Europe to wars within Europe. So the whole world has a right to be concerned.

A ‘just, democratic, inclusive, and rules-based international order’ is not just a mouthful. It can be an oxymoron. A just, democratic, and inclusive international order has to be rules-based. It cannot be otherwise. But there is no reason, a priori, why a rules-based order should necessarily be just, democratic, or inclusive. The international order at any point in time is a constitutional settlement reflecting power relations at its moment of origin. It changes slowly, if at all, and often conditionally or contingently, as power equations change.

Revisionist projects, and resistance to them, are therefore the stuff of international relations, and intrinsic to the international order and its dynamics. Most such projects play by the rules. Brazil, Germany, India, and South Africa have been campaigning unsuccessfully for years to expand the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. They can lead to institutional innovations: after failing to reform the governance of multilateral financial institutions, China decided to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which is now backed by nearly 100 countries, among them five members of G7. The Bandung conference of 1955 was feared in the West as a move to set up a parallel, non-Western United Nations. But despite problems with the UN system, this remains unthinkable so long as we have hopes of reforming it.

## Competition

### Perm---AT: Cease---1AR

#### “Cease” means to stop for a short time or slow down.

Benjamin ’01 [Susan; March of 2001; Benjamin, expert on plain language "Attorneys: Cause or Cure?" Plain Language, <https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/plainenglish/pdfs/01_mar.pdf> //smarx, AZG]

This ownership can develop into an expertise envied by many, requested by all; or it can become a sort of linguistic rigor mortis. Case in point: in my plain-language training sessions, the term cease and desist invariably crops up in discussions about wordiness. Why not use cease or desist? Or how about stop? Because, comes the response, cease means stop for a short time, and desist means stop for good. Or cease means slow down and desist means stop. Or this prizewinner: cease means stop and desist means leave the room. This subjectivity, by the way, is not usually rooted in stubbornness or arrogance so much as in a belief that goes something like this: language is; therefore, it must be.